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Executive Summary 
 
The New Madrid seismic zone in the Central USA has experienced some of the strongest 
earthquake ground motions observed nationwide.  The historic series of three earthquakes 
during 1811 and 1812 shook this Midwest region with magnitudes around 8.  The 
earthquakes were extensively reported. However, limited damage occurred because of the 
area was sparsely populated.  A recurrence of the 1811 and 1812 earthquakes would 
cause widespread and severely impacts affecting over 45 million residents of the states 
surrounding the New Madrid seismic zone.  A repeat of these historical events would 
subject the major urban center of Memphis, Tennessee to intense ground shaking while 
other urban centers such as St. Louis, Missouri, would experience less intense shaking.  
This does not indicate that St. Louis is less vulnerable, however.  Though not undertaken 
in this report, subsequent work will include the examination of other hazard scenario 
within the region of interest.  These scenarios will represent seismic activity in the 
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone of M7.1 as well as near St. Louis, Missouri, of M6.0. 
 
Numerous infrastructure systems are affected by regional ground shaking and failure.  
Buildings, transportation and utility networks would be damaged in addition to 
potentially serious loss of human life and crippling business interruptions.   A new 
catastrophic planning effort is now underway in the Mid-America Earthquake (MAE) 
Center, in cooperation with the Institute of Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management of 
George Washington University, under the auspices of FEMA. The scope of the recently-
started project is to quantify to the highest level of reliability possible the impact of a 
repeat of the New Madrid earthquakes on all societal endeavors. The outcome is intended 
for use in articulating response and recovery plans in order to reduce the anticipated 
disruption. 
 
In this report, a preliminary analysis of 230 counties surrounding the New Madrid Fault 
is presented.  Several levels of analysis using HAZUS-MH MR2 are undertaken; Level I, 
Improved Level I and Level II analyses.  The HAZUS Level I analysis is the most basic 
and employs all default settings without any input from the user.  The Improved Level I 
analysis applies ground motion with considerations for local site affects while still 
applying the default inventory and infrastructure component fragilities.  The Level II 
analysis examines three parameters; liquefaction susceptibility, pipelines inventory and 
building fragilities.  These parameterized fragilities were developed by the MAE Center 
for Memphis, Tennessee and adjusted to fit the region of interest in this study.  
Liquefaction susceptibility uses the same ground motion employed in the Improved Level 
I analysis and determines site liquefaction probabilities and ground deformation values to 
provide a more accurate hazard characterization.  Pipeline data obtained from the 
Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP) Gold dataset for natural gas and oil 
pipelines are used in stead of the HAZUS pipeline assumption.  Lastly, improved fragility 
relationships are employed with no changes of the building inventory.  All three analysis 
sets (improved hazard, improved pipeline inventory and improved building fragilities) are 
compared to determine a range of impact values. The preliminary analyses are intended 
to (i) provide a baseline against more advanced analysis is compared, (ii) test the HAZUS 
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software for large region analysis and (iii) underline the importance of parameter 
variations and sensitivity analysis, as opposed to single analysis scenarios. 
 
The Level II analysis that employs liquefaction susceptibility results in the highest 
estimate of economic losses and social impacts. The building stock experiences 
significant collapse rates, especially unreinforced masonry buildings and mobile homes.  
Hospitals, fire and police stations near the source are likely to incur heavy damage that 
will result in severe impairment of their function.  Transportation and utility networks 
will be severely damaged thus hampering evacuation and the arrival of relief workers. 
The availability of potable water and electricity will reduced to a critical level.  Finally, 
social and economic impacts will be severe.  Human fatalities are likely to be between 
1,500 and 2,000, depending on the location of the source.  Furthermore regional losses 
can be expected to reach $43-$51 billion. The current Level II results are summarized in 
the table below. Based on the results of this study thus far, an earthquake on the 
southwest extension of the New Madrid fault system is likely to result in the most severe 
impact on the eight states in the Central and Eastern USA. 
 
Northeast Central Southwest
Fatalities 1,799 1,570 1,939
Buildings Losses $32.9 $28.7 $34.4
Transportation Losses $4.4 $4.4 $5.1
Utility Losses $11.6 $9.8 $11.0
Total Direct Economic Losses $48.9 $42.9 $50.5  
 
The MAE Center-George Washington University team is continuing with the refinement 
of the impact assessment of the 8 states under consideration. The improvements entail 
updated hazard characterization for several scenario earthquakes, significant 
improvement in the inventory, especially for utilities and emergency services, and 
improved fragilities. The enhanced analysis is likely to increase the calculated impact.  It 
is also noteworthy that the impact assessed in this project represents the ‘direct’ losses. 
Consequential or ‘indirect’ losses include business disruption, impact on the workforce in 
distant locations, loss of market share on the international scene due to manufacturing 
and transportation disruption and loss, effect on tourism and erosion of the tax base. The 
indirect losses may be significantly higher than the direct losses, perhaps as high as twice 
or three times the values in the table above. 
 
While this report investigates several hazard parameters and select inventory and fragility 
parameters there are still many areas were are not included.  Many inventory categories 
are not updated and rely on HAZUS-MH default data.  All regional buildings, including 
residential, commercial, industrial, essential facilities, transportation and utility facilities 
are not improved.  In addition many default fragilities, with the exception of general 
building stock fragilities, are not improved.  These categories include all transportation 
facilities and networks and all utility facilities and networks.  Also regional demographics 
remain at the HAZUS-MH default level, which correspond to the most recent 2000 
census.  Fire, debris and social loss models are not updated or improved as well.   
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Definition of Loss Assessment 
 Loss assessment is the process by which the ramifications of a certain event are 
studied and consequential losses of various types are determined.  One of the most 
common forms of loss assessment is the investigation of natural hazards and their impact 
on regional infrastructure.  One of the most devastating natural hazards are earthquakes, 
the subject of the current report and project. In this context, seismic loss assessment is the 
determination of the impact of one or more earthquakes on the regional assets and 
societal systems of the area affect by the event(s). 
 Seismic loss assessment, or earthquake risk or impact assessment, requires 
addressing three primary and inter-related components; hazard, vulnerability and asset 
value (Scawthorn, 2006).  Hazard parameters define the earthquake by specifying various 
quantities that characterize the severity of ground motion including ground acceleration, 
velocities, displacement or their spectral value counterpart.  Asset value assessment 
requires the description of asset location, type and consequence of damage, which may be 
economical and/or functional.  Inventory data sets catalogues all the buildings, bridges, 
roads, utility and lifeline facilities, dams, levees, power plants, population, etc. that lie 
within a region of interest.  The sensitivity of the assets (inventory) to the hazard they are 
exposed to is characterized by fragility or vulnerability relationships.  These fragilities 
assign a level of damage to each inventory item based on the hazard value experienced by 
that inventory item.  Once a damage state is assigned to an asset, a loss value is 
associated with the inventory item.  Subsequently all inventory losses are aggregated for 
a single regional loss or consequence value.   
 
1.2 Necessity for Loss (Impact) Assessment 
 Loss assessment results provide a critical link between the occurrence of a hazard 
event, an earthquake in this case, and resources that are available in the aftermath of the 
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hazard event.  Linking pre- and post-hazard circumstances permits regional risk 
mitigation as well as response and recovery planning.  Moreover, response and recovery 
planning may be viewed as an intricate combination of hazard-generate and response-
generated demands (Harrald et al., 2007).  Therefore, the relationship between response 
to the hazard even is intrinsically coupled with the impact of the event and cannot be 
decoupled or dealt with prior to impact assessment. Conducting seismic impact 
assessment identifies vulnerable infrastructure components, areas that are most 
susceptible to significant damage and loss as well as the lingering social impacts that may 
hinder the recovery of a region in the aftermath of an earthquake.  By determining such 
quantities as the number of uninhabitable homes, functionality of hospitals and various 
other emergency response facilities and utility service interruptions, a region may be 
protected  (Durham, 2006).  Loss assessment is an absolute pre-requisite to mitigation 
measures; action taken before an earthquake to reduce its expected impacts. 
 Furthermore, loss assessment describes the state of a given region immediately 
after a hazard event.  Understanding the damage, loss and needs of the studied region 
allows urban planners, government agencies and aid workers the opportunity to plan 
ahead (Harrald & Jefferson, 2006) for response and recovery.  Reliable assessment results 
allow time and define objectives for groups involved in response and recovery to work 
together, develop plans and prepare so that services and aid workers are readily available 
for respond to the needs of affected communities.  Therefore, loss assessment is an 
absolute pre-requisite to response and recovery planning. 
To summarize, quantitative and reliable earthquake loss (impact) assessment is a 
necessary input into action for mitigating the consequences of a future earthquake (e.g. 
by retrofitting or other impact reduction measures) as well as articulating response and 
recovery plans to respond to the mitigated consequences. 
 
1.3 Difficulties with Desktop Studies 
It is common for seismic loss assessments to be conducted in the form of desktop 
studies using semi-empirical models which consider regional hazard, fragility and 
inventory to determine damage and loss.  Several previous and even recent loss 
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assessments focus on expert opinions, taking into account of the experience from urban 
planners, government aid agencies and local authorities.  Recently loss assessments have 
shifted more towards computer-based methods that employ the results of sensor data, 
laboratory experimentation and field observations into account (Scawthorn, 2006, 
Elnashai, 2002 & 2004).   
 Seismic risk analyses produced with computer software often provide numerous 
default settings and values that permit a determination of loss, notwithstanding the 
regional applicability of these assumptions (FEMA-NIBS, Technical Manual, 2006).  
Completing a loss assessment without first considering the input data and analysis models, 
understanding their implications on damage and loss and relative accuracy of assessment 
results may lead to erroneous loss determinations.  Since regional mitigation efforts and 
response and recovery plans are based on seismic loss assessments, providing unrealistic 
impact estimates has the potential to do totally undermine the validity of mitigation, 
response and recovery plans.  Using non-representative data to prepare a region for a 
natural disaster may result in inadequate stockpiling of supplies, misplacing of the 
supplies or insufficiently retrofitting of structures, for example.  In loss and impact 
assessment, imprudence is worse than lack of action. 
 Even apparent understanding of regional hazard and complete inventories is not 
enough to have an appreciation of the inherent uncertainty in seismic loss assessment.  A 
seismically active region, such as the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) may be 
assigned a specific probable earthquake intensity at a specific location, though there is a 
measurable probability that an earthquake with magnitude different to the predicted value 
occurs at an unexpected location.  Moreover, the site conditions present in the region of 
interest are not available to a fine enough resolution to assign site-specific soil 
characteristics to every portion of the study region. Therefore, not only are the source and 
path characteristics uncertain, but also the surface motion.  
 Regional inventory provides another set of uncertainties.  Any given inventory 
category may not represent every facility and asset within a study region as gathering 
data all structures is a time-consuming and capital-intensive process.  Structure types for 
example may be incorrect or unassigned since it can be difficult to determine structure 
type during field surveys.  For seismic impact assessment it is critical to ascertain the 
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level of seismic design provisions present in each structure, which is often dependent on 
the year of construction and the building code employed during design.  All of these 
design and construction parameters are difficult to obtain for every structure and thus are 
frequently assumed on an individual or geographic region bases. Lifelines, such as roads, 
bridges, utility networks, pose even more formidable problems due to the dispersion of 
the data sets, their proprietary nature and the age of some networks that predates 
regulations aimed at keeping tight inventory lists.  
In summary, the sources of uncertainty in earthquake impact assessment are 
several and a full appreciation of their influence on the assessed consequences is required. 
Sources of uncertainty may be groups into: 
 
Hazard: Uncertainties on the fault mechanism, magnitude, location, fault 
dimension, travel path and surficial soil characteristics 
Inventory: Uncertainties about the asset counts, location and characteristics, 
such as physical parameters and condition. 
Fragility: Uncertainty about the response and damage state definition for the 
various types of assets that may or may not be designed to resist 
seismic actions. 
 
There are other parameters that influence the outcome of the loss assessment exercise, 
such as unit values, repair costs, relationship between limit state of damage and loss of 
value, and others. It is therefore of extreme importance to assess the impact of 
earthquakes by varying the parameters influencing the assessment, within defensible 
limits, and providing Range of Impact, with an appreciation of uncertainty. 
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2 Seismic Loss Assessment Background 
 
2.1 History of Loss Assessment 
 The early beginnings of earthquake causes and effects are in the 17th Century in 
the work of Robert Hooke and his lecture series, “Lectures and Discourses in 
Earthquakes and Subterranean Eruptions,” delivered to the Royal Society (Elnashai, 
2002).  His work and that of others, such as T. Young and R. Mallet provided the basis 
from which earthquake investigations and future seismic loss assessments sprung.   
 The work of three English engineers and their Japanese colleagues in the 
aftermath of the 1880, Yokohama earthquake prompted the formation of the 
Seismological Society of Japan.  The efforts of the Society included the study of 
earthquakes and the development of seismic design codes to reduce damage.  The first 
form of seismic design provisions, however; were developed by a group of Italian 
engineers in the wake of the devastating Messina, Italy, earthquake of 1908 (Scawthorn, 
2006).  These provisions specify the assignment of a portion of the weight of the structure 
as a horizontal earthquake force.  Recommendations included those of the Politecnic of 
Turin’s Professor M. Panetti who suggested that 1/12th the weight be applied to the first 
floor while second and third floors receive 1/8th of the weight (Elnashai, 2006).  Methods 
such as these are referred to as equivalent static approaches and are still used today in all 
seismic design codes. 
 Various other historical earthquakes played critical roles in the development of 
seismic risk knowledge including; the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, 1923 Tokyo 
(Kanto) earthquake, 1925 Santa Barbara earthquake and the 1933 Long Beach earthquake.  
The historic San Francisco earthquake exposed investigators to the vast damage caused 
by fires following an earthquake.  Sizeable portions of the San Francisco harbor area 
burned as broken water lines inhibited the amount and pressure of water delivered to 
burning areas.  The Santa Barbara earthquake sparked the interest of J.R. Freeman, an 
insurance professional, curious about the impact of earthquakes and their relation to 
insurance compensation (Di Sarno et al., 2006, Scawthorn, 2006).  With the insurance 
industry now apprised to the affects of earthquakes seismically active areas became 
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subject to modified rates resulting from increased risk levels.  Lastly, the Long Beach 
earthquake prompted California to adopt the Field and Riley Acts which mandate the use 
of seismic design for schools and other critical buildings (Scawthorn, 2006).  This is the 
beginning of essential facilities definition, as critical facilities are identified and their 
post-earthquake operation protected.   
 More recent earthquakes have tested roughly two centuries of earthquake 
knowledge, research and design provisions.  The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake (Jones et 
al., 1995), 1994 Northridge earthquake (Rodgers et al., 2006) and 1995 Kobe earthquake 
(Kim et al., 2002) served as reminders of how drastic urban damage can be.  Within the 
same time frame various companies and organizations developed numerous seismic loss 
assessment software packages including; EQEHAZARD and EQECAT developed by EQE, 
EPEDAT, Shakemaps, AIR, EXTREMUM and the derivative program QUAKELOSS, and 
HAZUS-MH developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  Risk 
Management Solutions, RMS, developed its own version of loss assessment software 
‘RiskLink’ for various hazards including earthquakes.  HAZUS-MH is the software 
package of choice in the research presented hereafter and is discussed at length in 
subsequent sections.  In comparison to various other scientific fields, earthquake analysis 
and seismic loss assessment are relatively new, though the strides made to advance this 
field in its short 150-200 year lifespan have provided substantial scientific and economic 
contributions.   
 
2.2 Previous Seismic Loss Assessment Studies 
 HAZUS-MH has been employed by various government agencies, private 
organizations, research groups and professional associations to undertake seismic loss 
assessment studies in various regions of the USA.  The Washington Military Department 
Emergency Management Division, in conjunction with the Earthquake Engineering 
Research Institute (EERI), conducted a loss assessment of a magnitude 6.7 earthquake on 
the Seattle Fault in 2005.  This scenario predicted roughly $35 billion in losses (EERI & 
Washington Military Dept., 2005).   
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The Hayward Fault in the San Francisco Bay Area was the focus of a seismic loss 
assessment in 1996.  Damage to local infrastructure and its impact on residents placed 
regional loss greater than 1% of the gross product of the area, or $1.8 billion.  In this  
report, however; upper limits to regional losses are set at as much as $4 billion, which 
may in fact be more realistic than the $1.8 billion expected initially (EERI, 1996), 
however.   
HAZUS-MH was also utilized for a Level III analysis for the state of South 
Carolina.  This analysis consisted for four separate hazard scenarios, though the 
earthquake of greatest magnitude, M 7.3, was meant to replicate the Charleston, South 
Carolina, earthquake of 1886.  The Level III analysis completed is the most improved 
analysis available in HAZUS-MH and incorporates advanced data and models in various 
aspects of regional loss modeling.  The above are just examples of loss assessments 
conducted in the USA, though numerous other national and international studies exist.   
Regional hazard for the above study was developed through an external stochastic 
model that combined point-source and finite-fault components.  Once the required input 
ground motion parameters were determined these values were modified with 
amplification factors to account for soil effects.  A significant feature in this study is the 
use of a 2x2 km grid for hazard definition (Wong et al., 2005).  HAZUS-MH default 
setting defined ground motion on a census tract basis. Since higher resolution of the 
ground motion was required, a finer grid was implemented.  Detailed studies were also 
performed within the context of the South Carolina loss assessment to evaluate surficial, 
deep soil deposits and ground water levels for more accurate mapping of soil condition 
and liquefaction susceptibility.  Additionally, land-sliding susceptibility was evaluated 
state-wide and included in the loss model.   
Building inventories were updated using the 2x2 km grid as well.  Seismic design 
levels and quality characteristics were improved. Essential facilities inventories were also 
improved.  Transportation and utility lifeline inventories were modified with the most up-
to-date information available at the time of the study.   
Numerous scenarios were analyzed and various sensitivity studies completed.  
Regional losses for a repeat of the 1886, Charleston earthquake were determined to be 
$20 billion with over $14 billion attributed to buildings damage alone (Wong et al., 2005).  
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This loss assessment also predicted 44,000 injuries and as many as 900 deaths.  Schools 
and fire stations were also highlighted as structures particularly susceptible to significant 
damage.  Wide-spread failure of the potable water distribution system was also predicted, 
depriving roughly 80% of urban households of potable water.  Numerous other damage 
and loss parameters are highlighted in the study though they are not discussed here.  This 
study serves as a guideline for others interested in completing seismic loss assessment 
studies with improved model parameters.   
 
2.3 Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Seismic Impact Assessment 
 
2.3.1 Participating Disciplines 
 Though seismic loss assessment began as a study in earthquakes and seismic 
design codes, the field has grown to include disciplines stretching from science and 
engineering to social sciences and urban planning.  This multi-disciplinary approach 
affords loss assessment teams the expertise required in all stages of regional loss 
modeling including hazard definition, infrastructure response, economic loss modeling 
and social impact.   
 Loss assessments require the definition of a hazard event which employs the 
talents and expertise of geophysicists and engineering seismologists.  Ground motion 
parameters based on fault locations and ruptures must be determined.  Additionally, site 
characterization values are required for more accurate loss assessments, and are provided 
by geotechnical engineers.  The determination of soil types and liquefaction 
susceptibilities are important features that are also provided by geotechnical engineers.   
 The determination of structural and non-structural fragility functions for buildings, 
bridges and numerous other infrastructure components is the task of engineers, primarily 
structural engineers.  These fragilities include the seismic response measure at which 
various damage states are reached.  These damage states may signify such levels as 
immediate building occupancy, life safety and collapse prevention.  Structural fragilities 
are often defined by peak ground acceleration (PGA), spectral acceleration or spectral 
displacement depending on the component.   
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 The development of inventory gathering technologies and procedures is 
completed by urban planners and GIS experts.  Without the proper regional inventory 
loss assessments are of little or no use, thus the cataloguing of accurate inventory items is 
critical to a reliable loss assessment.  The development of economic loss models also falls 
to social scientists.  Regional losses can not be determined without appropriate depictions 
of the regional economy.  Another significant contribution from social science is the 
modeling of impact on societal systems such as housing, education and healthcare. 
 Though not strictly applicable to loss assessment, response and recovery planners 
are one of the primary users of the impact studies.  The development of plans for post-
disaster aid is the responsibility of emergency managers and community coordinators.  
The creation and location of stockpiles of medical supplies, food, water, emergency 
shelter, temporary housing, etc. are all organized by response and recovery planners, in 
conjunction with various government and private aid agencies, and is based on the 
expected impact provided in a seismic loss assessment studies.  This diverse group of 
scientists, economists, social scientists, city planners and response and recovery workers 
function as one cohesive unit to develop comprehensive seismic risk management. 
 
2.3.2 Challenges in Seismic Loss Assessment 
 With all the benefits provided by seismic loss assessment these studies are still 
complex and challenging to undertake.  The most accurate loss assessment requires the 
most complete inventory data and hazard information as well as accurate infrastructure 
component and system fragilities, and their interaction, alongside realistic economic and 
social consequences models.  The collection of this data is a time-consuming and 
uncertain endeavor, requiring the cooperation of numerous individuals and agencies.  In 
addition, some data does not exist or does not exist in a usable form (e.g. paper-based) 
and there are only minimal funding opportunities available to develop comprehensive 
inventories.   
 Regional demographics are required to determine displaced populations, shelter 
requirements and various other social consequences.  Population statistics must include 
the overall populations as well as population breakdowns by age, gender, occupation, 
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income, ethnicity, school age children, and the numbers of people working, commuting 
and at-home are various times of the day.  This data is not readily available for all regions, 
nor is it updated in all cases.  The US national census is conducted every ten year and 
provides the required demographic information, though mid-term this data is out-of-date.   
 Hazard characterization is dependent upon site characteristics amongst other 
seismological, geological and geotechnical parameters.  Obtaining reliable site 
classification requires rather extensive field testing.  These field studies are time-
consuming and costly for large regions, and thus are not often commissioned.  
Liquefaction and land-sliding susceptibility data is acquired in the same manner 
indicating that the gathering of regional hazard data is a formidable challenge in its own 
right.  If highly refined site information exists it is often for region of limited 
geographical extent, such as a city or a county.  Furthermore, the method by which 
ground motion is defined is critical to the overall hazard definition process. Options 
include point-source and finite-fault models, and the method chosen will impact the 
evaluation of ground motion at various locations. Acquiring reliable data and choosing an 
appropriate hazard model are two of the primary challenges faced when defining regional 
hazard. 
 Region inventory may also reduce the accuracy of loss assessments.  Complete 
data sets detailing building, transportation network, utility network, hazardous materials 
facilities and high-potential loss facilities is required and often difficult to obtain.  The 
most accurate inventory incorporate all of these data items with point-wise data for 
individual facilities, though this level of inventory data refinement is also time-
consuming and costly to obtain.  Buildings alone require individual locations, structure 
type, seismic design level, number of stories, occupancy and use parameters, as well as 
contents information. When complete inventories for bridges, highways, railways, buses, 
ports, airports, potable and waste water systems, natural gas and oil systems and electric 
power and communication systems are added the data collection task, the enormity of the 
challenge in conducting reliable risk assessment becomes evident. 
 The probabilistic performance of infrastructure components during earthquakes is 
defined by fragility functions.  These fragility functions, or curves, are required for all 
inventory components, not just buildings and bridges where fragility functions are rather 
- 11 - 
abundant.  Other lifeline components including pipelines and utility distribution networks, 
roads and railway tracks, dams and levees, and several others are also needed.  Several of 
the required fragilities do not exist, and the loss modeling effort has to resort to empirical 
and expert-opinion-based approaches, thus reducing the reliability of the assessment 
outcome. 
 Finally, regionally appropriate social and economic consequence models are 
required to determine accurate impacts.  These models, which depend on measures of 
social vulnerability and regional macro-economics, may be difficult to determine 
depending on the area under investigation.  Regional social and economic impact 
modeling as well as hazard, inventory and fragilities all contribute to the challenges 
presented to those attempting to conduct detailed and reliable seismic loss assessments.     
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3 HAZUS Overview and Methodology 
3.1 Levels of Analysis  
 
 All of the loss assessment analyses completed in this research project are 
conducted with HAZUS-MH MR2 (2006), a software package developed and distributed 
by FEMA and the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS).  As previously 
discussed, HAZUS-MH uses three primary components to estimate damage and loss 
values; hazard, inventory and fragility.  The developers of HAZUS-MH have specified 
three levels of assessment based on the refinement and improvement of analysis 
components (See Figure 1).  The most basic of these is a Level I analysis, which relies on 
HAZUS-MH default values heavily.  In this case hazard must be defined by the user, 
whether it is an arbitrary point-source epicenter, historical event (for Western U.S only) 
or via user-supplied hazard maps.  Additionally, site characteristics are assigned a 
standard Site Class ‘D’ and adhere to (NEHRP) guidelines for site class response.  
Inventory and fragility components, however; are taken as default analysis components 
within the software itself.  Provided inventory and fragilities cover major infrastructure 
divisions such as regional population demographics, essential facilities, transportation 
networks and facilities, utilities facilities, general building stock, hazardous materials 
facilities and high potential loss facilities.  Analyses at this level are based on building 
square footage and value, population characteristics, costs of building repair and basic 
economic data (FEMA-NIBS User’s Manual, 2006).  Developers stipulate, however; that 
assessments employing a Level I analysis have a large margin for uncertainty and thus 
are best-suited as a starting point from which improved analyses stem.  Separate analyses 
with updated hazard, inventory and fragility parameters are then compared to the Level I 
analysis to determine the impact of individual components on regional damage and losses.   
 More accurate loss assessments are accomplished in HAZUS-MH via the addition 
of hazard, inventory and fragility data for a given study region.  A Level II analysis 
incorporates site-specific soil characteristics through the use of maps specifying site class, 
liquefaction susceptibility and landslide potential.  All of these factors impact ground 
shaking levels and the attenuation of these motions at various periods and distances from 
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a given epicenter.  Supplementing the default data in HAZUS-MH with this site 
information alone provides a more accurate estimate of ground shaking and liquefaction 
behavior which ultimately improves damage and loss values throughout a study region 
(Bausch, “HAZUS Applications…”, 2006).    
Inventory improvements also play an important role in Level II analyses.  Local 
estimates of building square 
footages by building type, 
detailing inventories of essential 
facilities, adding utility networks, 
updating data for high potential 
loss facilities and hazardous 
material facilities, updating 
transportation facility and 
network information are all 
classified at Level II 
improvements.  Improving 
fragilities for various inventory 
components, particularly buildings, bridges and lifeline networks, are also classified as 
Level II improvements.  In addition, various updates to economic models for 
transportation and utility lifelines and induced damage models through the development 
of inundation maps and taking into account local factors for indirect economic loss 
models.  Completion of a Level II HAZUS-MH analysis requires considerable time and 
effort with regard to data collection and preparation, thus all possible data upgrades are 
not completed.  Component improvement is often selected based on the availability of 
information and time constraints placed on a project team.   
A Level III analysis is the most regionally accurate form of loss assessment in 
HAZUS-MH.  Once inventory, hazard and fragility components are improved in Level II 
the only remaining improvement suggested by program creators is to incorporate expert 
opinion (FEMA-NIBS Technical Manual, 2006).  The Technical Draft of the HAZUS-
MH Earthquake Manual cites engineering and economic study results completed outside 
HAZUS-MH as an “Advanced Data and Models Analysis,” for Level III.  The use of 
 
Figure 1: Levels of Analysis in HAZUS-MH 
- 14 - 
outside technical expertise in these fields is recommended as well as close cooperation of 
local utilities and special facility owners, in an effort to develop the best damage and loss 
models.  This is by far the most complicated and time consuming form of loss assessment 




3.2.1 Definition of Regional Ground Motion 
 Earthquake hazards take two forms within HAZUS-MH; deterministic and 
probabilistic events.  The latter is based on ground shaking demand as characterized by 
2002 United States Geological Survey spectral contour maps for rock sites, or site class 
‘B’ (FEMA-NIBS, Tech. Manual, 2006).  In addition the user may provide the required 
probabilistic maps developed via alternate methods.  Eight probabilistic analysis options 
are provided within the program and range from 39% probability of exceedance in 50 
years to 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years.  These probabilities of exceedance 
correspond to return periods of 100 years to 2,500 years, respectively.  A magnitude must 
be specified for this form of analysis, or probabilistic maps may be provided by the user 
and imported into HAZUS-MH.  In this report, due to the nature of the problem under 
investigation and the objectives of the study, a deterministic scenario is used, comprising 
the largest magnitude that is based on the capability of the known faults in the NMSZ.   
 Deterministic events are defined by the same ground motion parameters as 
probabilistic events. Peak ground acceleration, peak ground velocity, and spectral 
accelerations at 0.3 second period and 1.0 second period are calculated for a single 
seismic event.  At the most basic level ground motion parameters are not affected by soil 
characteristics.  These four ground motion parameters are the only input values required 
to determine damage states within HAZUS-MH since all other ground motion parameters 
(e.g. spectral velocities and displacements) are based on those four values.    
There are numerous methods to define a deterministic event within HAZUS-MH, the 
first of which being the selection of a historical event.  HAZUS-MH houses a database of 
over 8,000 past earthquake ground motion records which can be assigned to analyses.  
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This type of analysis provides relevant location, depth and magnitude values (FEMA-
NIBS, Technical Manual, 2006) for a given event, though this option is available for the 
western U.S. primarily.  Additionally, certain types of fault rupture events are reserved 
for the western U.S. including strike-slip, reverse and normal fault rupture.  Furthermore, 
the combination of attenuation relationships associated with the western U.S. tend to 
produce weaker ground shaking values than the combined CEUS attenuation relations for 
the same moment magnitude and source-to-site distance (FEMA-NIBS, Technical 
Manual, 2006). 
Seismic events can be defined with the ‘Arbitrary Event’ option in HAZUS-MH, 
though certain event characteristics are limited by geographic region.  This form of 
hazard assignment requires latitude and longitude values to specify and epicenter as well 
as a magnitude value to quantify earthquake intensity.  Earthquake rupture depth can also 
be specified, though the default value of 10 km is sufficient for the majority of the New 
Madrid Fault.  Rupture depths less than 10 km (approximately 5-8 km) are suggested for 
the northern portion of the NM Fault, though 10 km is applicable to the central and 
southwest thrust, so the default depth of 10 km is used for each fault extension for 
simplicity of analysis.   
 Analyses using the ‘arbitrary event’ hazard definition option are computed based 
on one of two groups of attenuations; the CEUS Event and CEUS Characteristic Event 
alternatives.  The CEUS Event incorporates four attenuation functions developed by 
Frankel et al. (1996), Toro et al. (1997), Atkinson and Boore (1995) and Campbell (2002) 
weighted in the following manner: 
Table 1: CEUS Event Attenuation Functions and Weight Factors 
Participating Attenuation Functions Weighting Factor 
Atkinson and Boore (1995) 0.286 
Toro, Abrahamson and Schneider (1997) 0.286 
Frankel et al. (1996) 0.286 
Campbell (2003) 0.142 
 
The CEUS Characteristic Event includes an additional attenuation relation developed by 
Somerville et al. (2002), with attenuation function weighting factors adjusted as shown 
below: 
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Table 2: CEUS Characteristic Event Attenuation Functions and Weight Factors 
Participating Attenuation Functions Weighting Factor 
Atkinson and Boore (1995) 0.250 
Toro, Abrahamson and Schneider (1997) 0.250 
Frankel, Mueller, Barnhard, Perkins et al. (1996) 0.250 
Campbell (2003) 0.125 
Somerville et al. (2002) 0.125 
 
The attenuations developed by Frankel et al. are available in tabular format only and 
include values for PGA, spectral acceleration at 0.2 seconds and spectral acceleration at 
1.0 seconds based on magnitudes from 4.4 to 8.2 and hypocentral distances, rhypo, of 10 to 
1000km.  All other attenuation functions consist of logarithmically decreasing functions 
modified with constants as detailed below: 
 
Atkinson and Boore: 
RCRMCMCCY 4
2
321 )log()6()6()log( −−−+−+=  
where: Y = Response parameter (PGA, PGV, Sa); 
 C1 – C4 = Regression Coefficients; 
 M = Moment Magnitude; 
 R = Hypocentral distance (km) 
Table 3: Atkinson and Boore Attenuation Function Constants 
Period C1 C2 C3 C4 
PGA 3.79 0.298 -0.0536 0.00135 
0.2 3.75 0.418 -0.0644 0.000457 
1.0 2.77 0.620 -0.0409 0.0000 
 
Toro, Abrahamson and Schneider:  





















CRR jbM +=  
where: Y = Response parameter; 
 C1 – C7 = Modeling constants; 
 M = Moment magnitude; 
 Rjb = Epicentral distance (km) 
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Table 4: Toro, Abrahamson and Schneider Attenuation Function Constants 
Period C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
PGA 2.20 0.81 0.00 1.27 1.16 0.0021 9.3 
0.2 1.73 0.84 0.00 0.98 0.66 0.0042 7.5 
1.0 0.09 1.42 -0.20 0.90 .49 0.0023 6.8 
 
Campbell: 
)(),()()ln( 3211 rfrMfMfCY rup +++=  
 
where: f1(M) = C2M + C3(8.5-M)2; 
 f2(M,rrup) = C4ln(R) + (C5 – C6M)rrup; 
 R = [ ]2)(72 8MCrup eCr + ; 
 f3(r) =  0       for rrup ≤ r1; 
  C7(ln(rrup) – ln(r1))    for r1 < rrup ≤ r2; 
  C7(ln(rrup) – ln(r1)) + C8(ln(rrup) – ln(r2)) for rrup > r2; 
 Y = Mean of response parameter; 
 C1 – C8: Regression coefficients; 
 M = Moment magnitude; 
 rrup = hypocentral distance (km); 
 r1 = 70 km; 
 r2 = 130 km; 
 
Table 5: Campbell Attenuation Function Constants 
Period C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 
PGA 0.0305 0.633 -0.0427 -1.591 -0.00428 0.000483 0.683 0.416 
0.2 -0.4328 0.617 -0.0586 -1.320 -0.00460 0.000337 0.399 0.493 
1.0 -0.6104 0.451 -0.2090 -1.158 -0.00255 0.000141 0.299 0.503 
 
The CEUS Characteristic Event includes the attenuation developed by Somerville, 
Collins and Abrahamson et al. according to the following functions and constants: 
Somerville et al.: 
For a hard rock site: 
For r < r1 -  
2
75143121 )5.8()ln()()ln()())(ln( McrcRmMcRcmMccgSa −++−++−+=  
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where:  Sa(g) = Spectral acceleration (g); 
 m1 = 6.4; 
 r1 = 50 km; 
 h = 6 km; 
 R = (r2 + h2)(1/2); 
 R1 = 2
2
1 hr + ; 
 M = Moment magnitude; 
 R = epicentral distance (km) 
 
Table 6: Somerville, Collins, Abrahamson et al. Attenuation Function Constants 
Period C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
Rift Zone 
0.2 0.793 0.805 -0.679 0.0861 -0.00498 -0.477 0.0000 
1.0 -0.307 0.805 -0.696 0.0861 -0.00362 -0.755 -0.1020 
 
The arbitrary event attenuation functions described above include no provision for the 
calculation of peak ground velocity (PGV).  HAZUS-MH employs the long period (1.0 
second) spectral acceleration value from which PGV is inferred, in units of inches per 
second.  The factor of 1.65 in the denominator is a weighting factor used to amplify PGV 
from spectral acceleration and is based on the work of Newmark and Hall (1982) 





















Further modifications to ground shaking include the inference of 0.3-second period 
spectral acceleration from 0.2-second period spectral acceleration.  For the CEUS this 
adjustment is accomplished via the division of the typical 0.2-second period spectral 
value by a factor of 1.4.    
The attenuation relationships discussed previously incorporate epicentral distances 
based on Figure 2.  While variable for dip angle and fault width may not apply to the 
CEUS Event or CEUS Characteristic Event equations all other distances are used to 
determine seismic response parameters at each census tract.  Individual census tracts are 
assigned PGA, PGV and Sa values at the tract’s centroid, meaning ground motion is 
attenuated to the centroid then assigned to the entire census tract for use in the 
determination of damage states of various infrastructure components.  The same principle 
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 of centroid assignment applies to site class, liquefaction susceptibility, landslide 
susceptibility and water depth site characterization parameters.  Instead of averaging the 
site characteristic over the entire census tract and applying the averaged value to adjust 
ground motion and infrastructure fragilities, HAZUS-MH recognizes the site 
characterization parameter at the centroid only and uses that value to modify ground 
motion, fragilities and economic models, despite the potential presence of variation of 
any given site characterization parameter within a census tract.  The study region used in 
this research is discussed in detail in subsequent sections, however; the map of census 
tract centroid locations for the study region employed in this research is illustrated in 
Figure 3.   
 Despite the use of a regionally appropriate combination of attenuation relations 
HAZUS-MH presents a critical attenuation deficiency.  All ground motion values are 
truncated at a source-to-site distance of 200 km.  Within the first 200km of the epicenter 
ground motions are calculated based on the specified equations.  At distances greater than 
200 km, however; all ground motion values are assigned zero values.  This is an arbitrary 
cut-off distance determined by HAZUS-MH developers and assumed to provide adequate 
regional coverage for ground motion attenuation.  Large regions experience extensive 
 
 
Figure 2: Source-to-Site Distances 
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assignment of null ground motion values 
which is not representative of actual ground 
motion propagation, which is the case in 
this research.   
Such serious program limitations 
necessitate the use of the ‘User-Supplied 
Hazard Maps’ feature.  It is possible to 
apply the HAZUS-MH combined 
attenuations outside of the program for the 
development of the four required ground 
motion maps and bypass the 200 km cut-off limitation.  Yet another option is to develop 
ground motion maps based on the USGS procedure for ground motion assignment 
resulting from USGS-determined probable earthquake locations and magnitudes.  The 
former alternative is chosen and applied to this research through the incorporation of the 
CEUS Event, while the latter is incorporated in a baseline study completed over a similar 
region by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  Both methods are 
discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections.   
 
3.2.2 Regional Hazard Modification  
HAZUS-MH allows for the inclusion of various site parameters including site class, 
liquefaction susceptibility, landslide potential and water depth as mentioned earlier.  
Computations of local site affects are carried out using the National Earthquake Hazard 
Reduction Program (NEHRP) Provisions for ground motion characterization.  These 
provisions specify six site classes, ranging from ‘A’ to ‘F’ to determine the composition 






Figure 3: Census Tract Centroids 
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Table 7: NEHRP Site Classes and Shear Wave Velocities (FEMA 450) 
Shear Wave Velocity (m/sec.) Site 
Class Description Minimum Maximum 
A Hard Rock 1500 -- 
B Rock 760 1500 
C Very Dense Soil & Soft Rock 360 760 
D Stiff Soils 180 360 
E Soft Soils -- 180 
F Soils Requiring Specific Evaluation -- -- 
 
NEHRP factors are provided for spectral acceleration values only, and no provisions are 
specified to account for PGA and PGV.  A ‘base’ or reference site class is required to 
determine amplification and reduction factors for the remaining soil types.  Site class ‘B’ 
is chosen as the reference site, from which all other classes are modified.  Modification 
factors for each site class are shown in Table 8.  These factors indicate a reduction in 
spectral acceleration of all periods for all site classified as hard rock.  As sites become 
less rock-like and include more soft soil amplification factors increase, particularly for 
long period spectral acceleration.  Note that for site class ‘D’ long period spectral 
accelerations of less that 0.2g are at least double that of site class ‘B’ values.  Site class 
‘E’ amplifies ground motions even further by increasing long period spectral acceleration 
up to 3.5 times that of reference site class.  Higher shaking values at longer period are 
amplified less, though still experiencing significant amplification, such as at 0.5g.  Short 
period spectral accelerations, however; are reduced for intense shaking values (i.e. SAS > 
1.0g) while lesser intensities are amplified up to 2.5 times that of shaking values of site 
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Table 8: NEHRP Soil Amplification Factors (FEMA 450) 
Site Class Site Class B Spectral 
Acceleration A B C D E 
Short Period, SAS (g) Short-Period Amplification Factor, FA 
≤ 0.25 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.6 2.5 
0.50 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.7 
0.75 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 
1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 
≥ 1.25 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 
1-Second Period, SA1 (g) 1.0-Second Period Amplification Factor, FV 
≤ 0.1 0.8 1.0 1.7 2.4 3.5 
0.2 0.8 1.0 1.6 2.0 3.2 
0.3 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.8 2.8 
0.4 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.6 2.4 
≥ 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.5 2.0 
  
 Liquefaction is another factor that is critical to the accurate determination of 
hazard in a given study region.  
Susceptibility to liquefaction is 
dictated by the type of soil, grain size 
distribution and relative density of 
local soils and relates the interaction 
of soil to ground motion, in particular 
the amplitude and duration of shaking.  Permanent ground deformation is a direct result 
of liquefaction probability and thus the incorporation of liquefaction susceptibilities is 
vital to the calculation of lifeline damage, especially pipeline network damage.  HAZUS-
MH provides a default  
 liquefaction mapping 
scheme for a generic study 
region as a function of 
percentage of region area, 
as shown in Table 9.  Users 
may also opt to specify 
liquefaction susceptibilities 
with a map attached to the 
Table 9: Proportion of Map Unit Susceptible to 
Liquefaction - HAZUS-MH Default 
 
 
Figure 4: Conditional Probability Relationships for Liquefaction 
Susceptibility (FEMA-NIBS, Technical Manual, 2006) 
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study region.  The map attachment process updates all inventory fragilities and loss 
models to reflect the liquefiable nature of regional soils.  For both default and user-
supplied liquefaction susceptibility values, however; only six broad categories of 
susceptibility exist.  These categories are shown in Table 9 and the related probability of 
liquefaction relationships are illustrated in Figure 4.  These relationships are calculated 
from the liquefaction probability equation which specifies the likelihood of liquefaction 
for a given liquefaction susceptibility, moment magnitude (via PGA) and groundwater 
depth. 









where;  KM = Moment magnitude correction factor for magnitudes other than M=7.5; 
 KW = Ground Water Correction Factor for depths other than five feet; 
 Pml = Proportion of Map Unit Susceptible to Liquefaction; 
P[LiquefactionSC│PGA=a] = Conditional Liquefaction Probability for a  
 Given Susceptibility Category at a Specified Level of PGA 
Correction factors are then defined according to the following equations: 
9188.22055.00267.00027.0 23 +−−= MMMKM  ; 
93.0022.0 += WW dK  
where M = Moment magnitude of seismic event; 
 dW = Depth to groundwater in feet 
 
Not only do high probabilities of liquefaction increase the probabilities of extensive 
damage, they also contribute to permanent ground deformations by way of lateral 
spreading and ground settlement.  Lateral spreading calculations are based on Youd and 
Perkins’ Liquefaction Severity Index combined with Sadigh et al.’s attenuation 
relationship.  This requires the normalization of PGA to a liquefaction probability of zero.  
Permanent ground deformation due to lateral spreading is determined as follows: 
[ ] ( )[ ]aPLPGAPGDEKPGDE SCSC == ∆ /*  
where: E[PGD│(PGA/PLSC)=a] = Expected permanent ground displacement for a  
given susceptibility category to a normalized ground shaking level 
(PGA/PGA)t); 
 PGA(t) = Threshold ground shaking required to induce liquefaction; 
 K∆ = displacement correction factor; 
 M = Moment Magnitude 
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9835.04698.00914.00086.0 23 −+−=∆ MMMK  
Ground settlement is the final displacement field related to liquefaction susceptibility.  
HAZUS-MH assumes the susceptibility of a given area is directly related to ground 
settlement experienced.  Work done by Tokimatsu and Seed in 1987 is cited by FEMA 
and NIBS to show that higher susceptibility soils typically have greater deposit thickness 
of potentially liquefiable soils.  In addition, strong correlations between volumetric strain 
and soil relative density are considered 
proof of the validity of the assumption 
that liquefaction susceptibility relates 
directly to ground settlement.  Settlement 
values are classified by susceptibility 
category as shown in Table 10.  
 Additional criteria employed to 
determine hazard include landslide susceptibility and ground water depth.  The latter is 
assumed to have a five-foot default depth in HAZUS-MH.  While the user may supply a 
ground water depth map this form of information is not incorporated herein, deferring to 
the default depth for all analyses.  Landslide susceptibility does not include a default 
value, or set of values, in HAZUS-MH.  All landslide information must be supplied by 
the user and is related to the surficial geologic makeup, slope angle and acceleration from 
a seismic event present in region under investigation.  Landslide susceptibility is 
excluded from this research, though is a hazard component recommended for future work.   
 
3.3 Inventory 
HAZUS-MH provides extensive inventory databases for numerous infrastructure 
components and lifeline networks which are utilized in regional analyses.  Inventory 
items are divided into several major categories including; demographic data, general 
building stock, essential facilities, high potential loss facilities, hazardous materials 
facilities, transportation lifelines and utility lifelines.  All but one of these data groups 
refers to the built environment, while demographic data provides extensive population 
statistics nationwide.  Various categories detailed within the demographic data provided 
Table 10: Ground Settlement Amplitude by 
Liquefaction Susceptibility Category 
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in HAZUS-MH include; age, gender, race, ethnicity, income, hotel population, working 
population, marriages, numbers of residents living in particular types of dwelling (single 
family, apartment, etc.), construction years of residential buildings, property values and 
school population.  While this database is extensive and provides sufficient information 
for characterization of regional residents, their economic, age and racial diversity, the 
information is out of date.  A national census occurs every ten years in the U.S. with the 
latest census occurring in 2000.  All demographic data supplied in HAZUS-MH is taken 
from this 2000 census and may not be truly representative of 2006 demographics.   
The remaining inventory items consist of data on the built environment.  There 
are two forms of database organization; point-wise data and census tract level data.  
Point-wise data specifies a specific coordinate location of a particular inventory item such 
as a building, bridge or length of road.  Inventory sets employing this type of data 
specificity include; essential facilities, transportation facilities as well as roads, runways, 
etc., utility facilities, hazardous materials facilities and high potential loss facilities.  The 
general building, however, is defined on a per census tract basis.  This broad category is 
comprised of all buildings within a census tract.  Providing a comprehensive, national 
building inventory would require excessive amounts of time to research and compile data,  
and thus general building stock inventory is based on assessment records which are used 
to estimate the number, square footage, occupancy type and dollar exposure of all 
buildings within a given census tract.   
The general building stock employs two types of mapping schemes for occupancy 
and building type; general and specific schemes.  Occupancy types refer to the general or 
specific use or function of a building, while building type refers to the material, height 
and structure types of a building.  General and specific classifications for the general 
building stock are detailed in Table 11and Table 12, respectively.  All 36 model building 
types found under the specific building types are based on model building types found in 
FEMA 178: NEHRP Handbook for the Seismic Evaluation of Existing Buildings (FEMA-
NIBS, Technical Manual, 2006).   
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Essential facilities are a specific group of buildings separated from the general 
building stock due to their criticality to the functioning of a society.  HAZUS-MH 
classifies essential facilities as schools, hospitals and emergency response facilities such 
as police stations and fire stations.  These buildings are defined with point-wise data and 
additionally qualified by seismic code level.  Buildings constructed without seismic code 
provisions are classified as pre-code, which is the case for some structures in the Central 
and Eastern U.S. (CEUS).  Structures with minimal seismic design receive a low-code 
designation, while buildings conforming to seismic code provisions are assessed 
moderate-code standing.  Most CEUS buildings are assigned low- or moderate-code 
levels, with high-code reserved for the stringent seismic provisions in California.  High 
potential loss facilities, which include dams and levees, military installations, nuclear 
power plants and hazardous material facilities are classified in a similar manner to 
essential facilities.   
Transportation inventory covers numerous forms of transportation including the 
support facilities for these modes of transport.  Various components of the transportation 
Table 11: HAZUS-MH Occupancy Types 
 
Table 12: HAZUS-MH Building Types 
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database in HAZUS-MH include; highways, railways, light rail, bus, port, ferry and 
airports.  Highway systems consist of all road segments as well as any tunnels and 
bridges associated with them.  Bridge classifications are based on National Bridge 
Inventory characteristics which consist of 28 bridge types.  Bridge categories are based 
on material, construction type (simple support or continuous) and seismic design 
consideration.  All rail and airport lifelines account for the airports and railway stations 
required to operate these modes of transportation.  These buildings are subjected to the 
same seismic code level, building and occupancy types and damage state determination 
processes as those for buildings in the general building stock.  Lastly, all water related 
transportation lifelines include inventory items for landings and ports, since it is 
unrealistic to assign damage states and losses to the rivers and waterways themselves.  
Each inventory item in the transportation database is defined with point-wise data, which 
is necessary to locate bridges on roads and ports on their respective waterways.  There are 
cases, however, where bridges do not line up with highways.  In this case the proper 
alignment of bridges is a task for a Level II analysis.   
 The final default inventory category provided in HAZUS-MH is utility lifelines.  
This database consists of information on the following utilities; potable water, waste 
water, oil (crude and refined), natural gas, electric power and communication.  Each 
system is comprised of distribution and facility components.  All types of utility systems 
have complete catalogs of information for maintenance and distribution facilities, wells 
and pumping stations, storage tanks and production plants.  Distribution pipelines are not 
as well represented, however.  Water and waste water pipelines are provided in the 
default inventory through estimates per census tract of brittle and ductile pipes.  These 
estimates of pipeline can be mapped in a fashion similar to that of general building stock 
values.  Natural gas and oil pipelines are not included in the default inventory, however 
general estimates of pipeline lengths are included for purposes of determining the number 
of breaks and leaks.  The assumption used by HAZUS-MH estimates a distribution 
pipeline under every street, which may be an overestimation of natural gas and oil 
pipeline distribution.  It is often the user’s responsibility to specify pipeline distribution 
systems for these two utilities.  Electric and communication utilities do not have any 
provisions for distribution systems within the default inventory, but rather estimations are 
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made to account for electric distribution circuits and communications distribution to 
attain predictions for power and communication losses following an earthquake.   
 An additional inventory category is provided in which the user may specify new 
building types.  New building types are defined with the Advanced Engineering Building 
Module.  Point-wise data is specified as well as related building type information to be 
used for damage estimation.  This tool is not utilized in this research and will not be 
discussed in detail.  For further information please reference the HAZUS-MH User’s 
Manual: Advanced Engineering Building Module (FEMA-NIBS, 2006).   
 
3.4 Fragility 
 Fragilities represent the conditional probability of reaching or exceeding a certain 
damage limit state given a specific level of ground shaking. They are specified for each 
inventory component which includes buildings, bridges, utility network systems as well 
as roads and railways.  Additional fragilities are included for various building contents, or 
non-structural components.  Contents include interior walls and finishes, mechanical and 
electrical equipment and building contents.  Only buildings appearing in the general 
building stock are assessed using non-structural fragilities, however.  All buildings 
associated with transportation, utilities, etc. are not assigned non-structural fragilities.  
These curves are calculated using a lognormal distribution with median potential earth 
science hazard parameter (PGA, Sa, Sd, etc.) and standard deviation values of that 
parameter, µ and β, respectively.  Fragility curves exhibiting lesser slopes indicate greater 
uncertainty of reaching or exceeding a given damage state, while greater slope indicates 
lower uncertainty.   
HAZUS-MH defines four damage states; slight, moderate, extensive and collapse.  
Slight damage includes superficial or non-structural damage as well as minor cracks in 
structural elements, which are often referred to as an immediate occupancy limit state.  
This means that the structure is able to be used immediately after an earthquake.  
Moderate damage, or a life safety limit state, indicates more damage to structural 
components.  This may include visible cracks in concrete or wood frame buildings and 
some yielding of bracing components of steel frame construction.  Extensive damage, or  
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collapse prevention limit state, 
includes damage to most structural 
components.  Severe structural 
damage consists of significant 
yielding in steel members and 
extensive cracking of wood and 
concrete.  Finally, complete damage 
implies an uninhabitable or unusable 
structure.  Complete damage results 
from intense ground shaking which exists nearest the epicenter of an earthquake typically.  
A typical fragility curve for building structural components is illustrated in Figure 5.   
Damage to various infrastructure components are defined by one of several 
ground motion or ground deformation quantities.  Within the general building stock 
damage states for various types of damage (structural, non-structural contents, non-
structural equipment, etc.) are defined by spectral displacement, spectral acceleration, 
PGA or PGD.  Similarly, buried tanks are affected by spectral displacement, though 
buried pipeline damage is determined by a combination of peak ground velocity and 
permanent ground deformation.  The above examples highlight the variety of ground 
shaking parameters that are required to determine damage states to the entire 
infrastructure of a region.  The incorporation of only one component, such as peak 
ground acceleration, will not provide comprehensive damage state probabilities in 
HAZUS-MH.   
 
 
Figure 5: Typical Fragility Curve in HAZUS-MH 
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4 Project Overview 
4.1 Need for Seismic Loss Assessment in CEUS 
Based on previous large earthquakes experienced over the winter of 1811 and 
1812, earthquake probability maps have been developed by the USGS for the NMSZ.  
Major epicenter locations are located in northeastern Arkansas and the southeast tip of 
Missouri.  Greater intensities are expected near the locations of these historic earthquakes, 
while farther sites, such as the New England states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire 
and Vermont show much lower intensities, as shown in Figure 6.  It is also important to 
note the locations of St. Louis, Missouri, and Memphis, Tennessee.  Both of those cities 
lie in areas expected to experience strong shaking of intensity 8 and 9, respectively.  Loss 
modeling of highway networks after an earthquake indicates significant reduction in 
capacity as bridges are affected and road segments incur liquefaction-induced damage 
(Loh et al., 2003).  This form of highway network damage and reduced functionality is 
likely to occur in the Central and Eastern U.S. due to the presence of liquefiable soils and 
a nationally-significant transportation network.   
 
Figure 6: USGS Expected Seismic Intensity 
Map 
 
Figure 7: Recent Seismic Activity in the New 
Madrid Seismic Zone 
  
The devastation brought to the Gulf Coast by hurricane Katrina in September, 
2005, generated losses of roughly $125 billion (Associated Press, 2005). A repeat of the 
1811 and 1812, earthquakes has the potential to cause damage significant damage and 
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generate billions of dollars in economic losses.  A comprehensive seismic risk assessment 
and component response and recovery plan is an economically and socially prudent 
choice to reduce damage levels and thus incur smaller losses and avoid the devastating 
losses and social impacts created by hurricane Katrina.   
 The Central and Eastern U.S. has not experienced earthquakes of significant 
magnitudes since the 1811 and 1812 events.  Earthquakes of smaller magnitudes continue 
to occur along the presumed New Madrid Fault system.  These smaller earthquakes, or 
magnitudes ranging from 3 to 5 (Figure 7), do not cause damage and often go unnoticed 
by the residents. The continuing seismic activity highlights the urgency of assessing, 
mitigating and planning for response and recovery from a NMSZ earthquake, the 
occurrence of which is not a question of ‘if’ but rather of ‘when’. 
 Coordinated response and recovery plans are key to minimizing downtime and to 
rapid regional recovery.  Previous post-hazard planning efforts have been based on expert 
opinions as oppose to scientifically based studies, leading to misinterpretations of hazards 
and subsequent post-hazard needs of victims and evacuees (Harrald & Jefferson, 2007).  
The results of the loss assessment conducted in this research, accompanied by results 
from the larger CEUS study, will provide response and recovery planners scientifically 
based data that more accurately depicts post-earthquake scenarios and ideally allows 
them to create better strategic plans and regional aid provisions.  Adequate preparation 
may include developing host city plans for evacuees, stockpiling supplies (water, non-
perishable food items, and medical supplies) and assessing the need for immediate and 
short-term housing for displaced residents and businesses.  Coordinating government 
agencies with industry and volunteers prior to an earthquake will streamline response 
procedures and prevent some of the chaos and communication breakdowns experienced 
in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina.   
Furthermore, the identification of vulnerable infrastructure components prior to an 
earthquake will allow authorities and agencies to retrofit those components (buildings, 
bridges, roads, and utility networks, amongst other important components) that are 
extremely likely to see damage and affect the performance of lifelines.  With improved 
systems performance and fewer damaged structures it follows that fewer injuries will be 
sustained, post-earthquake systems functionalities will improve, and the region will 
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experience lesser economic losses and business interruptions.  The resulting loss 
assessment can be used as a preemptive design tool for infrastructure improvement and 
loss minimization; in other words, spending money for upgrades now has the potential to 
save more money later.   
 
4.2 Project Objectives 
 The Federal Emergency Management Agency is engaged in a major catastrophic 
event planning initiative which includes a major hurricane in Miami, Florida, and an 
earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ).  The Mid-America Earthquake 
(MAE) Center, in cooperation with the Institute of Crisis Risk and various other 
contributors from the region, have been charged with undertaking a comprehensive 
seismic risk assessment and response and recovery plan for the New Madrid Seismic 
Zone.  Other closely related projects are lead by the Central US Earthquake Consortium 
(CUSEC) and Innovative Emergency Management Inc. (IEM). The MAE Center-lead 
study comprises earthquake risk assessment of the eight state region in the Central and 
Eastern U.S. (CEUS) to earthquakes including a magnitude 7.7, located along the 
presumed New Madrid Fault.  Other scenarios will also be developed and their impact 
assessed in detail, including a Wabash Valley event. These impact assessments comprise 
determination of damage states for numerous infrastructure components, the economic 
loss and social impact associated with those damage states.  Specifically, this project 
details expected post-earthquake induced damage and social impact estimates such as 
locations and amounts of debris and numbers of evacuees and displaced residents due to 
damage or collapse of structures.  Based on regional damage and evacuee estimated 
temporary shelter and short-term housing needs are determined and subsequently host 
city plans developed for evacuee shelters alongside support facilities for the evacuees.  
Additionally, the assessment of damage to infrastructure components is used to identify 
specific needs for mitigation and retrofit in order to prevent damage due to future seismic 
events.  Finally, the risk assessment developed herein is intended to be used as outreach 
and education tools to encourage public awareness campaigns and initiate communication 
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between the business and government agencies that will coordinate and conduct post-
earthquake assistance and rehabilitation efforts.   
The work discussed hereafter focuses on the loss assessment of a reduced region 
(definition of which is discussed in section 5.1) within the eight state region under 
investigation by the MAE Center.  The selected region is that most highly impacted by a 
NMSZ earthquake.  The major objectives from the catastrophic event planning project 
are refined for this reduced study to investigate the affects of various hazard and 
infrastructure component inventory parameters within the central portion of the NMSZ 
where the greatest ground motions are anticipated to occur.  More specifically, the 
influence of soil amplification within the study region is determined, as well as its affect 
on damage states and corresponding economic losses to the regional infrastructure.  
Inventory improvements are also considered, some of which include the addition of 
pipeline networks for oil and natural gas as provided by the Homeland Security 
Infrastructure Program (HSIP) Gold Dataset which was obtained from the Office of 
Americas/North America and Homeland Security Division and details numerous datasets 
in addition to the pipeline datasets used in the current study. The issues raised, problems 
solved and plans developed as a result of this risk assessment and response and recovery 
planning effort have the opportunity to set a standard for future regional hazard 
assessments and cooperative emergency planning programs.  The consortia assembled, 
the dual focus on engineering and planning, the impetus provided by FEMA and DHS 
and the financial commitment underpinning the current effort provide a unique 
opportunity not only to protect the heartland of the USA but also to set detailed and well-
documented scenario-based earthquake impact assessment, response and recovery 
framework for future applications in other regions. 
  
4.3 Region Background 
 
 The eight states region considered in this study is centered on the New Madrid 
Fault and consists of the following states; Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee (See Figure 8).  These states lie along one of the 
United States’ major waterways, the Mississippi River.  Historically this river has been a 
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critical thoroughfare for the transport of goods and workers, particularly prior to the 
advent of railways and vehicles as a form of mass transportation (DesRoches, 2006).  As 
a result of the major industrial and transportation uses of the Mississippi River vast 
numbers of businesses and towns developed along this stretch of river in the Central and 
Eastern U.S.   
 
Figure 8: Central & Eastern U.S. 
 
Figure 9: Highways and Bridges in the CEUS 
 
The buildings and services that were once so intimately tied to the river 
transitioned to other forms of industry more appropriate and lucrative to the developing 
transportation centers in St. Louis, Missouri, and Chicago, Illinois.  With the westward 
expansion of the United States in the 19th Century few large cities grew up in Midwest, 
making it a region known for agriculture and major industry.  With few major commerce 
centers between the east and developing west coast, the Midwest became a region critical 
to the distribution of food and goods for the entire nation.  Even today central U.S. 
highways and interstates (Figure 9) carry over $2 trillion of goods to various other 
regions in the country (DesRoches, 2006).   
 While the majority of the Central and Eastern U.S. is comprised of small towns 
and farming communities there are a few major cities in the region.  St. Louis, Missouri, 
known as the ‘Gateway to the West’, which is symbolized by the famous St. Louis Arch, 
boasts approximately 350,000 residents while Memphis, Tennessee, houses 
approximately 675,000 residents based on 2005 population estimates.  Other major cities 
include Nashville, Tennessee, Birmingham, Alabama, Louisville and Lexington, 
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Kentucky, and Kansas City, Missouri (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006).  Despite the 
approximately three million people living in these major cities, the majority 45 million 
people living in the central and eastern US live in small towns and rural areas.   
The presence of the Mississippi River and its tributaries, including the Ohio, 
Illinois, Missouri, Rock, and Arkansas rivers, dramatically affect the geology of the 
CEUS study region.  The soil surrounding these rivers is comprised of sediments and 
deep deposits of soft soils (Tsai, Park & Hashash, 2006).  Not only are soft soils weak 
and easily compressible, but they are notorious sources of liquefaction, or the tendency of 
the saturated, unconsolidated soils to take on a liquid-like behavior, as in a suspension.  
This characteristic is especially prevalent to seismic events, as soil liquefaction frequently 
occurs under seismic loading.  Soils lose bearing capacity and buildings shift, sustain 
damage or even collapse.  While the mechanism and consequences of liquefaction will be 
discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections, it is relevant to note the importance of 
this regional characteristic when discussing key features of the region included in this 
loss assessment study.   
The Central and Eastern U.S. is not widely-known as a seismically active region, 
such as California or Japan, though the New Madrid region has experienced major 
earthquakes in the past two centuries.  In the winter of 1811 to 1812 three earthquakes 
occurred on the New Madrid Fault.  According to the United States Geologic Survey 
(USGS) the first two earthquakes occurred in northeast Arkansas on December 16, 1811, 
with an estimated magnitude of 8.1.  Just months later, on January 23, 1812, and 
February 7, 1818, two more earthquakes, with magnitudes estimated greater than 8.0, 
rocked southeastern Missouri.  It is proposed, though unsubstantiated, that another 
earthquake greater than 8.0 magnitude shook southeastern Missouri on December 16, 
1811.  At the time of these earthquakes this region of the U.S. was not largely populated 
and thus the earthquakes were not well reported or strong motion effects documented.  Of 
the minimal information collected after this series of earthquakes was evidence of 
landslides, mangled trees and large depressions and uplift due to ground failure (See 
Figure 10 & Figure 11).  Despite the severity of the ground motion there were very few 
reported casualties and damage to man-made structures.  Damage reports for that time 
period include the toppling of chimneys and collapse of some log cabins.  In addition, 
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uplift in Mississippi riverbed created large waves that were perceived to move upstream, 
and against the natural flow of the river (USGS, 2006).  One area experiencing more 
significant damage, however; was St. Louis, Missouri.  Even in 1811 and 1812, the city 
of St. Louis was populated with numerous homes and small businesses; a majority were 
wood and suffered some damage or total collapse.   
 
Figure 10: Mangled Trees Resulting from New 
Madrid Earthquakes 
 
Figure 11: Landslides Caused by New Madrid 
Earthquakes 
 
Reports from this time also indicate that ground motions resulting from the New 
Madrid earthquakes were felt as far away as Washington, D.C., and Charleston, South 
Carolina (CUSEC, 2006).  The far-reaching shaking felt on the east coast is due, in part, 
to the type of soil in the New Madrid Seismic Zone, and the Mississippi Embayment, 
which allows for the amplification of motions as specific frequencies to transmit farther.  
When a weaker, magnitude 6.0 earthquake from 1895 in the CEUS is compared to a 
stronger, magnitude 6.7 earthquake in California from 1994, the difference in attenuation 
distances is obvious.  Strong motions from Central and Eastern U.S. earthquakes have a 
far greater capacity to affect areas hundreds 
of miles away, as oppose to those on the 
west coast with more localized damage 
regions (See Figure 12).   
A lack of seismic design provisions 
allowed decades of construction without 
regard for seismic detailing and energy 
dissipation capability.  What this means is 
 
Figure 12: Attenuation Comparison for New 
Madrid Seismic Zone 
- 37 - 
that the Central and Eastern U.S. has hundreds of thousands of wood and masonry 
building reminiscent of those that collapsed during the 1811 and 1812 earthquakes.  
Though current construction adheres to more stringent design guidelines seismic 
provisions are still lacking.  Unreinforced masonry buildings, in particular, are likely to 
sustain damage with moderate levels of shaking (Moon et al., 2001), thus reducing the 
capability of emergency response personnel and endangering numerous school children.  
Injury and casualty levels were investigated by FEMA in a baseline study of an 
earthquake on the northeast extension of the New Madrid Fault which indicates the 
prevalence of unreinforced masonry buildings (URMs) as a critical factor in terms of 
serious and loss of life injuries.   
Table 13: Casualties in Unreinforced Masonry Buildings 
No. of Level 
2,3,4 Casualties Night Time (2am) Day Time (2 pm) Commuting (5 pm) 
Without URMs 1,750 3,750 5,500 
With URMs 16,500 16,550` 17.300 
% Caused by 
URMs 
89% 77% 68% 
 
According to the FEMA study (Bausch, 2006) there are approximately 450,000 
unreinforced masonry buildings in roughly 2,500 census tracts centered on the New 
Madrid Fault.  Based on the casualty data reported by Bausch (HAZUS Applications, 
2006), it is evident that the majority of serious injuries and fatalities in a New Madrid 
earthquake can be attributed to the damage or collapse of URMs.  The vulnerability of 
URMs is substantiated by South Carolina researchers, as they also report poor seismic 
design performance for the low-rise unreinforced masonry structures that are common in 
both central and eastern U.S. regions (Wong et al. 2005).  This data alone posed strong 
evidence for the prioritization of URM retrofits to reduce injures and fatalities in the 
CEUS, as well as illustrating the need for seismic design provisions to ensure that URMs 
are no longer constructed.  The work of Moon et al. (2001) also highlights the benefits 
and improved seismic performance of retrofitted URM structures.  It follows then that 
reduced damage will reduce the injuries related to this type of structure.     
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4.4 Parameters for the Loss Assessment Study 
 An initial Level I analysis is completed to illustrate regional damage, loss and 
functionality with default inventory, hazard and fragility data.  Three earthquake 
scenarios are analyzed at this basic level of analysis and are used for later comparison 
with improved regional models.  An improved Level I analysis is also carried out.  This 
set of three analyses, one for each epicenter, is conducted with improved soil classes only.  
Regional ground motion is modified based on the regional site classes to reflect more 
accurate regional propagation of ground motion.  These two levels of analysis lead to the 
final level, Level II, which is the main focus of regional damage, loss and functionality.   
 The most improved loss assessment undertaken in this research focuses on a 
Level II HAZUS-MH analysis.  Improvements to default hazard and inventory data focus 
on site characteristics, ground motion attenuations as well as the addition and upgrade of 
several inventory components.  Regional site class and liquefaction susceptibility maps 
are incorporated into the determination of ground motion response.  Ground motion is 
assessed for a given epicenter outside of HAZUS-MH through the development of hazard 
maps for peak ground acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), spectral 
acceleration at 0.2 second period and spectral acceleration at 1.0 second period to avoid 
attenuation limitations present within HAZUS-MH.  A set of hazard maps is created of 
the default site class and improved site classes for a given epicenter.  Liquefaction 
susceptibility information is incorporated within HAZUS-MH in conjunction with hazard 
maps for improved site classes.  The procedure through which hazard maps are created is 
not detailed here as it is discussed in much greater detail in subsequent sections.   
 Major inventory upgrades include the addition of utility pipeline networks.  The 
MAE Center obtained a copy of the Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP) 
Gold Dataset for 2005 which is distributed by the Office of Americas/North America & 
Homeland Security Division.  This compilation of information contains over 200 data 
sets for numerous infrastructure components based on use or occupancy.  For example, 
the data set contains information on theaters, schools, state capitals, major manufacturing 
and utility facilities, utility networks, transportation facilities, hazardous material 
facilities, in addition to locations of major natural resources and their controlling 
mechanisms (locks, dams, levees, etc.)  Each dataset details the location, contact 
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information and some facility statistics (number of stories, construction year, etc.) for 
each list item.  While the amount of data that can be drawn from this dataset is expansive 
only natural gas and oil pipeline datasets are chosen for this project.  These data items are 
not part of the default inventory in HAZUS-MH and will supplement the assumed 
inventories for water and wastewater pipelines within the program already.   
 Level II analysis also includes the incorporation of updated fragility curves.  The 
MAE Center developed 36 sets of parameterized building fragility curves for the 36 
specific building types in HAZUS-MH (FEMA-NIBS User’s Manual, 2006).  Each set of 
fragility curves defines the probability of each building type reaching or surpassing each 
of three limit states; collapse prevention, life safety and immediate occupancy, as a 
function of spectral acceleration (Jeong & Elnashai, 2006).  There is also work within the 
MAE Center to develop fragilities for various bridge types that will eventually be 
introduced into the HAZUS-MH fragility framework.  Despite the capability of HAZUS-
MH to recognize and evaluate damage based on improved fragilities this form of analysis 
is not undertaken in this research due to time constraints.  Updated fragilities will be 
considered in later loss assessment studies related to the CEUS.   
 
4.5 FEMA Baseline Study 
 The Federal Emergency Management Agency completed a baseline seismic loss 
assessment study for a region in the Central and Eastern U.S. centered on the New 
Madrid Fault.  This study region is comprised of 2,517 census tracks in the same eight 
states as those in the general area of interest for this project.  Figure 13 details the extent 
of the region analyzed in the baseline study. Three hazard scenarios are included in this 
study with fault ruptures located along the northeast, central and southwest extensions of 
the New Madrid Fault.  For fault extension locations reference Figure 21.  Each fault 
extension is estimated to experience a magnitude 7.7 earthquake, which is the generally 
accepted magnitude for the New Madrid Fault as determined by the USGS and are 
estimated to resemble the level of the 1811 and 1812 earthquakes along the New Madrid 
Fault (Bausch, 2006).   
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 Hazard maps are generated outside of 
HAZUS-MH and imported for ground response 
parameters, PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.3 seconds and Sa at 
1.0 (See Figure 14 & Figure 15) seconds as 
required by HAZUS-MH for proper determination 
of damage states results based on ground motion. 
When computing ground motion values the USGS 
did consider the affect of site class on the 
amplification or reduction of these response 
parameters.  The USGS also considered the affects of liquefaction on seismic response 
and related permanent ground deformations due to liquefied soils.  Liquefaction 
susceptibilities were developed from site class maps compiled by state geologists for the 
Central United States Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC).  The greatest liquefaction 
susceptibility is illustrated by the areas showing a level 5 in Figure 16, and classified as 
“Very High” susceptibility.  Lesser numbers indicate lower levels of liquefaction 
susceptibility until reaching no susceptibility at a value of “0.”  The liquefaction 
susceptibility map used by FEMA shows high liquefaction susceptibilities in and around 
the riverbeds of local rivers as well as within the Mississippi Embayment, which is 
depicted by the greens appearing in the southern portion of the map.  The development 
procedures and resulting accuracy of the liquefaction susceptibility values have been 
questioned by various agencies thus correcting these values is one of the primary goals of 
future loss assessment hazard definition in the CEUS.     
 













Figure 14: USGS PGA Hazard Map NE 
Legend











Figure 15: USGS Sa 0.3 Sec. Hazard Map NE 
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Figure 16: USGS Liquefaction Susceptibility Map 
 
No additions to regional inventory were made in the baseline study though some 
updated inventory data was included in the HAZUS-MH region file for this study.  
Default pipeline assumptions can be supplemented by supplying natural gas and oil 
transmission and trunk line data to the study region.  Specifying this supplemental data 
overwrites assumptions of local distribution pipeline layouts and also the breaks and 
leaks associated with those lines.  These larger lines, however; carry much greater 
capacities than the smaller local lines and also provide definitive locations for each 
lifeline distribution system.  See Figure 17 for the layout of both pipeline distribution 
systems.  This accuracy in inventory reporting is the goal of upper level analyses in 
HAZUS-MH, and thus the lack of local pipeline assumptions is allowed.  This data was 
obtained from the HSIP Gold dataset distributed by the Office of Americas/North 
America and Homeland Security Division, which also details numerous other datasets 
and is discussed in greater depth elsewhere in this research.   
 It is also relevant to note several other analysis parameters used in the FEMA 
baseline study.  All population demographic data are drawn from the year 2000 census 
data.  No updated estimates of population were incorporated during this study.  Moreover, 
this regional analysis was conducted using the MR1 release of HAZUS-MH, in which 
replacement costs for all buildings are based on 2002 per square foot replacement costs as 
dictated in the 2002 volume of R.S. Means.  The latest release of HAZUS-MH MR2, also  
employs replacement costs that are based on 2002 per square foot costs from R.S. Means 
(FEMA-NIBS, User’s Manual, 2006).  As a result of these outdated replacement costs 
- 42 - 
estimated repair costs and economic losses attributed to building stock will not reflect 
inflation over the period of 2002 to the present.   
 
Figure 17: Regional Oil & Natural Gas Pipelines 
 
The combination of improved hazard and inventory items are filtered into 
HAZUS-MH and three scenarios analyzed within the scope of the FEMA baseline study.  
Each fault extension was analyzed for determination of damage and losses as a function 
of fault rupture.  Particular areas of interest included economic losses related to buildings, 
transportation and utility systems, as well as the affect of liquefaction susceptibility on 
damage for each of the three epicenter locations.  Total economic losses were calculated 
for each epicenter to determine an overall worst case scenario.  The results and findings 
of this study will be detailed in subsequent sections, where they are also compared to the 
findings of this research.   
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5 Project Scope and Procedure 
5.1 Region Definition 
 The risk assessment study conducted in the CEUS focuses on eight states within 
the New Madrid Seismic Zone; Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee.  Several levels of study region refinement are 
defined within the broad scope of the regional risk assessment being conducted by the 
MAE Center.  The most detailed level consists of five locals assessments for two major 
urban centers; St. Louis, Missouri, and Memphis, Tennessee, as well as three rural 
communities; Cairo, Illinois, Wickliffe, Kentucky, and Charleston, Missouri.  The 
locations of these local studies are illustrated in Figure 18.  State-wide risk assessments 
comprise the second level of region refinement.  Individual state assessments are 
designed to provide each CEUS state with a worst-case earthquake scenario and loss 
estimation for their own preparedness efforts.  Lastly, a regional assessment consisting of 
all eight states define the final level of analysis (Figure 19).  From this broad region a 
smaller area within the CEUS states is defined based on threshold ground shaking 
parameters, such as peak ground acceleration.  
 
Figure 18: CEUS Local Risk Assessment 
Locations 
 
Figure 19: Extent of Regional Risk Assessment 
 
Additional criteria for study region determination in this loss assessment are taken 
from the FEMA baseline study.  The extents of the region used in the FEMA loss 
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assessment are illustrated previously in Figure 13.  Region determination for the FEMA 
study employed a 0.05g PGA threshold value.  All counties appearing in the study region 
are expected to experience 0.05g PGA, or greater, when any of three earthquake 
scenarios are applied to the area (epicenters along northeast, central and southwest 
extension of New Madrid Fault).  One of the PGA shake maps used to establish regional 
boundaries appear in the previous illustration, Figure 14.   
 At this juncture in the region determination process is it exceedingly relevant to 
consider the region size limit inherent in the basic use of HAZUS-MH.  The default 
server used for all regional damage and loss processing within HAZUS-MH only permits 
the use region files that require less than two gigabytes (2GB) of information, which 
equates to approximately 2,000 census tracts for the earthquake model.  The entire eight 
state region consists of more than 10,200 census tracts, which far surpasses the default 
server’s processing capabilities.  FEMA’s reduced region comprises only 2,500 census 
tracts, roughly.  Though this amount of census tracts exceeds the recommended region 
limits, HAZUS-MH was still able to process the region and all file attachments, though 
the performance of the program decreases significantly due to the large region size.  
Region sizes exceeding 2GB can be processed through the use of a new server, SQL 
Server 2000 (FEMA-NIBS, User’s Manual, 2006).  At the time this research began SQL 
Server 2000 was not available and thus region sizes were limited to approximately 2,000 
census tracts.   
 Based on the scope of the CEUS loss assessment, the regional criteria and 
boundaries employed in the FEMA baseline study and the study area limitations inherent 
in HAZUS-MH a study region for this research is determined.  The study region used in 
this research is similar to that used in the FEMA baseline study, though reduced by over 
500 census tracts.  Reference Figure 20 for comparisons between CEUS, FEMA and 
newly defined regional boundaries.  The largest region, in blue, details the CEUS region 
comprised of all eight states.  The tan region highlights the extents of the FEMA baseline 
study region.  Considering the threshold value of 0.05g defines the boundary of the 
FEMA region, the remaining portion in the CEUS region, nearly 8,000 census tracts, is 
expected to experience minimal shaking due to an earthquake on the New Madrid Fault 
according to FEMA.  The central green portion illustrates the area investigated in 
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preliminary research.  The tan FEMA baseline region is chosen for this study which 
provides an identical basis for comparison.  According to the hazard maps associated 
with this region the PGA threshold value that roughly defines the regional boundary is 
0.06g.   
 
Figure 20: Region Size Comparison 
 
5.2 Hazard Definition 
Due to the geometry and length of the presumed New Madrid Fault several 
epicenters are evaluated along the fault to determine a worst-case scenario over its entire 
reach.  Three epicenters are chosen, two representing the extreme northern and southern 
ends of the proposed fault, on one centrally located epicenter.  As mentioned previously, 
there are three proposed locations of New Madrid Fault which comprise the larger New 
Madrid Seismic Zone.  The northern most epicenter, hereafter referred to as the Northeast 
(NE) epicenter, sits on the northern most point of the northern most fault.  A second 
hazard scenario, hereafter referred to as the Central epicenter, is defined along the central 
thrust of the proposed middle fault line and appears in northwestern Tennessee.  Yet 
another epicenter is located at the southern most extent of the south fault in northeast 
Arkansas and hereafter referred to as the Southwest (SW) epicenter.  The locations of 
each proposed fault line appear in red and epicenter locations are illustrated by blue dots 
in Figure 21.  The northeast epicenter will elicit damage as far north as relevant 
attenuations will allow.  Similarly the southwest epicenter will account for damage due to 
an earthquake occurring on the extreme southern reach of the fault.  All other events 
occurring in between these extreme locations are encompassed by the Central fault which 
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estimates damage to areas centrally located along the fault system.  Epicenter locations 
are as follows: 
Table 14: Epicenter Locations 
Epicenter Name Latitude Longitude 
Northeast (NE) Epicenter 37.189521 N -89.38144 W 
Central Epicenter 36.36318 N -89.5768 W 
Southwest (SW) Epicenter 35.181592 N -90.415265 W 
 
 
Figure 21: Proposed New Madrid Fault and Epicenter Locations 
 
There are infinite locations where epicenters can be placed and sensitivity 
analyses performed, however; with the three scenarios used in the baseline study in mind, 
three epicenters is determined to be an adequate number to represent the possible hazard 
within the study region.  With epicenter coordinates defined the hazard due to earthquake 
at each location is determined.  As discussed in the previous section on HAZUS-MH 
methodology the point-source epicenter option for hazard definition within HAZUS-MH 
assigns a maximum attenuation distance of 200km to any point-source event.  The region 
under investigation here exceeds the attenuation limit, and thus assigns ground motion 
parameters of zero to southern portions of the region when the NE epicenter is used, as 
seen in Figure 22. Non-zero ground motion values exist beyond the 200km limit and the 
arbitrary assignment of a cut-off distance in HAZUS-MH yields, not only an inaccurate 
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representation of the ground motion at distances greater than 200km, but also assigns 
random values for damage state probabilities.  This random assignment is most evident in 
essential facility damage state estimations.  A hospital or school, for example that lies 
farther than 200km from a given epicenter is likely to experience minimal ground motion 
and incur little to no damage.  HAZUS-MH, however; may assign a 60%, or higher, 
probability of extensive damage or collapse. It is intuitive that such severe damage states 
will not actually occur when a given structures experiences less than 0.05g PGA or 
spectral acceleration.  Abnormally high probabilities of severe damage are incorporated 
into the determination of economic loss despite their inaccuracies, and leads to excessive 
regional economic loss values for essential facilities, as shown in Figure 23.  
 
Figure 22: Study Region with Attenuation Limit 
 
Figure 23: Essential Facilities Damage with Cut-Off Distances 
 
This problem is compounded when damage state values are incorporated into the 
post-earthquake functionality of essential facilities lying more 200km from the epicenter.  
It seems logical that building experiencing negligible ground motion will not be severely 
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damage and thus functional immediately after or within days of an earthquake.  When 
random damage states are assessed to these structures, however; HAZUS-MH predicts 
that structures experiencing no ground motion will not be function until weeks after an 
earthquake (See Figure 24).  Essential facilities functionalities are then represented 
inaccurately due to the random assignment of damage states.  In order to remedy this 
problem and provide accurate ground motion values to census tracts lying farther than 
200km from an epicenter, the HAZUS-MH attenuation methodology is applied outside 
the program itself to develop ground motion maps which are then applied to HAZUS-MH 
as a predefined hazard.   
 
Figure 24: Emergency Care Facilities Functionality 
 
5.2.1 Hazard Map Development 
  The development of hazard maps follows the HAZUS-MH methodology for 
ground motion determination, though permits the attenuation of response values beyond 
200km.  As mentioned in the HAZUS-MH methodology section, there are two sets of 
attenuation functions that apply to the Central and Eastern U.S.; the CEUS Event and the 
CEUS Characteristic Event.  Both sets of attenuations are applicable to the New Madrid 
Seismic Zone so the CEUS Event, with four contributing attenuations, is chosen to 
represent overall ground motions for this study region.   
 A program was developed using Matlab 7.0 Version 4 which incorporates the 
necessary attenuations and census tract centroid distances to determine various seismic 
response parameters.  Developed in the MAE Center (Lafore, 2006), the ground motion 
program permits the addition of site class information and response amplification or 
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reduction based on National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) 
Provisions for site class (FEMA 450, 2003).  Each attenuation also requires a depth to 
epicenter distance, which is used in conjunction with the surface distance to calculate 
each response parameter for each census tract in a given study region.  HAZUS-MH 
employs a default depth of 10km to the CEUS Event, and this assumption is carried 
through in the determination of ground motion conducted herein.   
 Prior to the calculation of ground motion outside HAZUS-MH a preliminary 
ground motion analysis is carried out within HAZUS-MH.  While the seismic response 
parameters are not used, this step is essential to the establishment of an epicenter and the 
distances to census tract centroids within the study region.  If the HAZUS-MH default 
site class, D, is sufficient then the preliminary analysis requires no additional map 
attachments.  If improved site classes must be accounted for in the hazard maps to be 
developed, however; a map detailing the site class assignments within the study region 
must be attached at this stage and prior to the determination of preliminary ground 
motion.  Once the proper site class information is incorporated HAZUS-MH performs an 
analysis of ground motion values only.  The resulting information is then exported as a 
text file from the ‘Attribute Table’ of any mapped ground motion parameter and then 
opened in a spreadsheet program, such as Microsoft Excel.  The ‘Attribute Table’ details 
numerous quantities for every census tract within the study region, though the only 
parameters of interest are the census tract number, distance and soil class columns.  These 
three sets of values are placed in a new text file which is read into the Matlab ground 
motion program.   
 HAZUS-MH requires four hazard maps when using the User-Supplied Maps 
option to define an earthquake; PGA, PGV, and spectral acceleration at 0.3 second and 
1.0 second periods.  Running the ground motion calculator in Matlab will provide the 
required response values for each census tract, which are copied into yet another  
text file.  The new text file with Matlab output lists input parameters; census tract, 
distance and site class, as well as all output parameters.  User-Supplied hazard maps read 
in each parameter type (PGA, PGV, etc.) according to a parameter heading,  
 “PARAMVALUE,” thus requiring each response parameter to have its own text file with 
each of the four parameters displaying the heading, “PARAMVALUE.”  These four text 
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files must be saved as comma separated value (.csv) files to ensure compatibility with 
ArcGIS programs.   
ArcMap, a facet of ArcGIS, is used to develop the shapefiles required for later 
creation of a geodatabase of hazard maps.  A copy of the “hzTract” file, within the 
“RegionBndry” geodatabase for the study region, is opened in ArcMap with subsequent 
application of a data layer containing the newly created .csv file for a single response 
parameter (PGA, etc.).  The joining function in ArcMap is utilized to join the “hzTract” 
file with the ground motion file based on the census tract values in each ArcMap layer.  
Successful joining of the two files is ensured by the appearance of the chosen response 
value column heading appearing as “PARAMVALUE” and all the values in that column 
displaying non-“Null” values, meaning the numeric values associated with the response 
parameter and the corresponding census tract.  The updated “hzTract” file is exported as 
a shapefile and appears in the same location (folder) as the response file (PGA, etc.) in 
ArcCatalog.  Completion of this joining process for PGA, PGV, Sa at 0.2 sec. and Sa at 
1.0 sec. provides the needed shapefiles, however; this format is not supported by the 
HAZUS-MH platform.  The final step of hazard map creation requires the creation of a 
new geodatabase where are all shapefiles are exported.  The maps in the geodatabase are 
added into HAZUS-MH where the User-Supplied Hazard option is used to define the 
new hazard maps.  Mapping the newly defined hazard values in HAZUS-MH illustrates 
the lack of cut-off distance and full attenuation of ground motion, as seen in Figure 25.   
 
Figure 25: User-Supplied PGA Hazard Map for NE Epicenter (Site Class D) 
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5.2.2 Accuracy of Hazard Maps 
 
 While the accuracy of the ground motion generation program was verified for the 
CEUS Event by its developer ensuring the accuracy of the ground motion used for any 
analysis is critical step.  Determination of HAZUS-MH ground motion is accomplished 
through a supplementary analysis using an arbitrary event at the same epicenter selected 
for previous hazard maps development.  Since default site classes are used for the 
aforementioned set of hazard maps, attenuation functions form concentric circles that 
emanate from the epicenter, thus permitting a straight-forward comparison of ground 
motion parameters.  Figure 26 - Figure 29 illustrate the relationship between HAZUS-
MH ground motion and the externally derived ground motion.  Peak ground acceleration 
values are considerably larger using the HAZUS-MH ground motion for distances less 
than 50km.  A maximum PGA value of roughly 1.5g is determined by HAZUS-MH, 
whereas the external hazard shows a maximum PGA value of approximately 0.9g.  Peak 
ground velocity shows similar trends to PGA, with discrepancies of several inches per 
second between HAZUS-MH and user-supplied hazards.  Again, HAZUS-MH provides a 
much higher estimate of maximum PGV nearest the epicenter, by nearly 17 in./sec.   
 The short-period spectral acceleration responses show similar values within 20km 
of the epicenter, short-period response appears to provide the same acceleration value, or 
nearly, up to the cut-off distance.  The one second spectral acceleration does not compare 
as well, though.  With the exception of the distance range of 140km to 200km from the 
epicenter, the HAZUS-MH Sa 1.0 second values are much higher than the user-supplied 
values.  With the accuracy of the ground motion generation program assured by hand 
calculations completed by the developer prior to its distribution, HAZUS-MH appears to 
overestimate the hazard within the attenuation range, particularly near the epicenter.  
Additionally, the attenuation functions incorporated into the CEUS Event are 
exponentially decreasing functions, which should result in smooth curves, such as those 
seen for the user-supplied hazard.  The HAZUS-MH ground motion curves show breaks 
or jumps in the curves that can not be attributed to any particular cause due to the ‘black 
box’ nature of HAZUS-MH coding.  With these concerns regarding the HAZUS-MH 
ground motion determination in mind, and the accuracy checks completed for the 
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external hazard generation program, the user-supplied hazard maps are determined to be 















































Figure 27: PGV Comparison 























Figure 28: Sa 0.3 Sec. Comparison 


























Figure 29: Sa 1.0 Sec. Comparison 
 
5.2.3 Incorporation of Site Classification 
Hazard determination for the default site class requires the integration of the four 
CEUS Event attenuation functions only, whereas improving the hazard to account for site 
class necessitates the inclusion of NEHRP provisions for site response.  Adjustments are 
made only to portions of the region assigned site classes ‘A,’ ‘B,’ ‘C’ and ‘E.’  Any 
region assigned site class ‘F’ must be adjusted to site class E because HAZUS-MH does 
not recognize site class ‘F’ as there are no NEHRP site class factors for soils in this 
category.  Figure 30 details the portions of the study region where improved site class 
information is available.  Approximately 80% of the study region is covered by the 
improved site class map, which leaves only a small portion of the region defined by the 
default site class, ‘D.’ 
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 Amplification and reduction factored associated with the map of improved soil 
types are calculated based on the procedure outlined in the NEHRP Recommended 
Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings and Other Structures (FEMA 450, 
2003).  Determinations of acceleration parameter response are based on a maximum 
considered earthquake which is a magnitude 7.7 event for NMSZ region.  The maximum 
spectral accelerations, SMS and SM1, are calculated for each census tract in the study 
region based on the following:  
saMS SFS *=   &    11 * SFS vM =  
where  SS = The short period maximum spectral acceleration response at 5% damping 
 S1 = The one-second period maximum spectral acceleration for at 5%  
  damping  
 Fa = The short period site coefficient (at 0.2 sec. period) 
 Fv = The long period site coefficient (at 1.0 sec. period) 
 
Figure 30: Improved Site Class Map 
 
Both site coefficients are found in table for short and long period responses, respectively, 
and dependent on the value of corresponding spectral acceleration period value.  Site 
coefficients, Fa and Fv, are determined via Table 15 & Table 16.  In cases when the 
response value does not appear in one or both of the tables, for example SS = 0.45g, linear 
interpolation between spectral values is used to determine the appropriate coefficient(s).   
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Table 15: Site Coefficient, Fa, for Short Period Spectral Acceleration (FEMA 450, 2003) 
 
Table 16: Site Coefficient, Fv, for Long Period Spectral Acceleration (FEMA 450, 2003) 
 
 
Once the site coefficients are determined the spectral acceleration value is multiplied by 
the factor and a new spectral value, more representative of actual soil response, is 
calculated. 
 Peak response parameters, PGA and PGV, are also evaluated using the NEHRP 
site coefficient method.  Since PGA represents the ground motion at a spectral 
acceleration of zero-period, the short period coefficient is applied, and the value is 
modified in the same manner as the short period spectral acceleration.  Peak ground 
velocity, however; is calculated using the long period spectral acceleration in CEUS 
Event attenuation functions and thus modified by the factor, Fv, applied to the one-second 
period spectral acceleration.   
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 The NEHRP ground motion modification factor for site class used to develop 
hazard maps for the NMSZ employ a short-period of 0.2 seconds, as discussed previously.  
HAZUS-MH, however; calculated short-period spectral values at a period of 0.3 seconds. 
Subsequently, all damage state determinations for infrastructure components are based on 
the greater short-period, 0.3 sec.  This difference of 0.1 seconds between periods is not 
problematic due to the shape of the spectral acceleration response curve as it relates to 
structural period. Design spectral accelerations, SDS and SD1, are reductions to the 
maximum expected spectral accelerations for the purposes of structural design.  As 
illustrates in the equations below the maximum spectral values are reduced by a factor of 
one-third, which implies the spectral values structures are expected to experience is two-
thirds of the predicted values for the maximum considered earthquake.   
MSDS SS *3
2
=   &  11 *3
2
MD SS =  
where;  SDS = The design spectral acceleration for short-period response 
 SD1 = The design spectral acceleration for one-second period response 
The design spectral accelerations are then used to determine the range of period values 
over which the short period spectral acceleration applies.  Boundary values of period for 











T 1=  
Both periods of interest, 0.2 seconds and 0.3 seconds, fall within the range of T0 to TS, 
thus permitting the use of short-period acceleration for either period value, as seen in 
Figure 31.  Over the range of T0 to TS the spectral acceleration is constant at the short-
period acceleration, meaning the same spectral response value will be assigned to any 
structural period within that range.  As a result of this constant spectral acceleration the 
determination of damage states in HAZUS-MH will not be affected by the shorter period 
employed in the NEHRP specifications and the CEUS Event attenuations.   
A census tract analysis is performed to check the accuracy of response parameter 
adjustment based on the aforementioned NEHRP site class factors for PGA, PGV and 
both spectral acceleration values.  Comparisons show that ground motion is amplified 
considerably for site class ‘B,’ with increases in PGA as much as 1.8 times larger than the  
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Figure 31: Spectral Acceleration vs. Period (FEMA 450, 2003) 
 
PGA for site class ‘D.’  Short-period spectral acceleration increases similarly to PGA, 
though PGV and long-period spectral acceleration values increase as much as 2.67 times 
that of site class ‘D’ values.  Site class ‘C’ shows a much lower increase in ground 
motion values, approximately 10-40% for all response parameters.  As is expected site 
class ‘D’ response values remain unaltered when compared to the default analysis.  
Decreases in ground motion values of up to 33% are present in site class ‘E.’  This is 
especially relevant to the locations of all three epicenter considered in this research.  Each 
epicenter resides within the central expanse of red, illustrating site class ‘E,’ in Figure 30.  
The strongest ground motions experienced near the epicenter will be reduced due to the 
presence of extremely soft soils.  At greater distances, however; lesser ground motions 
will be amplified, in the north and west for example.  This creates a larger region of 
moderate shaking, 0.1g to 0.3g, as seen in Figure 32.   
 
Figure 32: PGA Map for Improved Site Class 
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In addition to the soil class improvement procedure employing the regional site 
class map the FEMA baseline maps discussed earlier also incorporate site class 
parameters.  The maps themselves were developed with this information and thus do not 
require updating or alterations to obtain regional ground motion values that reflect local 
site effects.   
 
5.2.4 Liquefaction Susceptibility 
 A critical factor required to adequately represent the seismic hazard in the New 
Madrid Seismic Zone is regional liquefaction susceptibility.  Surface built inventory such 
as highways and airport runways are only impacted by permanent ground deformation as 
a result of liquefaction or landsliding.  There is extensive evidence of widespread 
paleoliquefaction events in the NMSZ.  In addition, the soils layer developed by the 
CUSEC state geologists describes the Type F soils as liquefiable.  A liquefaction proxy 
was developed by Doug Bausch at FEMA Region VIII to approximate the potential for 
permanent ground deformation.  All susceptibility classifications are based on the 
aforementioned site class map for the NMSZ. Site classes are assigned a corresponding 
susceptibility level, assume shallow ground water, and are based on NEHRP liquefaction 
susceptibility levels (Bausch – Liquefaction Proxy, 2006), as seen in Table 17. These 
classifications are associated with site characteristics, such as soil composition and shear 
wave velocity and propagation. 







A Hard Rock NONE 0 
B Rock NONE 0 
C Very Dense Soil & Soft Rock LOW 1 
D Stiff Soils HIGH 4 
E Soil Soils VERY HIGH 5 
F Soils Requiring Site-Specific Evaluation VERY HIGH 5 
 
There is a critical need for regional geologists and seismologists to provide 
liquefaction susceptibility assignments within the New Madrid Seismic Zone. With the  
exception of the Type F soils described as liquefiable, as well as the presence of 
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paleoliquefaction features, the rubric used to ascertain site class is nothing more than an 
estimation of behavior based on typical site class response to seismic activity. The 
liquefaction proxy (See Figure 16) needs to be replaced with a product that is better 
supported by geological mapping and data.   Results generated from its use should only 
be considered approximate. Industry and government professionals warn that the use of 
this data may not reflect the actual response of the ground, in terms of liquefaction 
probability, and lateral spreading.  However, it should be noted that permanent ground 
deformation in the NMSZ scenarios may be underestimated due to the lack of a landslide 
susceptibility layer.  
A possible solution would be to use liquefaction susceptibility data based on 
experimental and field research.  Information of this type, however; is severely lacking in 
the Central and Eastern U.S.  Two local studies were commissioned by the USGS several 
years ago to investigate the liquefaction susceptibilities of two major urban centers in the 
New Madrid Seismic Zone; St. Louis, Missouri, and Memphis, Tennessee.  While these 
studies present highly refined data based on field surveys, the area covered between the 
two is negligible on the regional level used in this research.  Subsequent phases of the 
New Madrid catastrophic planning effort focusing on local assessments will employ these 
highly-refined liquefaction susceptibility maps.  Due to the detailed nature of these maps 
it is likely that the damage and losses determined in these major urban areas will be 
greater than those determined for the same cities in the larger regional impact assessment.  
Additionally, Tsai et al. (2006) have investigated the affects of depth-dependent site 
factors in the Mississippi Embayment and the deep sediment deposits in the area.  This 
information may aid in the determination of better liquefaction susceptibility evaluations, 
however; at the time the research discussed herein was completed the work on depth-
dependent site factors was not available for use and thus not incorporated.  As a result of 
these factors the FEMA-developed liquefaction susceptibility proxy remains the only 
source of information and is used by default, since it is deemed more crucial to include 
approximate data than to include none at all.   
 The baseline study used as a reference in this research developed a separate set of 
hazard maps for their study region in the New Madrid Seismic Zone, similar to those 
developed in this research.  Maps sets (PGA, PGV, Sa 0.3 sec. and Sa 1.0 sec.) were 
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created for a magnitude 7.7 earthquake on each of the three New Madrid Fault thrusts.  In 
addition to non-zero ground motions at distances greater than 200 km, FEMA/USGS 
maps also account for soil amplification through the use of site class factors which are 
identical to the site class map used in this research.  While standard HAZUS-MH CEUS 
Event attenuation functions and weighting factors are applied to the ground motions 
generated herein, FEMA and the USGS did not develop their baseline maps in 
accordance with the HAZUS-MH CEUS attenuation approaches; CEUS Event or CEUS 
Characteristic Event.  Baseline shake maps were developed with a modified fault-rupture 
model similar to the format used by the USGS for national hazard map construction.  
Ruptures employed for fault thrusts are characterized by coordinates for depth-to-top, dip 
and down-dip-length of rupture instead of epicenters (or hypocenters) that apply to 
HAZUS-MH attenuations.  It should be noted that FEMA ground motions are 
significantly higher than the hazard values determined in this research using CEUS Event 
weighted attenuations.  This trend is evident when Figure 14 and Figure 32 are compared.  
Further comparison with baseline hazard levels is discussed in subsequent sections.   
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6 Earthquake Impact Assessment 
6.1 Level I Analysis 
 A Level I analysis in HAZUS-MH is comprised of default inventory and 
fragilities in conjunction with internal hazard calculation.  For this type of deterministic 
analysis the hazard definition only requires the user to specify the location of an epicenter 
and earthquake intensity.  As discussed earlier all Level I analyses employ the CEUS 
Event consisting of the attenuation relations highlighted in the HAZUS-MH 
Methodology section.  There is no consideration for soil amplification, liquefaction or 
various other parameters which modify ground shaking and damage values in a Level I 
analysis.  With virtually no region-specific data the accuracy of this form of analysis is 
very low.  Loss assessments completed with default data are used typically to provide a 
baseline for comparison against future analyses with improved hazard, inventory and 
fragility data.  The Level I analysis detailed herein serves this purpose by providing 
initial estimations of damage and economic loss for the New Madrid Seismic Zone.   
 Adequate portrayal of the hazard present in the CEUS requires the 
implementation of three potential earthquake locations corresponding to the three 
proposed thrusts of the New Madrid Fault.  As seen in Figure 21, there are three 
suggested locations each with three segments.  Potential epicenters are positioned 
according to those illustrated in the aforementioned figure and Level I analyses run for 
each hazard scenario.  A comparison is then completed for the determination of a worst-
case scenario at the default level of analysis.  
 
6.1.1 Northeast Epicenter 
6.1.1.1 Ground Motion 
 Hazard is defined via the ground motion map generation procedure outlined in the 
previous Hazard Definition section.  Shake maps for the northeast epicenter equate to 
ground motion results within HAZUS-MH since all attenuations are applied externally.  
Ground shaking results for the northeast epicenter are illustrated in Figure 33 - Figure 36.  
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Peak ground accelerations are most intense within 40 km of the epicenter, where PGA > 
0.35g.  Maximum accelerations, however; occur within the census tract where the 
epicenter is located and experience intensities of nearly 0.9g.  Moderate shaking values 
between 0.05g and 0.35g cover a considerable portion of the region.  Only extreme 
southern counties and several northwestern census tracts realize minimum PGA values 
less than 0.05g.  The lack of site-specific soil conditions permits the concentric 
appearance of PGA and all other shaking response parameters.   
 
Figure 33: Peak Ground Acceleration (g) – NE Level I 
 
Figure 34: Peak Ground Velocity (in./sec.) – NE Level I 
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Similar trends are exhibited by the peak ground velocity and spectral acceleration 
responses.  Tracts nearest the epicenter experience maximum shaking values while the 
majority of the region sees only moderate shaking, such as PGV where most of the region 
is assessed between 5 in./sec. and 15 in./sec. Spectral accelerations show significant 
shaking, greater than 0.5g, within 50 km of the epicenter for a period of 1.0 seconds.  
Short-period spectral accelerations are far greater than long-period spectral accelerations, 
with maximum values near 2.2g.  Large spectral acceleration values generate more 
damage to structures which will be reflected in extensive and complete damage state 
probabilities.   













Figure 35: Sa 0.3 Sec. (g) – NE Level I 












Figure 36: Sa 1.0 Sec. (g) – NE Level I 
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 Resulting spectral displacement values show large displacements in the northern 
portion of the study region. Displacements greater than one-inch occur within 50km of 
the epicenter for short-period structures.  Maximum displacement values greater than 4 
four-inches near the epicenter are likely to cause severe damage to structures subjected to 
short-period excitation.  Long-period structures are likely to experience even larger 
displacements, greater than five-inches, nearest the epicenter.  The majority of the study 
region sees long-period spectral displacements greater than 0.75-inches (See Figure 37 & 
Figure 38), which is enough to damage most structures, as well as buried pipelines.   
 
Figure 37: Sd 0.3 Sec. (in.) – NE Level I 
 
Figure 38: Sd 1.0 Sec. (in.) – NE Level I 
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6.1.1.2 General Building Stock 
 The general building stock encompasses all buildings constructed within the study 
region.  These buildings are classified by building type and occupancy/use.  Figure 39-
Figure 42 illustrate the distributions of square footage and building count by both general 
occupancy and general building type.  The predominant general building type is wood 
fame construction (light wood frame specific building type), with 72% of the buildings, 
or over 2.7 million buildings in the study region.  This equates to nearly 5.1 billion square 
feet and 65% of the total square footage built with wood frame construction.  Additional 
common specific building types include low-rise unreinforced masonry (URML) and 
mobile homes (MH) at 13.8% and 12.7% of the total building count, or 526,000 and 
484,000 building, respectively.  These building types also account for 17.5% and 6.7% of  
 
Figure 39: Building Count by General Building Type 
 
Figure 40: Square Footage by General Building Type 
 
Figure 41: Square Footage by General Occupancy 
 
Figure 42: Building Count by General Occupancy 
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the total regional square footage with URML buildings covering 1.4 billion square feet 
and mobile homes comprising 0.5 billion square feet.  Since these three building types 
comprise over 95% of the regional general building stock inventory analysis of regional 
damage focuses on these three building types.   
 The primary general occupancy class present in this study region in the residential 
class.  Nearly 99% of the over 3.8 million buildings are residential, with 82.4% of those 
being single family homes and 12.7% being manufactured housing.  Residential buildings 
equate to 82.5%, or 6.5 billion square feet of regional construction.  Commercial building 
account for 11.7% of regional square footage, while the remaining 5% is divided between 
industrial, agricultural, religion, education and government buildings, in descending order 
of regional square footage.  These building types, with the addition of commercial 
buildings comprise just over 1% of the total number of buildings, however.  Due to this 
inventory distribution damage state assessments of all analyses will focus on residential 
and commercial buildings as they account for the majority of the general building stock 
inventory.   
 Building types in HAZUS-MH are classified by seismic design levels; high-, 
moderate-, low- and pre-code.  The study region used in this research includes moderate-, 
and low- and pre-code classifications within the general building stock.  Moderate-code 
building exists along the New Madrid Fault and low-code building comprise the 
remainder of the region, as classified in HAZUS-MH.  This classification geography is 
represented in Figure 43.  Pre-code buildings can be found throughout the region.   
 
Figure 43: Moderate-Code Classification Boundary 
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 Damage state probabilities for the primary building type, light food frames, 
indicate that the majority of these structures are unlikely to sustain structural damage.   
Figure 44 illustrates the probability that W1 structures experience no structural damage.  
The greatest probability, depicted in blue, shows the extent of building greater than 70% 
likely to undergo no structural damage, which encompasses the majority of the region.  
Figure 45 illustrates at least moderate damage probabilities, meaning the probability of 
experiencing moderate, extensive or complete structural damage.  The only tracts with 
more than a 10% probability of experiencing at least moderate damage are within 50 km 
the epicenter.   
 
Figure 44: No Damage - W1 – NE Level I 
 
Figure 45: At Least Moderate Damage - W1 – NE Level I 
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Additional categories of damage include non-structural acceleration damage, 
which applies to interior partitions, mechanical equipment and electrical equipment.  
Non-structural drift damage affects building contents and is specified in yet another 
damage calculation.  The probabilities of at least moderate damage for these two damage 
types are illustrated in Figure 46 & Figure 47.  While structural damage is confined to a  
 
Figure 46: At Least Moderate Damage - Non-Structural Acceleration - W1 – NE Level I 
 
Figure 47: At Least Moderate Damage - Non-Structural Drift - W1 – NE Level I 
 
small region near the epicenter, non-structural damage of similar likelihoods (i.e. 10%, 
20%, etc.) extend farther from the epicenter.  Non-structural damage due to acceleration, 
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in particular, is at least 25% probable up to a distance of 90 km from the epicenter.  This 
form of damage is experienced roughly twice as far as structural damage of comparable 
likelihood.  Non-structural drift damage covers roughly the same are as structural damage, 
though the probability of non-structural damage due to drift is much greater within that 
area.  Damage probabilities are likely to be greater than 30% for at least moderate 
damage as oppose to greater than only 10% with strictly structural damage.  
 A second critical building type in the Central and Eastern U.S. is unreinforced 
masonry buildings.  These structures are numerous as well as susceptible to damage 
which often lead to numerous deaths as was highlighted in the FEMA baseline study.  
Default damage state probabilities for the no structural damage case are illustrated in 
Figure 48. As with light wood frames the blue color indicates lower likelihoods of 
damage.  For URMs greater than 65% probability of no structural damage exists at 
distances greater than 150 km from the epicenter, while structures within 75 km of the 
epicenter are almost guaranteed to experience damage.  Probabilities of at least moderate 
structural damage appear to be the mirror image of the no structural damage case.  
Greater than 50% likelihood of exceeding this damage state exists up to 100 km from the 
epicenter, as seen in Figure 49.   
 
Figure 48: No Damage – URML – NE Level I 
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Figure 49: At Least Moderate Damage – URML – NE Level I 
 
 Non-structural damage patterns for URMs are similar to those of wood frame 
structures.  As shown in Figure 50 & Figure 51, acceleration-controlled and drift-
controlled damage are critical nearest the epicenter.  While non-structural damage due to 
acceleration encounters lower probabilities as source-to-site distances increase, damage 
likelihoods greater than 10% extend noticeably farther from the epicenter than drift 
controlled damage, by approximately 50 km.  Drift-sensitive damage probabilities for 
non-structural elements, however; exhibit much higher probabilities of damage as 
epicentral distances increase to nearly 90 km.  Regardless of which variable damage is 
sensitive too, non-structural components in URMs are likely to experience damage 
nearest the epicenter like wood frame structures.   
Mobile homes exhibit damage probability trends similar to those seen for wood 
frame and URM structures.  Likelihoods of at least moderate damage extend slightly 
beyond those of the previous two structure types, however.  As shown in Figure 52, 
structural damage probabilities greater than 10% reach farther than 200 km from the 
northeast epicenter, with likelihoods greater than 55% extending up to 100 km from the 
epicenter.  Wider ranges of more severe damage states apply to extensive damage, while 
the extent of the area expected to see no damage decreases.  Both forms of non-structural 
damage state probabilities follow trends represented by previous structure types, though 
with the greater source-to-site distance ranges illustrated for this particular structure type.   
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Figure 50: Non-Structural Acceleration – URML – NE Level I 
 
Figure 51: Non-Structural Drift – URML – NE Level I 
 
A second method to determine damage to the general building stock is to consider 
the number of buildings damaged.  One manner in which this may be accomplished is to 
focus on the three primary building types present in the study region; light frame wood 
construction, unreinforced masonry structures and mobile homes.  Damage is quantified 
by seismic code level and damage state, then totaled for each building type, and finally a 
percentage of the total inventory in a particular damage state is determined.  These values 
are outlined in Table 18.  This table illustrates the performance of each building type, 
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with light wood frames experiencing the least damage, percentage-wise, despite the total 
number of damaged wood frame structures being greater than the remaining two.  Mobile 
homes suffer the greatest losses, with roughly 60% of this building type sustaining some 
form of damage.  Over 20% of all unreinforced masonry buildings experience damage 
due to seismic activity, while 5% of those buildings that are damaged sustain extensive 
damage or total collapse.   
 
Figure 52: At Least Moderate Damage - Mobile Homes – NE Level I 
 
Table 18: Damage State by Building Count – NE Level I 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 439,548 31,811 15,471 1,877 142
Total Low Code Buildings 2,184,833 74,793 5,915 67 0
Total Buildings 2624381 106604 21386 1944 142
2754457
%Total Buildings 95.278% 3.870% 0.776% 0.071% 0.005%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 40,647 6,910 5,484 4,166 2,456
Total Low Code Buildings 156,420 16,321 5,154 823 58
Total Pre-Code Buildings 217,560 45,517 17,152 4,695 2,065
Total Buildings 414627 68748 27790 9684 4579
525428
%Total Buildings 78.912% 13.084% 5.289% 1.843% 0.871%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 21,154 9,237 9,963 4,060 949
Total Low Code Buildings 139,743 19,340 10,764 977 2
Total Pre-Code Buildings 136,379 49,005 63,017 17,391 2,613
Total Buildings 297276 77582 83744 22428 3564
484594
%Total Buildings 61.345% 16.010% 17.281% 4.628% 0.735%
Light Wood Frame
Total Number of Building Type:
Unreinforced Masonry
Total Number of Building Type:
Mobile Homes
Total Number of Building Type:
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Damage to regional structures is further defined by a local damage state 
assessment.  By defining damage on a state-wide basis it is clear how the location of an 
epicenter impacts the amount and type of damage local structures experience.  A 
northeast epicenter event yields damage according to the statistics outlined in Table 19.  
While this table provides total damage estimates for the entire region, nearly 7% of 
building sustaining damage, or approximately 230,000 buildings, also details which areas 
experience the greatest amount of damage.  It is clear that Illinois and Missouri incur that 
largest number of damaged buildings, which is representative of all building types, not 
just the three primary types discussed earlier.  States farther from the epicenter; 
Mississippi, Alabama and Arkansas, realize fewer damaged buildings than the northern 
states.  It is also relevant to note that damage severity as determined by building count is 
a function of the inventory in a state, meaning that states with fewer buildings are likely 
to incur fewer damaged buildings, however; if that state is the site of an earthquake 
damage will not be proportional to states farther away.   
Table 19: Building Damage by State – NE Level I 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 205,329 162 4 0 0 205,496
Arkansas 343,961 732 30 0 0 344,724
Illinois 284,040 37,610 10,142 1,163 50 333,005
Indiana 124,678 3,515 252 4 0 128,450
Kentucky 158,169 25,791 6,791 613 20 191,385
Mississippi 231,760 628 18 0 0 232,406
Missouri 636,668 29,047 3,571 174 5 669,465
Tennessee 503,772 13,947 1,704 43 0 519,466
Code Total 2,488,378 111,432 22,514 1,998 75 2,624,396
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 137,487 6,944 932 17 0 145,380
Illinois 517 2,853 4,290 2,283 1,101 11,045
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 3,917 3,539 1,956 564 52 10,028
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 38,226 25,862 22,272 7,293 2,430 96,083
Tennessee 325,400 9,115 1,868 114 1 336,498
Code Total 505,548 48,313 31,319 10,271 3,584 599,035
Region Total 2,993,926 159,746 53,833 12,268 3,658 3,223,431





Finally, damage may be quantified by overall square footage based on building 
type.  Table 20 displays square footage values defined by code level and damage state of 
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the three primary building types in the CEUS.  Of the nearly 4.9 billion square feet of 
light wood frame construction, only 6% sustain damage, while over 20% of unreinforced 
masonry buildings and 40% of mobile homes experience damage.  As with building 
count damage estimates, approximately 0.8% of all light wood frames are damaged 
extensively or collapse, which is far less than the 2.5% and 5.5% seen with unreinforced 
masonry buildings and mobile homes, respectively. 
Table 20: Building Damage by Square Footage – NE Level I 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Square Footage 778,282,390 55,439,660 28,105,250 3,416,800 256,120
Total Low Code Square Footage 3,867,438,150 133,758,650 10,810,940 132,640 200
Total Square Footage 4,645,720,540 189,198,310 38,916,190 3,549,440 256,320
4,877,640,800
%Total Square Footage 95.245% 3.879% 0.798% 0.073% 0.005%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Square Footage 116890200 17114140 12504240 9560220 5773920
Total Low Code Square Footage 365956540 36656260 11772100 1969820 149530
Total Pre-Code Square Footage 614201520 119070660 43899390 12376280 5249180
Total Square Footage 1,097,048,260 172,841,060 68,175,730 23,906,320 11,172,630
1,373,144,000
%Total Square Footage 79.893% 12.587% 4.965% 1.741% 0.814%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Square Footage 23137030 10174810 10989170 4469420 1036470
Total Low Code Square Footage 151968670 21120550 11768140 1091110 7750
Total Pre-Code Square Footage 148213050 53587960 68916210 18993670 2894800
Total Square Footage 323,318,750 84,883,320 91,673,520 24,554,200 3,939,020
528,368,810
%Total Square Footage 61.192% 16.065% 17.350% 4.647% 0.746%
Total Number of Square Footage Type:
Total Number of Square Footage Type:
Unreinforced Masonry





Damage estimates categorized by occupancy permit determinations of use groups 
sustaining the greatest losses.  Table 21 delineates loss by general occupancy and state.  
This data highlights the extensive damage incurred by residential buildings.  Over 95% 
damage in each damage state is incurred by single family homes or other residential 
buildings.  Commercial structures also exhibit significant damage with approximately 
15% of all commercial buildings experiencing at least moderate damage. 
Table 21: Building Damage by General Occupancy - NE Level I 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Agriculture 1,435 0.04% 433 0.17% 281 0.20% 51 0.14% 6 0.07%
Commercial 28,716 0.85% 4,363 1.69% 2,722 1.98% 782 2.20% 199 2.33%
Education 242 0.01% 31 0.01% 18 0.01% 4 0.01% 2 0.02%
Government 1,381 0.04% 187 0.07% 126 0.09% 31 0.09% 10 0.12%
Industrial 4,749 0.14% 680 0.26% 532 0.39% 135 0.38% 24 0.28%
Other Residential 419,874 12.46% 85,817 33.17% 86,455 62.73% 23,136 65.03% 3,829 44.78%
Religion 2,234 0.07% 252 0.10% 149 0.11% 49 0.14% 14 0.16%
Single Family 2,910,763 86.39% 166,969 64.53% 47,534 34.49% 11,387 32.01% 4,467 52.24%
TOTAL 3,369,394 258,732 137,817 35,575 8,551
CompleteNone Slight Moderate Extensive
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6.1.1.3 Essential Facilities 
 The general building stock provides comprehensive coverage of all buildings 
within a study region.  Certain types of buildings, however; are critical to emergency 
response efforts and community safety thus these buildings are assessed separate from 
general buildings.  These buildings are classified as essential facilities and include 
emergency care facilities (hospitals), police and fire stations, and schools.  All essential 
facilities are assigned seismic code levels, similarly to the general buildings stock, though 
with point-wise structure definition the affect of code level is evident.  Figure 53 
expresses the probability of at least moderate damage to hospitals, and it is clear that the 
highest damage probabilities lie in the north-central portion of the region.   
 
Figure 53: At Least Moderate Damage – Hospitals – NE Level I 
 When considering damage state as a function of ground acceleration, notice that 
hospitals designated pre-code and moderate-code experience significantly different 
damage state probabilities despite being exposed to the same level of ground shaking.  
This variation is due to the seismic code level assessed to each building.  As was the case 
with the general building stock, structures along the New Madrid Fault are assessed 
moderate-code level seismic design, while all other areas, in particular the northeastern 
portion of this study region, are assessed a pre-code seismic design level.  Many hospitals 
displayed in dark in Figure 53 are precast concrete construction and at least 10% likely to 
experience moderate damage.  This means visible cracks, significant crack width and 
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propagation up to collapse of these buildings.  Figure 54 further delineates the likelihood 
of complete damage to hospitals.  Even with pre-code specifications only two of 308 
hospitals are more than 2.5% likely to collapse, indicating that even those buildings 
closest to the epicenter are not likely to collapse.   
 
Figure 54: Complete Damage – Hospitals – NE Level I 
 
 Police station damage trends are similar to those seen in hospital damage.  Only 
structures within 30 km of the epicenter are more than 10% likely to collapse.  This 
equates 28 of the 1,207 total police stations in the study region. Structures nearest the 
epicenter are more than 50% to collapse, though this is directly related to the severe 
shaking occurring within kilometers of the epicenter (See Table 22).  






Hospitals 308 39 0
Schools 4,695 287 27
EOCs 92 8 1
Police Stations 1,207 92 9




Seismic code trends that apply to hospitals extend to police and fire stations as 
well.  Both fire and police stations are specified as unreinforced masonry buildings, 
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where structures near the NM Fault are designated moderate-code and the remainder of 
buildings classified as pre-code.  Damage state probability distributions as well as the 
probabilities associated with damage states at specified source-to-site distances for police 
and fire stations are quite similar to those exhibited by hospitals.  This trend is illustrated 
in Figure 55.  The only variation to be noted is slight and results in a minimal increase in 
damage state probabilities for fire and police stations due to the structure type (UMRL) as 
opposed to the precast concrete structure classification of most hospitals.  Schools are 
also assigned unreinforced masonry building types and thus show damage states 
distributions like those appearing in Figure 55 for fire stations.   
 
Figure 55: At Least Moderate Damage - Fire Stations – NE Level I 
 
Essential facilities are also assigned functionalities to determine how long each 
facility will be non-operational in the aftermath of an earthquake.  HAZUS-MH employs 
a baseline functionality level of 50% operational and thus is the functionality level 
considered acceptable in this research.  This level can be adjusted by the user to reflect 
the required operational capabilities of a specific area.  Functionalities of all essential 
facilities are enumerated in Table 23.  Hospitals and fire stations present the lowest 
functionality ratings just one day after an earthquake, with 80.8% and 82.4% of the total 
facility type inventory operational, respectively.  Schools are the most functional by far,  
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Table 23: Essential Facilities Functionalities – NE Level I 
No. 
Functional












% of Total 
Functional
Day 1 249 80.84% 1222 83.41% 1026 85.00% 4167 88.75%
Day 3 249 80.84% 1225 83.62% 1031 85.42% 4180 89.03%
Day 7 283 91.88% 1398 95.43% 1157 95.86% 4541 96.72%
Day 14 284 92.21% 1398 95.43% 1157 95.86% 4541 96.72%
Day 30 307 99.68% 1465 100.00% 1207 100.00% 4695 100.00%
Day 90 308 100.00% 1465 100.00% 1207 100.00% 4695 100.00%
Schools
308 Total Strucutres 1465 Total Strucutres 1207 Total Strucutres 4695 Total Strucutres
Hospitals Fire Stations Police Stations
 
 
as 85% of all schools are functional the day after an earthquake.  It is not until a month 
after an earthquake that all essential facilities exhibit greater than 95% of all buildings 
functioning properly.  Further illustration of essential facilities functionality is provided 
in Figure 56 where school functionality at 14 days post-earthquake is represented.  It is 
evident that most schools in the study region are functioning, except for those within 75 
km of the epicenter.  With the addition of two more weeks post-earthquake only the 
schools in the immediate vicinity of the epicenter are non-operational, which is due to 
extensive damage and collapse from severe shaking.  Again, it is critical to consider 
seismic code level, as these building sustain more damage and thus recover slower and 
remain non-operational longer than structures designed to more stringent seismic code 
levels.   
 
Figure 56: Schools Functionality at 14 Days – NE Level I 
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6.1.1.4 Transportation Systems 
 The transportation system is one of the most densely populated inventory 
categories in HAZUS-MH.  It covers numerous modes of transportation including road, 
rail, waterways and air transport.  Due to the massive amount of data provided for 
transportation system components this research will focus on highways, highway bridges, 
rail lines, railway bridges and airport damage and functionalities.  There are over 30,000 
highway bridges in this CEUS study region creating illegible damage maps, thus all 
damage state probabilities are reported via single quantities as oppose to maps.  Of the 
30,314 bridges of varying structural types only 2,647 bridges are more than 10% likely to 
suffer at least moderate damage.  Occurrences of at least moderate damage are defined by 
50% or greater probability of reaching a damage state, thus reducing the number of at 
least moderately damaged bridges to only 350, or 1.5% of all bridges.  Only 41 bridges 
are more than 50% likely to collapse which can be attributed to there source-to-site 
distance being less than 30 km.  With so few bridges likely to sustain damage this 
indicates that the majority of regional bridges are not likely to sustain more than slight 
damage, if any.  Especially when HAZUS-MH estimates indicate that over 27,500 
bridges, or 91%, are more than 80% likely to sustain no damage (See Table 24). 
Table 24: Transportation Damage by Component - NE Level I 
Region 
Total




Highway Bridges 30,314 371 7
Railway Bridges 425 0 0
Railway Facilities 393 20 0
Bus Facilities 84 1 0
Ferry Facilities 5 5 5
Port Facilities 691 17 0
Airport Facilities 637 6 0  
  
Bridges, like essential facilities, are classified operational when they are at least 
50% functional.  Based on this assumption the bridge recovery timeline is shown in Table 
25.  HAZUS-MH functionality predictions show that nearly 99% of all highway bridges 
are functional only one day after an earthquake.  Functionality does not reach 100% 
within 90 days post-earthquake, and this is attributed to extensive bridge damage or 
collapse.  Further estimates of highway bridge damage indicate that the value of this 
damage is more than $216 million dollars.  Estimates of highway segment damage and 
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loss are null in this analysis due to the lack of liquefaction information to estimate 
permanent ground deformations which are the critical factor for determining highway 
segment losses.   
Table 25: Highway Bridge Functionality – NE Level I 
Time No. Functional % Total Functional
Day 1 29957 98.82%
Day 3 30085 99.24%
Day 7 30119 99.36%
Day 14 30124 99.37%
Day 30 30158 99.49%




Railway systems comprise 425 bridges and vast network of track throughout the 
CEUS.  Track damage and loss are not calculated due to lack of liquefaction 
susceptibility information, however; railway bridge damage is determined.  Only seven 
bridges are more than 10% likely to experience at least slight damage.  These low 
probabilities of damage elicit damage estimates for railway bridges at $110,000.   
Damage to airport facilities is illustrated in Figure 57.  There are 36 airports more 
than 10% likely to meet or exceed the moderate damage state, while less than ten airports 
are more than 50% likely to exceed that same damage state.  Only three airports in 
southern Illinois are more than 10% likely to experience collapse, indicating that nearly 
all airport facilities should remain standing following an earthquake.  Airport facility 
related loss estimates are more than $156 million dollars for a seismic event on the 
northeast extension of the New Madrid Fault.   
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Figure 57: Airport Facilities - At Least Moderate Damage – NE Level I 
 
6.1.1.5 Utility Systems 
Default analyses of utility systems are governed primarily by the performance of 
utility facilities.  HAZUS-MH inventory does not include pipeline information for any 
utility system, thus all estimates of pipeline damage are based on assumptions for 
pipeline distribution systems as previously discussed in the HAZUS-MH Methodology 
section.  Damage to facilities, however; is determined for moderate damage or more 
severe and is pictured in Figure 58.  The distribution of damage state probabilities, 
decreasing in concentric circles emanating from the epicenter, mimics damage trends 
seen in various other inventory groups.  Distributions are similar for all other types of 
utility system facilities and thus are not illustrated here.   
 Damage estimates for pipelines are applicable for potable water, waste water and 
natural gas only.  There are no assumptions made within HAZUS-MH for the distribution 
of oil pipelines which results in the null values shown in all fields under ‘Oil’ in Table 26.  
Potable water lines incur the greatest number of leaks and breaks, while natural gas lines 
exhibit the highest leak rate, 0.11 leaks/km, as oppose to 0.05 leaks/km and 0.07 
leaks/km for potable water and waste water, respectively.  Natural gas lines also have the 
greatest break rate at 0.028 breaks/km.  Potable water and waste water lines show break 
rates one-third and two-thirds those of natural gas lines, respectively.  These rates 
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indicate that natural gas lines are more sensitive to ground shaking than water distribution 
lines.   
 
Figure 58: Waste Water Facilities - At Least Moderate Damage – NE Level I 
 







Potable Water 500,560 26,241 6,560
Waste Water 300,336 20,754 5,188
Natural Gas 200,224 22,185 5,546
Oil 0 0 0  
 
Table 27: Utility System Component Damage - NE Level I 
Region 
Total




Potable Water 249 7 0
Waste Water 1,646 22 0
Natural Gas 114 0 0
Oil 49 0 0
Electric Power 158 2 0
Communications 940 11 0  
 
Utility systems functionality is yet another critical parameters, particularly when 
post-earthquake service is required.  Without functioning utilities even customers with 
inhabitable structures may not be able to stay due to a lack of utility services.  Table 28 
shows the functionality of each type of utility facility at various post-earthquake intervals.  
Waste water facilities appear to be most affected with only 1,548 treatment plants, or 
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94% of all facilities, operational the day after and earthquake (See Table 27).  Natural gas 
and oil facilities do not have facilities located within 50 km of the epicenter and as a 
result these buildings remain almost entirely functional immediately after an earthquake.  
Electric and potable water functional losses lead to service disruptions which are 
quantified in Table 29.  Losses of potable water outnumber electricity losses within the 
first week post-earthquake.  Nearly 1.5% of customers are without potable water the day 
after an earthquake, though that number is reduced to less than 1% within the first three 
days.  All customers are expected to regain potable water service after one month.  
Electricity does not recover as quickly as water service.  Even after a month nearly 2,000 
customers are still without power, and 60 still without power after three months.  
Table 28: Utility System Functionalities – NE Level I 
Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 14 Day 30 Day 90 Total
Potable Water 238 249 249 249 249 249 249
Waste Water 1548 1617 1637 1640 1640 1646 1646
Natural Gas 111 114 114 114 114 114 114
Oil Systems 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Electric Power 151 156 158 158 158 158 158




Table 29: Electric and Potable Water Service Disruptions – NE Level I 
Total No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 Day 90
Potable Water 57,022 38,691 24,465 0 0
Electric Power 46,712 28,436 10,912 1,951 60
4,236,197
No. of Households without Service
 
 
Finally, structural damage to utility facilities results in repairs and reconstruction, 
all of which contribute to the economic impact of utility system losses in the study region.  
The economic value of facility losses are outlined in Table 30.  Of the nearly $3.5 billion 
in utility system losses the greatest amount, 74% is incurred by waste water facilities.  
This is a result of the large number of facilities in the CEUS study region.  Another 
10.4% is attributed to electric systems damage and 6.8% related to potable water facilities.  
The remaining utilities do not represent a significant portion of the utility facilities 
inventory and thus do not generate significant loss value in comparison to major 
inventory categories.   
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Table 30: Utility System Losses – NE Level I 
Utility System Loss % Total
Potable Water Facility $234,760,000 6.75%
Potable Water Lines $118,080,000 3.40%
Waste Water Facility $2,563,630,000 73.73%
Waste Water Lines $93,390,000 2.69%
Oil Facilities $40,000 0.00%
Nautral Gas Facilities $2,140,000 0.06%
Natural Gas Lines $99,830,000 2.87%
Electric Systems $363,150,000 10.44%
Communication $1,900,000 0.05%
Total $3,476,920,000  
 
6.1.1.6 Induced Damage 
 Damage to buildings and utility systems, in particular natural gas and oil systems 
leads to induced damage such as fires following the initial earthquake.  Fire following 
earthquake is quantified in several ways, the first of which is the number of expected 
ignitions due to a given earthquake.  This model is based on work completed for highly 
urban areas which is not representative of the region investigated herein (Hamada, 1975).  
In addition, the model is simplified to calculate fire ignitions, burned area and damage 
from fire based on building density and peak ground acceleration .  Since this model is 
less complex than other damage and loss models in HAZUS-MH (such as building 
damage models) the fire following earthquake results should be considered approximate.  
With that in mind, HAZUS-MH predicts 50 ignitions across the entire study region.  
These fires are expected to displace 74 people and burn 0.40 square miles.  These values 
equate to less than 0.5% of total regional population and surface area.  Damage resulting 
from all fires is predicted to affect four million dollars of infrastructure value.  Ignitions 
and induced damage does not necessarily occur nearest the epicenter as is common with 
various buildings, bridges and utility system facilities.  Areas damaged by fire are located 
as shown in Figure 59.  Damaged building value is located over 50 km from the epicenter, 
which is due to the fire following model employed in HAZUS-MH.  Ignitions, and thus 
damaged value, is based on PGA and various other values including pipeline breaks and 
story drift in buildings.  This generally equates to ignitions in more populated areas 
where utilities are buildings are more numerous.   
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 Fires are defined further by the water demand required to extinguish them. The 
amount of water needed put out fires is shown in Figure 60.  As with the exposed value, 
fire demand, or water required in gallons per minute (gpm), is randomly positioned as 
well.  Census tracts near the epicenter require water to extinguish fires, though some of 
the greatest demands occur in  outlying census tracts such as two in central Missouri and 
one it western Tennessee.   
 
 
Figure 59: Fire Following EQ - Exposed Value ($) – NE Level I 
 
Figure 60: Fire Demand (gpm) – NE Level I 
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 Damage to infrastructure components across the entire region generates debris 
which must be removed prior to and in conjunction with repair and recovery efforts.  
HAZUS-MH divides debris into two categories, brick/wood and steel/concrete.  The 
earthquake presented in this scenario generates five million tons of debris, which is 
distributed according to Figure 61.  Logically, debris generation patterns mimics building 
loss patterns since debris is created from damage to infrastructure components.  Brick and 
wood comprises 53% of the debris generated with the remaining 2.35 million tons of 
debris is attributed to steel and concrete.  Debris removal utilizes trucks with a capacity 
of 25 tons each, thus requiring roughly 200,000 truckloads to completely remove the 
debris generated from this earthquake.   
 
Figure 61: Total Debris Generation (thousands of tons) – NE Level I 
  
Damage to structures, loss of utility services and induced damage all contribute to 
the number of uninhabitable structures as well as temporary and short-term shelter 
requirements region-wide.  From a regional population of 10.9 million people 2,758 
people are expected to seek temporary public shelter.  In addition 9,924 households are 
anticipated to be displaced.  Since supplementary housing needs are due to uninhabitable 
structures caused by severe structural and utility damage it is intuitive that displaced 
persons trends follow the building damage trends illustrated in previous discussions of 
damage by building type.  
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6.1.1.7 Social and Economic Losses 
HAZUS-MH also determined amounts of injuries and deaths related to a given 
hazard, all of which are termed ‘casualties’ and they are divided into four severity 
categories.  Please reference the HAZUS-MH Technical Manual for these classifications.  
Casualties caused by damage from an earthquake are calculated for three times 
throughout the day; 2AM, 2PM and 5PM to represent times where people are at home, at 
work and commuting.  These injuries and deaths are further categorized by general 
occupancy type.  The worst case scenario occurs at 2 PM, with 6,723 casualties of 
varying levels.  The fewest casualties occur at 5 PM, with only 6,557 casualties.  Table 
31 illustrates the distribution of casualties for the worst case scenario.  The majority of 
casualties are minor injuries, while approximately 6% are severe injuries or casualties.  
Commercial buildings are also cited as the occupancy class experiencing the greatest 
number of casualties, with approximately half of all causalities at each severity level 
occurring in commercial structures.   
Table 31: Casualties - 2 PM – NE Level I 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Commercial 2,914 616 77 149
Commuting 3 3 6 1
Educational 724 164 23 44
Hotels 10 2 0 1
Industrial 452 94 11 22
Other-Residential 439 81 7 14
Single Family 648 152 22 41
TOTAL 5,190 1,112 146 272  













Total 1,450 420  
 
 Shelter requirements for this scenario are displayed in Table 32.  A total of 420 
temporary shelters are required to house displaced residents.  Most of these temporary 
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shelters, 95%, are needed in Illinois, Kentucky and Missouri, with over half required in 
Missouri alone.   
 With all direct damage, induced damage, shelter needs and casualties computed 
the final step in risk assessment is to determine the economic losses associated with the 
hazard applied to the study region.  Losses are divided into direct and indirect economic 
losses.  Direct economic losses are further categorized by infrastructure system; buildings, 
transportation and utilities.  The first of these, direct losses due to building damage is by 
state displayed in Table 33 in thousands of dollars.  This information shows that non-
structural damage causes the greatest overall losses at nearly 50% of all building related 
losses.  The state of Missouri experiences the largest economic loss of $4 billion of the 
total $8.5 billion for buildings.  Loss ratio is also a critical factor in HAZUS-MH risk 
assessment.  Loss ratios greater than ten indicate significant economic losses as compared 
to the value of inventory in a given area.  Illinois, Kentucky and Missouri show the 
greatest loss ratios though these are much less than ten.   
Building losses are also classified by occupancy type.  These losses are also 
broken down by capital and income losses as was the previous table.  Economic losses 
are displayed in millions of dollars.  Capital stock losses are greatest for residential 
buildings, which is comprised of single family homes and other residential buildings.  
Approximately half of all capital losses are attributed to residential buildings with another 
one-third incurred by commercial buildings (See Table 34).  The majority of income 
losses, however; roughly 75% occur with commercial structures.  Residential buildings 
make-up another 15% with the remaining occupancy types filling the final 10%.  As with 
the previous table, all building related economic losses total nearly $8.4 billion.   






















Alabama $483 $3,043 $1,568 $72 0.01 $4 $78 $115 $132 $5,495
Arkansas $16,379 $53,730 $22,787 $1,066 0.12 $292 $4,137 $5,447 $4,627 $108,465
Illinois $465,679 $1,166,272 $347,166 $7,590 4.13 $10,269 $101,092 $133,114 $132,384 $2,363,565
Indiana $68,036 $80,709 $39,071 $3,099 0.26 $670 $10,674 $12,809 $8,255 $223,325
Kentucky $216,021 $511,715 $165,776 $5,528 2.30 $4,877 $62,694 $87,796 $62,428 $1,116,836
Mississippi $2,275 $10,541 $5,496 $405 0.03 $28 $489 $695 $636 $20,564
Missouri $721,701 $2,006,476 $661,191 $23,851 2.58 $15,458 $185,216 $243,106 $214,097 $4,071,096
Tennessee $97,278 $279,122 $115,332 $4,202 0.54 $2,085 $30,690 $41,916 $30,250 $600,875
TOTAL $1,587,852 $4,111,609 $1,358,387 $45,813 $33,684 $395,070 $524,997 $452,808 $8,510,220
Capital Losses Income Losses
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Table 34: Direct Economic Losses by General Occupancy ($ millions) – NE Level I 
Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Others TOTAL
Income Losses Wage $0.00 $18.92 $464.59 $19.24 $22.25 $525.00
Capital-Related $0.00 $8.27 $367.61 $12.18 $7.02 $395.08
Rental $110.12 $111.66 $202.15 $7.11 $9.04 $440.08
Relocation $12.09 $4.46 $13.38 $0.65 $3.10 $33.68
SUBTOTAL $122.21 $143.31 $1,047.73 $39.18 $41.41 $1,393.84
Capital Stock Losses Structural $542.42 $343.60 $477.15 $88.69 $135.99 $1,587.85
Non-Structural $1,807.04 $1,033.46 $905.19 $171.77 $194.15 $4,111.61
Content $578.46 $198.25 $386.37 $102.28 $93.02 $1,358.38
Inventory $0.00 $0.00 $16.98 $24.00 $4.83 $45.81
SUBTOTAL $2,927.92 $1,575.31 $1,785.69 $386.74 $427.99 $7,103.65
TOTAL $3,050.13 $1,718.62 $2,833.42 $425.92 $469.40 $8,497.49  
 
 Direct economic losses for transportation systems are detailed in Table 35 by 
state and appear in thousands of dollars.  As with building losses, Illinois and Missouri 
experience the greatest amounts of loss at nearly $109 million and $164 million, 
respectively.  Mississippi and Alabama see the least economic losses which is due to the 
significantly smaller number of census tracts as well as reduced ground motion.  
Transportation losses are also quantified by transportation subsystems and their 
respective components as seen in Table 36 displayed in millions of dollars.  Loss ratios 
indicate the total loss of ferries and significant economic losses incurred by railway 
facilities, bus facilities, port facilities and airport facilities.  As mentioned earlier segment 
damage for railways and highways is not calculated due to a lack of liquefaction 
information.   
Table 35: Direct Transportation Losses by State ($ thousands) – NE Level I 
Highway Railway Light Rail Bus Facility Ports Ferries Airports Total
Alabama $1,294 $123 $0 $18 $641 $0 $518 $2,593
Arkansas $28,403 $944 $0 $98 $2,255 $0 $11,784 $43,484
Illinois $14,301 $10,677 $0 $1,407 $22,646 $2,420 $57,990 $109,441
Indiana $247 $2,317 $0 $51 $3,969 $0 $9,327 $15,911
Kentucky $9,828 $8,287 $0 $348 $27,912 $1,068 $16,284 $63,727
Mississippi $6,144 $70 $0 $29 $408 $0 $2,666 $9,317
Missouri $65,831 $16,378 $0 $2,964 $34,742 $1,123 $43,028 $164,066
Tennessee $53,070 $2,831 $0 $487 $7,197 $959 $14,939 $79,484
TOTAL $179,119 $41,627 $0 $5,403 $99,769 $5,570 $156,535 $488,023
Transportation 
 
Table 36: Direct Transportation Losses by Subsystem Component – NE Level I 
Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio
Highway Bridges $25,505,730,000 $179,120,000 0.70%
Railway Bridges $53,160,000 $50,000 0.10%
Railway Facilities $830,860,000 $41,570,000 5.00%
Bus Facilities $90,310,000 $5,400,000 5.98%
Ferry Facilities $5,570,000 $5,570,000 100.00%
Port Facilities $1,413,120,000 $99,770,000 7.06%
Airport Fcilities $3,366,410,000 $156,540,000 4.65%  
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The final category of direct economic losses is utility systems.  Losses are 
classified by state and represented in thousands of dollars in Table 37.  As with the two 
previous direct loss categories Illinois and Missouri realize the greatest damage values at 
$1.3 and $1.5 million, respectively.  Additional utility losses based on facility type and 
component are found in Table 38  Numerous components show loss ratios greater than 
one, including potable water facilities and distribution lines, waste water facilities, natural  
gas facilities and distribution lines electric facilities and communication facilities.  Total 
utility losses are nearly $3.5 billion.   
Table 37: Utility Systems by State ($ thousands) – NE Level I 
Potable Water Waste Water Oil Systems Natural Gas Electric Power Communication Total
Alabama $1,396 $1,852 $0 $1,106 $640 $3 $4,996
Arkansas $9,361 $72,100 $2 $6,500 $9,441 $53 $97,456
Illinois $129,306 $994,165 $13 $32,108 $140,007 $573 $1,296,173
Indiana $5,626 $20,990 $4 $2,337 $10,211 $34 $39,201
Kentucky $41,405 $233,386 $1 $10,866 $50,598 $286 $336,542
Mississippi $2,770 $7,433 $0 $2,232 $773 $7 $13,217
Missouri $143,587 $1,192,504 $10 $36,177 $141,417 $777 $1,514,472
Tennessee $19,393 $134,596 $7 $10,643 $10,066 $169 $174,874




 When all losses are totaled direct economic losses equate to approximately $12.5 
billion for the entire study region.  These losses are broken down according to Table 39.  
Roughly 45% of all direct losses are sustained by Missouri with another 30% incurred by 
Illinois.  Kentucky experiences another 12% of all direct economic losses and the 
remaining states compose the final 13%.  Buildings sustain approximately two-thirds of 
the total direct economic losses, with another 28% accounted for utility losses and only 
4% are attributed to transportation losses.  These estimates indicate the crucial nature of 
building damage to regional loss assessment, though this analysis does not account for 
roadway and railway segment damage, or utility pipelines used for transmission.  These 
data items will be included in subsequent analyses for later comparison with this baseline 
scenario for the northeast epicenter.    
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Table 38: Utility System Losses by Subcomponent – NE Level I 
Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio
Potable Water Facilities $8,314,300,000 $234,760,000 2.82%
Potable Water Distribution Lines $10,011,200,000 $118,080,000 1.18%
Waste Water Facilities $108,128,400,000 $2,563,630,000 2.37%
Waste Water Distribution Lines $6,006,700,000 $93,390,000 1.55%
Natural Gas Facilities $117,100,000 $2,140,000 1.82%
Natural Gas Distribution Lines $4,004,500,000 $99,830,000 2.49%
Oil Facilities $4,800,000 $40,000 0.75%
Electric Power Facilities $17,087,400,000.00 $363,150,000.00 2.13%
Communication Facilities $89,600,000.00 $1,900,000.00 2.12%  
 





Total $12.5  
 
Additional impacts are calculated for indirect losses, or losses due to business 
downtime and loss of work time.  These values are determined for the first five years 
after an earthquake with additional predictions up to 15 years after an earthquake.  Losses 
are displayed in millions of dollars and in numbers of employees.  The first three years 
show induced losses for both employment and income on the order of $27.1 billion and 
6.9 million jobs gained.  By the fourth year income gains begin, as denoted by the value 
in parentheses.  Additionally, loss ratios become negative in the fourth year, indicating 
recovery of the regional economy (See Table 40).  The region continues to recover up to 
the fifth year after the applied earthquake.   
Table 40: Indirect Economic Losses without Aid – NE Level I 
Loss Total %
First Year Employment Impact 5,092,278 171.00
Income Impact 16,550 11.67
Second Year Employment Impact 1,790,617 60.13
Income Impact 8,468 5.97
Third Year Employment Impact 40,807 1.37
Income Impact 2,101 1.48
Fourth Year Employment Impact 2,299 0.08
Income Impact -135 -0.10
Fifth Year Employment Impact 131 0.00
Income Impact -261 0.18
Years 6 to 15 Employment Impact 7 0.00
Income Impact -268 -0.19  
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6.1.2 Central Epicenter 
 
6.1.2.1 Ground Motion 
The second epicenter considered in this research is located on the northern tip of 
the Missouri and Tennessee border.  This position is chosen to determine the impact of 
centrally located earthquake on the New Madrid Seismic Zone.  Hazard maps illustrating 
the shaking of the study region are shown in Figure 62-Figure 65.  Peak ground 
accelerations of 0.67g exist in the few census tracts the surround the epicenter, beyond 
which PGA values decrease rapidly.  Moderate shaking, quantified by PGA values 
between 0.35g and 0.1g, are experienced throughout the majority of the region, with the 
exception of tracts within 40 km of the epicenter.  Very few tracts fall outside the PGA 
threshold-defined area of less than 0.05g.  Only corners of the study region see such 
minimal shaking values.  Similar trends exist for peak ground velocity, with regional 
maximum values reaching approximately 30 in./sec.   
Spectral accelerations, in particular short-period accelerations, include a much 
broader range of moderate shaking.  Nearly the entire breadth of the region experiences 
short-period spectral accelerations greater than 0.1g.  Only northern and southern bands 
of census tracts show minimal acceleration values.  As expected, tracts near the epicenter 
encounter severe shaking upwards of 1g, maxing out at 1.67g.  Maximum long-period 
spectral accelerations are roughly half that of short-period values at identical source-to-
site distances.  Nearest the epicenter Sa at 1.0 seconds reaches 0.8g, and decreases rapidly 
from there.  The hazard map indicates that nearly 75% of the region experiences long-
period spectral accelerations less than 0.2g.   
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Figure 62: Central Epicenter PGA (g) – Central Level I 
 
Figure 63: Central Epicenter PGV (in./sec.) – Central Level I 
 
The regional hazard is also characterized by additional shaking parameters 
including spectral displacement.  As shown in Figure 66 & Figure 67, maximum short-
period spectral displacement is 3.15-inches along the Tennessee/Missouri border.  More 
common regional values are less than one-inch, with the exception of those census tracts 
within 75 km of the epicenter.  Long-period spectral displacements are considerably  
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Figure 64: Central Epicenter Sa 0.3 sec. (g) – Central Level I 
 
Figure 65: Central Epicenter Sa 1.0 sec. (g) – Central Level I 
 
higher, with a maximum displacement value of 5.04-inches.  This is approximately 60% 
greater than the short-period maximum displacement.  Lesser displacements are seen 
across the study region, with most census tracts experiencing displacements less than 1.5-
inches.  Despite the reduction of displacement as source-to-site distances increases, 
structures still undergo damage-causing deflections.  Displacements of ¼-inch are enough 
to cracks some glass and one-inch deflections are likely to crack architectural finishes 
and most types of glass, particularly interior glass.     
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Figure 66: Central Epicenter Sd 0.3 sec. (in.) – Central Level I 
 
Figure 67: Central Epicenter Sd 1.0 sec. (in.) – Central Level I 
 
6.1.2.2 General Building Stock 
 As with the northeast epicenter, damage to the general building stock focuses on 
damage to three primary specific building types; light wood frame, low-rise unreinforced 
masonry and mobile homes.  Structural damage state probabilities representing the 
likelihood of at least moderate damage to these three building types are illustrated in 
Figure 68 - Figure 70.  Light wood frame buildings, W1, show less than 10% probability  
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Figure 68: At Least Moderate Structural - W1 – Central Level I 
 
Figure 69: At Least Moderate Structural - URML – Central Level I 
 
of suffering at least moderate damage over nearly the entire region.  Only within 40 km 
of the epicenter are W1 buildings more than 10% likely to reach the aforementioned  
damage state.  The behavior of light wood frame buildings completely contrasts that of 
URMs and mobile homes.  Both of these building types show extensive areas within 
which buildings are likely to sustain at least moderate damage.  Low-rise unreinforced 
masonry (URML) structures show a region of greater than 55% probability of realizing at 
least moderate damage which extends approximately 100 km from the epicenter.  Beyond 
this source-to-site distance, this damage state decreases to less than 10% over a short 
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distance, roughly 40-50 km.  Mobile homes exhibit a similar trend for high damage state 
probabilities.  Within 100 km of the epicenter the likelihood of at least moderate damage 
is 55% or greater.  Mid- range probabilities, however; extend for nearly another 100 km 
before falling below 10% likelihood of at least moderate structural damage. 
 
Figure 70: At Least Moderate Structural - MH – Central Level I 
 
Non-structural damage state probability distributions mimic those of their 
structural damage probability counterparts.  Damage state probabilities for acceleration 
and drift dependent non-structural components are detailed in Figure 71 & Figure 72 for 
unreinforced masonry low-rises.  The likelihoods of at least moderate damage are vastly 
different for acceleration-controlled equipment and drift-controlled building contents.   
Acceleration-dependent damage probabilities are high only nearest the epicenter then 
taper to less than 10% over the ensuing 100 km, approximately.  Drift-sensitive damage 
components, however; show high probabilities of at least moderate damage for the first 
75 km then reduce to less than 10% within another 30-40 km.  The other primary 
building types show similar trends, though light wood frame damage is consolidated into 
a much smaller area around the epicenter, similar to that of the structural damage 
probability figure for at least moderate damage.  Conversely, mobile homes are expected 
to cover a slightly larger area as its corresponding structural damage area does.   
Further estimates of damage to the general building stock are quantified by 
building count and total square footage.  Table 41 highlights damage to the three primary 
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building types as specified by seismic design level.  Light wood frames sustain 
significant damage with regard to the number of buildings, though the overall percentage  
 
Figure 71: Non-Structural Acceleration - URML – Central Level I 
 
Figure 72: Non-Structural Drift - URML – Central Level I 
 
of damaged buildings is low, less than 5%.  Other notable results for light wood frames 
include the collapse rate, almost a negligible percentage of the total building stock, at 
only 57 buildings out of a total 2.75 million structures.  Unreinfocred masonry buildings 
do not fare as well, with over 16% of all buildings experiencing some damage.  The 
collapse rate of 0.4% is over 100 times greater than that of light wood frames.  Mobile 
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homes also experience significant damage as nearly 60% of all structures see some form 
of damage.  Also noteworthy is the large proportion of mobile homes sustaining slight 
and moderate damage.  These damage states are classified as damage and/or separation 
Table 41: Damage by Building Count and Seismic Design Level – Central Level I 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 406,948 69,146 11,789 889 57
Total Low Code Buildings 2,217,682 45,582 2,414 15 0
Total Buildings 2624630 114728 14203 904 57
2754522
%Total Buildings 95.284% 4.165% 0.516% 0.033% 0.002%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 30418 14622 9754 3738 1154
Total Low Code Buildings 167479 9023 1990 199 12
Total Pre-Code Buildings 242092 31143 10350 2462 980
Total Buildings 439989 54788 22094 6399 2146
525416
%Total Buildings 83.741% 10.428% 4.205% 1.218% 0.408%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 9932 14466 16761 3834 383
Total Low Code Buildings 145538 17473 7399 403 0
Total Pre-Code Buildings 141412 56641 57026 11997 1316
Total Buildings 296882 88580 81186 16234 1699
484581
%Total Buildings 61.266% 18.280% 16.754% 3.350% 0.351%
Light Wood Frame
Total Number of Building Type:
Unreinforced Masonry
Total Number of Building Type:
Mobile Homes
Total Number of Building Type:
 
 
Table 42: Building Damage by Square Footage and Seismic Design Level – Central Level I 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Square Footage 722,111,310 120,964,690 20,707,010 1,610,420 106,560
Total Low Code Square Footage 3,928,967,730 78,886,710 4,252,080 34,340 60
Total Square Footage 4,651,079,040 199,851,400 24,959,090 1,644,760 106,620
4,877,640,910
%Total Square Footage 95.355% 4.097% 0.512% 0.034% 0.002%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Square Footage 87396180 38704930 23897240 9042490 2802150
Total Low Code Square Footage 389646860 21107730 5190740 529160 30390
Total Pre-Code Square Footage 668915330 87206990 29108720 6995980 2570210
Total Square Footage 1,145,958,370 147,019,650 58,196,700 16,567,630 5,402,750
1,373,145,100
%Total Square Footage 83.455% 10.707% 4.238% 1.207% 0.393%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Square Footage 10850170 15816030 18423200 4279500 437860
Total Low Code Square Footage 158403250 18980340 8111280 459620 1710
Total Pre-Code Square Footage 154414510 61612890 61948920 13124880 1505510
Total Square Footage 323,667,930 96,409,260 88,483,400 17,864,000 1,945,080
528,369,670
%Total Square Footage 61.258% 18.247% 16.746% 3.381% 0.368%
Light Wood Frame
Total Number of Square Footage Type:
Total Number of Square Footage Type:
Unreinforced Masonry
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from attached components such as porches and stairs and complete detachment of 
porches and rocking of the structures which requires resetting the home on its supports 
for slight and moderate damage, respectively.  As with URMs, mobile homes show a 
collapse rate approximately 100 times that of the rate for light wood frames.  
 Moreover, damage state determinations are quantified by total square footage per 
building type. Table 42 illustrates the distribution of building type damage by square 
footage.  These measures of damaged floor area correlate well to estimates of damage by 
building count with regard to percentages of the building stock regional square footage.  
Table 43: Number of Buildings Damaged by State – Central Level I 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 204,690 778 28 0 0 205,496
Arkansas 341,512 3,029 182 1 0 344,724
Illinois 324,995 7,153 839 17 0 333,005
Indiana 127,819 609 22 0 0 128,450
Kentucky 175,179 13,316 2,752 137 1 191,385
Mississippi 225,994 5,981 426 4 0 232,406
Missouri 662,091 6,839 529 6 0 669,465
Tennessee 476,469 34,884 7,575 525 14 519,466
Code Total 2,538,749 72,590 12,353 690 15 2,624,396
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 111,650 25,076 7,656 952 46 145,380
Illinois 7,444 2,452 1,077 71 1 11,045
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 4,945 3,199 1,568 287 29 10,028
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 48,119 25,906 16,402 4,597 1,060 96,083
Tennessee 278,692 42,534 12,108 2,682 483 336,498
Code Total 450,851 99,167 38,811 8,588 1,618 599,035
Region Total 2,989,600 171,757 51,164 9,279 1,632 3,223,431




Table 44: Damage by State – Central Level I 
No. Buildings 
Damage









Tennessee 148,595 3.90%  
 
Just as the location of the epicenter plays a critical role in the overall value of 
regional damage it is also a crucial factor when damage is evaluated by state.  A central 
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epicenter will cause greater damage to central states as oppose to northern or southern 
portions of the study region.  This is evident in damage determinations by state as shown 
in Table 43.  Regionally, over 90% of the general building stock experiences no damage 
while nearly three-quarters of the remaining 7% is attributed to slight damage.  This 
indicates that approximately 2%, or over 62,000 buildings undergo moderate, extensive 
or complete damage.  Furthermore, state data reveals that Missouri and Tennessee 
experience the greatest numbers of damaged buildings as shown in Table 44.  While 
roughly half of all regional buildings are located in Missouri and Tennessee two-thirds of 
all damaged buildings are located there.  This estimate includes all damage states, not just 
those buildings exceeding moderate damage.   
Table 45: Building Damage by General Occupancy – Central Level I 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Agriculture 1,976 0.06% 134 0.05% 62 0.05% 24 0.10% 10 0.25%
Commercial 30,266 0.89% 3,707 1.41% 2,154 1.78% 565 2.31% 90 2.22%
Education 260 0.01% 23 0.01% 12 0.01% 2 0.01% 0 0.00%
Government 1,463 0.04% 155 0.06% 91 0.08% 20 0.08% 6 0.15%
Industrial 4,829 0.14% 645 0.25% 485 0.40% 143 0.58% 18 0.44%
Other Residential 420,861 12.38% 96,042 36.62% 83,486 69.17% 16,842 68.72% 1,890 46.53%
Religion 2,311 0.07% 231 0.09% 116 0.10% 32 0.13% 8 0.20%
Single Family 2,936,595 86.41% 161,318 61.51% 34,286 28.41% 6,881 28.08% 2,040 50.22%
TOTAL 3,398,561 262,255 120,692 24,509 4,062
CompleteNone Slight Moderate Extensive
 
  
Lastly, damage is classified by general occupancy type as shown in Table 45.  Damage 
percentages are greatest for residential buildings, though this is likely due to the large 
number of residential structures in comparison to the remaining occupancy types.  
Commercial structures do not occupy large damage percentages for slight and no damage 
categories, though they comprise over 2% of collapsed buildings.  This is the case for 
agricultural buildings as well, incurring greater overall loss percentages with increasing 
damage state, perhaps indicating that these structures are not as well-suited to resist 
collapse as residential structures are.   
 
6.1.2.3 Essential Facilities 
 Essential facilities damage is similar to that of unreinforced masonry buildings, 
since most essential facilities are assigned that building type.  A diagram illustrating the 
regional probability of at least moderate damage appears in Figure 73.  Higher 
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probabilities of damage exist near the epicenter, as expected, though moderate 
probabilities extend to the east and west in a somewhat non-concentric fashion.  This 
behavior is due to the pre-code seismic design level assigned to buildings in those areas 
and a higher vulnerability to seismic activity than the moderate code building present in 
the center of the region.  While only damage to fire stations is pictured here damage state 
probabilities for the remaining essential facilities replicate this behavior, with minor 
deviations of source-to-site distance ranges for the damage state probabilities listed.   
 
Figure 73: At Least Moderate Damage - Fire Stations – Central Level I 
 






Hospitals 308 28 0
Schools 4,695 220 13
EOCs 92 8 0
Police Stations 1,207 103 6





Essential facilities damage is illustrated in Table 46.  Hospitals show the greatest 
percentage of at least moderate damage, at roughly 9% of the total inventory.  Fire 
stations show a significantly lesser percentage of damaged inventory at roughly 7% 
experiencing at least moderate damage.  Schools incur the most cases of complete 
damage, though this is still only 5% of all regional schools which are situated nearest the 
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source of seismic activity.  EOCs still show the greatest percentage of damage with 
roughly 10% of all facilities experiencing complete damage.  No hospitals show complete 
damage which does not substantially limit the number of beds available to treat injured 
persons in the aftermath of an earthquake.   
Table 47: Essential Facilities Functionalities – Central Level I 
No. 
Functional












% of Total 
Functional
Day 1 268 87.01% 1216 83.00% 1020 84.51% 4181 89.05%
Day 3 270 87.66% 1224 83.55% 1025 84.92% 4194 89.33%
Day 7 280 90.91% 1362 92.97% 1104 91.47% 4470 95.21%
Day 14 280 90.91% 1364 93.11% 1104 91.47% 4475 95.31%
Day 30 303 98.38% 1444 98.57% 1181 97.85% 4637 98.76%
Day 90 308 100.00% 1455 99.32% 1194 98.92% 4668 99.42%
Schools
308 Total Strucutres 1465 Total Strucutres 1207 Total Strucutres 4695 Total Strucutres
Hospitals Fire Stations Police Stations
 
 
Functionalities for essential facilities are also determined across the region.  Fire 
and police stations fare the worst with less 85% of facilities operational the day after an 
earthquake.  This lack of functionality, particularly nearest the epicenter, is likely to 
affect the response of aid personnel immediately after the earthquake and must be 
considered in response and recovery plans.  Recovery of approximately 150 fire stations 
as well as 85 police stations occurs in the first two weeks after an earthquake, equating to 
greater than 90% of all facilities functioning.  Hospitals are not as quick to recover with 
only 36,608 hospitals beds available the day of the earthquake, or 76% of regional beds.  
After two weeks 91% of hospitals are functional, though not those in the hardest hit areas 
near the epicenter (See Table 47).  School, however, have over 95% of all buildings 
operational within the first week after an earthquake.  Despite this high percentage it is 
important to note that there are still over 200 schools which are non-functional.  Even 
after three months 27 schools are still unusable which requires the relocation of 
thousands of students.  As expected schools nearest the epicenter comprise all the non-
functional schools at the 90-day period.   
 
6.1.2.4 Transportation Systems 
 One of the primary subcomponents of the transportation system is the highway 
network.  Without liquefaction information none of the roadway damage is calculated, 
- 103 - 
leaving only bridge damage.  Only bridges within 40 km of the epicenter are more than 
10% likely to collapse, with no single bridge more than 60% likely to collapse.  At least 
moderate bridge damage state probabilities extend farther into the region, with 10% 
likelihood of meeting or exceeding this damage state as far as 200 km from the epicenter.  
Total bridge losses resulting from all damage states are predicted to exceed $177 million 
for an earthquake along the central thrust of the New Madrid Fault.   
Table 48: Highway Bridge Functionalities – Central Level I 
Time No. Functional % Total Functional
Day 1 29957 98.82%
Day 3 30085 99.24%
Day 7 30119 99.36%
Day 14 30124 99.37%
Day 30 30158 99.49%




Damage to bridges directly correlates to bridge functionality.  The number of 
functional bridges at various time periods after an earthquake is displayed in Table 48.  
Initially over 98% of bridges are functional, though this high percentage equates to over 
350 bridges that are not useable.  This number is nearly cut in half after one week, with 
only 60 bridges not operating three months after the earthquake.  These remaining 
bridges, within 30 km of the epicenter, are most likely to collapse or experience severe 
damage resulting from intense shaking.   
 Railway subsystem damage is divided into railways and railway facilities.  A 
centrally located earthquake estimated low damage probabilities for only a few bridges, 
resulting in $50,000 of loss, while the remaining bridges are not at all likely to see 
damage.  The related facilities, however; generate much higher losses which are 
approximately $39 million.  The damage state probability distribution is illustrated in 
Figure 74, which shows that the bridges expected to incur significant damage are along 
the Mississippi River in Tennessee and southern Missouri.  Highway bridge damage 
mimics this behavior, though the network is much denser.    
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Figure 74: At Least Moderate Damage - Railway Facilities – Central Level 
 
Table 49: Transportation Systems Damage & Functionality – Central Level I 
Region 
Total




Day 1 Day 7
Highway Bridges 30,314 371 7 29,951 30,119
Railway Bridges 425 0 0 425 425
Railway Facilities 393 20 0 389 393
Bus Facilities 84 1 0 84 84
Ferry Facilities 5 5 5 0 0
Port Facilities 691 17 0 683 691
Airport Facilities 637 6 0 634 637
With > 50% Functionality
 
 
The remaining transportation subsystems, their damage and functionalities are 
detailed in Table 49.  Airport facilities are not expected to sustain much damage as a 
subsystem, as only six facilities are predicted to sustain moderate damage or greater.  
When slight damage is added in however; airport facility loss values skyrocket to over 
$147 million.  Seventeen port facilities are expected to incur damage, which contributes 
to the over $83 million in losses.  All ferry facilities experience at least moderate damage 
that result in $5.6 million in loss, or $1.1 million per facility, which is also true of the 
northeast epicenter.  This is possible for the two overlapping facilities on the 
Kentucky/Missouri border, though not so likely for the outlying facilities in Tennessee 
and Illinois (Figure 75).  These results bring into question the accuracy and reliability of 
HAZUS-MH and its calculations as it is unlikely all of these facilities collapse.  This is 
an area that may require intervention by HAZUS-MH developers.   
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Figure 75: Complete Damage - Ferry Facilities – Central Level I 
  
6.1.2.5 Utility Systems 
 Utility facilities damage for all facilities types resembles that seen in the general 
building stock.  An example map of utility facilities damage state probabilities for at least 
moderate damage is depicted by the waste water facilities in Figure 76.  Radiating 
damage is shown, with the greatest damage probabilities nearest the epicenter.  In light of 
the damage probabilities seen with ferry facilities it is relevant to note that there are no 
outlying utility facilities predicted to collapse.  Table 50 also provides damage state 
quantities for each type of utility facilities.  According to the HAZUS-MH analysis no 
utility facilities experience complete damage, though numerous structures are predicted 
to experience at least moderate damage.  Potable water facilities exhibit the highest 
damage rate at nearly 3% of facilities damaged, while the remaining facilities show 
approximately 1% or less. 
 Functionalities for all types of utility systems indicate that every utility facility is 
operational 90 days after an earthquake.  All but waste water facilities, in fact, are fully 
operational only three days after an earthquake.  This trend is due to the locations of 
facilities in relation to the epicenter.  Most structures do not lie within the few tracts 
nearest the epicenter where the most intense shaking occurs.  Table 51 displays the 
number of operational facilities at various post-earthquake intervals.    
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Figure 76: At Least Moderate Damage - Waste Water Facilities – Central Level I 
 
Table 50: Utility Systems Damage & Functionality – Central Level I 
Region 
Total




Day 1 Day 7
Potable Water 249 7 0 242 249
Waste Water 1,646 22 0 1,565 1,643
Natural Gas 114 0 0 113 114
Oil 49 0 0 19 49
Electric Power 158 2 0 149 158
Communications 940 11 0 938 940
With > 50% Functionality
 
 
Table 51: Utility Systems Functionality – Central Level I 
Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 14 Day 30 Day 90 Total
Potable Water 242 249 249 249 249 249 249
Waste Water 1565 1632 1643 1643 1644 1646 1646
Natural Gas 113 114 114 114 114 114 114
Oil Systems 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Electric Power 149 158 158 158 158 158 158




Utility system performances are also quantified by service disruption, such as 
breaks and leaks in pipelines as well as the number of customers with suspended service 
due to system damage.  Breakage and leakage are detailed in Table 52 for potable and 
waste water systems and oil and natural gas distribution networks.  It is relevant to note 
that this scenario employs default data only and thus HAZUS-MH default pipeline 
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assumptions, instead of actual pipeline distribution networks, are used to determine these 
service disruptions.  Potable water pipelines display the greatest number of both breaks 
and leaks, while waste water lines experience the least.  Natural gas lines possess the 
largest leak rate, 0.10 leaks/km, with both water networks at 0.06 leaks/km or less.  
Natural gas lines also exhibit the largest break rate of 0.026 break/km.   







Potable Water 500,560 24,462 6,115
Waste Water 300,336 19,347 4,837
Natural Gas 200,224 20,681 5,170
Oil 0 0 0  
 
Table 53: Electric and Potable Water Service Disruptions – Central Level I 
Total No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 Day 90
Potable Water 43,821 25,522 10,078 0 0
Electric Power 29,923 17,023 5,921 972 39
4,236,197
No. of Households without Service
 
 
Electric and potable water are also classified by service interruptions, as shown in 
Table 53.  Potable water is restored to all regional households within 30 days of an 
earthquake, while electric power is not fully restored for more than three months.  Even 
with the rapid recovery rate of potable water line there are still nearly 44,000 households, 
or 1.4% of all regional households, without water the day after the earthquake.  This is in 
contrast to less than 1% of households without electric power.   
 Finally, utility systems are characterized by individual subsystem losses.  Table 
54 highlights losses by subsystem.  The waste water system incurs the greatest economic 
loss at over $1.7 billion and over 71% of all utility losses.  The electric system sustains 
the second largest losses at about 11.1% of the $2.49 billion total utility system losses.  
Oil, natural gas and communication facilities incur roughly 0.1% of all utility losses, 
which is a very small margin for three major utility systems.  
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Table 54: Utility System Losses – Central Level I 
Utility System Loss % Total
Potable Water Facility $151,810,000 6.10%
Potable Water Lines $110,080,000 4.42%
Waste Water Facility $1,767,560,000 71.02%
Waste Water Lines $87,060,000 3.50%
Oil Facilities $40,000 0.00%
Nautral Gas Facilities $1,430,000 0.06%
Natural Gas Lines $93,070,000 3.74%
Electric Systems $276,130,000 11.10%
Communication $1,530,000 0.06%
Total $2,488,710,000  
 
6.1.2.6 Induced Damage  
The scenario earthquake under investigation herein ignites 48 earthquakes and 
burns roughly 0.27 square miles.  This burned area equates to less than 0.01% of the total 
regional area, however.  Figure 77 compliments this data, illustrating the extent of fire 
demand in gallons of water per minute.  Fire demand appears to be distributed randomly, 
not following attenuation trends as building damage does.  HAZUS-MH estimates show  
that 82 people are displaced due to fires following the scenario earthquake and generate 
approximately $5.4 million in economic losses.   
 
Figure 77: Fire Demand (gpm) – Central Level I 
Damage estimates are used to determine debris generation across the study region.  
Most infrastructure damage occurs nearest the epicenter and thus most debris is generated 
in those census tracts.  Approximately three million tons of debris are generated due to 
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the scenario earthquake.  About 1.7 tons are brick and wood, while the remaining 1.3 tons 
is from steel and concrete.  Debris removal will require 120,000 truckloads across the 
region (See Figure 78). 
 
Figure 78: Total Debris (Thousands of Tons) - Central Level I 
 
6.1.2.7 Social and Economic Losses 
 Estimates of displaced residents indicate that 5,192 households will require 
alternative housing due to uninhabitable homes.  Of those displaced households 
approximately 1,554 people will require temporary housing (See Table 55).  Missouri and 
Tennessee see the greatest number of displaced households and temporary housing needs.  
Alabama, Indiana and Mississippi have relatively no displaced residents, by comparison.  













Total 5,192 1,554  
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 The worst case for regional casualties occur at 2 PM, with 4,184 total casualties.  
Other casualty calculations indicate 3,963 at 2 AM and 3,953 at 5 PM.  Table 56 shows  
the distribution of casualties by severity level and general occupancy type.  Roughly 75% 
of all casualties are Level 1 minor injuries and only 5% are severe injuries and fatalities. 
Commercial buildings account for more than half of all casualties, with 2,264 casualties.  
Educational and single family homes incur 600 and 551 casualties, respectively.   
Table 56: Casualties - 2 PM – Central Level I 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Commercial 1,808 342 39 75
Commuting 3 3 6 1
Educational 457 96 13 24
Hotels 6 1 0 0
Industrial 276 47 5 9
Other-Residential 346 60 5 10
Single Family 423 91 13 24
TOTAL 3,319 640 81 143  
 
Direct building losses are quantified in Table 57 & Table 58 where capital and 
income losses are divided by state and general occupancy category, respectively.  A total 
loss of $5.8 billion is incurred by regional buildings, with nearly half of that in Tennessee 
alone.  Another 25% is lost in Missouri and the remaining value divided between the 
other six states.  Additionally, nearly $3.2 billion is lost through damage to residential 
buildings, while another one-third is incurred by commercial buildings.  Industrial and 
other buildings (government, educational and religion) comprise approximately 10% of 
all building losses.   




















Alabama $2,921 $12,703 $5,675 $253 0.05 $48 $824 $1,160 $871 $24,456
Arkansas $99,017 $270,332 $96,737 $4,104 0.57 $2,216 $24,072 $32,342 $31,164 $559,984
Illinois $56,551 $139,248 $51,639 $1,180 0.44 $1,105 $14,147 $17,631 $15,164 $296,666
Indiana $6,659 $16,821 $9,771 $811 0.05 $52 $715 $865 $926 $36,620
Kentucky $101,410 $236,376 $82,173 $2,562 1.37 $2,354 $31,838 $44,338 $29,985 $531,035
Mississippi $29,774 $77,678 $32,475 $2,207 0.26 $606 $10,781 $14,873 $8,734 $177,128
Missouri $299,508 $794,739 $261,314 $10,262 2.14 $6,806 $55,627 $79,894 $86,928 $1,595,078
Tennessee $433,991 $1,212,123 $433,082 $16,320 2.87 $10,409 $131,891 $184,473 $141,776 $2,564,065
TOTAL $1,029,830 $2,760,020 $972,866 $37,699 $23,596 $269,895 $375,578 $315,548 $5,785,032
Capital Losses Income Losses
 
 
Transportation losses are greatest in Missouri followed by Tennessee with overall 
regional losses of over $456 million.  Approximately one-third of all losses are attributed 
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to highways and roughly another one-third to airport facilities.  Railway, bus, ferry and 
airport facilities show the highest loss ratios, all of which are greater than four.  These 
high loss ratios indicate significant portions of the region’s dollar exposure has sustained 
damage and incurred large economic losses (See Table 59 & Table 60).   
Table 58: Direct Building Losses by General Occupancy Class ($ millions) – Central Level I 
Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Others TOTAL
Income Losses Wage $0.00 $13.31 $329.65 $16.97 $15.65 $375.58
Capital-Related $0.00 $5.89 $248.46 $10.62 $4.93 $269.90
Rental $70.22 $76.61 $144.75 $6.54 $5.95 $304.07
Relocation $7.53 $3.36 $10.04 $0.57 $2.10 $23.60
SUBTOTAL $77.75 $99.17 $732.90 $34.70 $28.63 $973.15
Capital Stock Losses Structural $326.08 $238.05 $319.90 $67.42 $78.39 $1,029.84
Non-Structural $1,214.36 $680.62 $604.64 $131.04 $129.36 $2,760.02
Content $429.54 $127.52 $271.99 $79.62 $64.20 $972.87
Inventory $0.00 $0.00 $13.56 $20.28 $3.85 $37.69
SUBTOTAL $1,969.98 $1,046.19 $1,210.09 $298.36 $275.80 $4,800.42
TOTAL $2,047.73 $1,145.36 $1,942.99 $333.06 $304.43 $5,773.57  
 
Table 59: Direct Transportation Losses by State ($ thousands) – Central Level I 
Highway Railway Light Rail Bus Facility Ports Ferries Airports Total
Alabama $1,294 $297 $0 $37 $1,375 $0 $1,198 $4,202
Arkansas $28,403 $3,342 $0 $207 $6,036 $0 $26,056 $64,044
Illinois $13,298 $3,096 $0 $595 $8,429 $2,420 $20,183 $48,021
Indiana $247 $832 $0 $18 $1,864 $0 $3,948 $6,909
Kentucky $9,734 $6,142 $0 $243 $19,245 $1,068 $11,927 $48,359
Mississippi $6,144 $241 $0 $96 $1,102 $0 $7,731 $15,313
Missouri $64,881 $15,711 $0 $2,212 $29,293 $1,123 $46,461 $159,680
Tennessee $53,070 $9,515 $0 $1,028 $16,184 $959 $29,429 $110,185




Table 60: Direct Transportation Losses by Subsystem Components – Central Level I 
Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio
Highway Bridges $25,505,730,000 $177,070,000 0.69%
Railway Bridges $53,160,000 $50,000 0.09%
Railway Facilities $830,860,000 $39,130,000 4.71%
Bus Facilities $90,310,000 $4,440,000 4.92%
Ferry Facilities $5,570,000 $5,570,000 100.00%
Port Facilities $1,413,120,000 $83,530,000 5.91%
Airport Facilities $3,366,410,000 $146,930,000 4.36%  
 
The final economic loss category is utility losses.  Loss values are delineated by 
state and general occupancy in Table 61 & Table 62, respectively.  A total of $2.5 billion 
in economic losses is incurred by utility systems, with nearly half of that occurring in 
Missouri alone.  Tennessee shows nearly 25% of all utility losses with the remaining six 
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states experiencing lesser losses.  Alabama and Indiana show the smallest losses by far, at 
$11 million each.   
Table 61: Utility System Losses by State ($ thousands) – Central Level I 
Potable Water Waste Water Oil Systems Natural Gas Electric Power Communication Total
Alabama $2,483 $5,096 $0 $1,812 $2,320 $10 $11,720
Arkansas $23,059 $244,505 $7 $13,432 $39,815 $189 $321,007
Illinois $26,679 $181,094 $2 $8,053 $21,730 $109 $237,667
Indiana $2,105 $5,447 $1 $1,214 $2,371 $8 $11,146
Kentucky $23,280 $140,140 $0 $7,573 $23,825 $167 $194,985
Mississippi $6,191 $36,390 $0 $4,759 $4,651 $41 $52,032
Missouri $122,062 $798,927 $2 $31,350 $154,167 $507 $1,107,017
Tennessee $56,026 $443,019 $31 $26,299 $27,255 $499 $553,130




Table 62: Utility System Losses by Subsystem Component – Central Level I 
Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio
Potable Water Facilities $8,314,300,000 $151,810,000 1.83%
Potable Water Distribution Lines $10,011,200,000 $110,080,000 1.10%
Waste Water Facilities $108,128,400,000 $1,767,560,000 1.63%
Waste Water Distribution Lines $6,006,700,000 $87,060,000 1.45%
Natural Gas Facilities $117,100,000 $1,430,000 1.22%
Natural Gas Distribution Lines $4,004,500,000 $93,070,000 2.32%
Oil Facilities $4,800,000 $40,000 0.83%
Electric Power Facilities $17,087,400,000 $276,130,000 1.62%
Communication Facilities $89,600,000 $1,530,000 1.71%  
 
Over 75% of all utility losses are incurred by waste water systems.  Oil and 
communication systems show $0.04 and $1.5 millions, respectively.  Economic losses are 
experienced by waste water systems primarily.  Another 10% in attributed to potable 
water systems, while oil systems see minimal inventory losses around $40 million.   
Total regional direct economic losses total $8.7 billion.  Building losses comprise 
more than half of all losses, while utility and transportation losses account for 28% and 
5%, respectively.  These values are reflected in Table 63.  Further direct economic losses 
are detailed by state as well.  As with various direct economic loss categories, Missouri 
and Tennessee incur the greatest total direct economic losses at $2.8 and $3.2 billion, or 
33% and 36% of regional losses, respectively.  Arkansas sees 11% of all losses at $945 
million. Again, Alabama and Indiana show the lowest loss values of all study region 
states.   
Finally, induced losses resulting from business interruption is detailed in Table 64.  
In the first year following the scenario earthquake nearly 3.5 million jobs are added for 
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recovery staff and monetary losses are roughly $11.5 billion.  The region begins to 
recover in the second year, despite the fact that losses are still accruing.  By the fourth 
year following the earthquake the region begins to see positive income again.  Also, 
employment increases level out as fewer and fewer regional recovery and rebuilding jobs 
are required.   
Table 63: Total Direct Economic Losses – Central Level I 













TOTAL $8.7  
 
Table 64: Induced Economic Losses without Aid – Central Level I 
Loss Total %
First Year Employment Impact 3,535,300 118.71
Income Impact 11,468 8.09
Second Year Employment Impact 1,229,631 41.29
Income Impact 5,814 4.10
Third Year Employment Impact 27,917 0.94
Income Impact 1,441 1.02
Fourth Year Employment Impact 1,574 0.05
Income Impact -87 -0.06
Fifth Year Employment Impact 90 0.00
Income Impact -173 -0.12
Years 6 to 15 Employment Impact 5 0.00
Income Impact -178 -0.13  
 
6.1.3 Southwest Epicenter  
 
6.1.3.1 Ground Motion 
 The southwest epicenter is located in northeastern Arkansas as is shown 
previously (See Figure 21).  This positioning represents an earthquake occurring along 
the southwest extension of the New Madrid fault.  It is expected that this epicenter 
location will provide worst-case scenario data for southern states within the study region; 
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Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas.  Ground motion inputs are shown in Figure 79-
Figure 82 for this scenario earthquake.  Peak ground acceleration is maximum at the 
epicenter with a value at 1.05g.  This is by far the greatest PGA of all the epicenters.  The 
PGA map, as well as other ground motion maps, illustrate the moderate ground shaking 
values at the western and southern boundaries of the study region.  PGA values of nearly 
0.2g exist at the boundary, indicating that further attenuation in these locations is 
warranted by increasing the study region size.  Additionally, the northern third of the  
 
Figure 79: Southwest Epicenter PGA (g) – SW Level I 
 
Figure 80: Southwest Epicenter PGV (in./sec.) – SW Level I 
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region does not experience significant shaking, less than 0.05g PGA, as well as short- and 
long-period spectral acceleration responses.  Peak ground velocity reaches a maximum of 
over 44 in./sec., while short- and long-period spectral accelerations reach 2.62g and 1.2g 
maximum values, respectively.  As with PGA, these ground motion responses are the 
greatest of all three epicenters.   
 
Figure 81: Southwest Epicenter Sa 0.3 Sec. (g) – SW Level I 
 
Figure 82: Southwest Epicenter Sa 1.0 Sec. (g) – SW Level I 
  
Spectral displacements for this scenario earthquake are also illustrated herein; see 
Figure 83 & Figure 84.  Short-period spectral displacements are greatest in the census 
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tract where the earthquake occurs, whereas long-period displacements appear to reduce 
over a greater distance, approximately 20 km.  Short-period maximum displacements 
reach nearly five inches, though more common regional values are between 0.25- and 
1.5-inches.  The greatest long-period displacement far exceeds the short-period maximum 
at nearly 7.5-inches.  The remainder of the region, however; experiences more typical 
long-period displacements between 0.5- and 1.75-inches.   
 
Figure 83: Southwest Epicenter Sd 0.3 Sec. (in.) – SW Level I 
 
Figure 84: Southwest Epicenter Sd 1.0 Sec. (in.) – SW Level I 
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6.1.3.2 General Building Stock  
Structural damage for an earthquake at the southwest epicenter appears to be 
greatest for light wood frame buildings.  As shown in Figure 85 census tracts within 75 
km of the epicenter are more than 55% likely to experience at least moderate damage.  
Unreinforced masonry buildings show similar trends, though the region of lesser damage 
state probabilities (10%-40% of damage state exceedance) is much more condensed.  
This mid-range of probabilities stretches for nearly another 75 km for building type W1.  
The damage state probability distributions exhibited by light wood frames apply to 
unreinforced masonry buildings and are completely opposite the behavior shown by 
mobile homes.  High probabilities of meeting or exceeding moderate damage exist within 
the census tracts immediately surrounding the epicenter only.  Previous epicenters 
indicated that mobile homes are very likely to sustain at least moderate damage, though  
the southwest epicenter shows that mobile homes are not likely to incur damage outside 
the small region around the epicenter.  Additionally, there is not an extensive area with 
moderate or low probabilities of reaching this damage state.  All tracts with at least 10% 
probability of moderate damage or greater are within 50 km of the epicenter, as shown in 
Figure 86 & Figure 87.  
 
Figure 85: At Least Moderate Damage - W1 – SW Level I 
  
Damage to non-structural components follows behavioral trends for damage state 
exceedance presented for structural damage.  This means that mobile homes experience  
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the same extents of non-structural drift- and acceleration-controlled damage as structural 
damage, which occurs over an extremely confined region.  Figure 88 & Figure 89, 
illustrate the extents of damage state probabilities for acceleration- and drift-controlled 
components of low-rise unreinforced masonry buildings.  Acceleration sensitive 
components show the pattern of damage state probabilities exhibited in the analysis of 
previous epicenters.  A small area in the immediate vicinity of the epicenter experiences 
high probabilities of damage state exceedance, while moderate to low probabilities 
extend for over 100 km.  Drift-sensitive components show opposing behavior, with a 
larger area of high damage state likelihoods for at least moderate damage and a much 
shorter distance over which these probabilities decrease rapidly.  The non-structural 
response of light wood frame buildings is similar to URML buildings with regard to 
source-to-site distance and damage state probability and thus are not pictured here.   
 
Figure 86: At Least Moderate Damage-URML – SW Level I 
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Figure 87: At Least Moderate Damage - MH – SW Level I 
 
 
Figure 88: Non-Structural Acceleration-URML – SW Level I 
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Figure 89: Non-Structural Drift - URML – SW Level I 
 
 Damage state probabilities for the southwest scenario earthquake lead to the 
building damage estimates listed in Table 65.  Light wood frames fare the best of the 
three primary building types.  Only 10% of all buildings incur some form of damage and 
less than 0.01% are predicted to collapse.  There are over 2.75 million light wood frame 
buildings in this study region and only 132 buildings are estimated to collapse, while over 
5,700 URMs and mobile homes are estimated to experience the same form of damage, 
despite the lesser inventory of these two building types.  Unreinforced masonry buildings 
exhibit roughly 15% damage rate.  Over 40% of all damaged URMs incur only slight 
damage, or minor cracking.  Over 7% of all damaged buildings collapse, though this 
equates to 1% of all URMs collapsing and this percentage is over 100 times greater than 
light wood frames.  This trend is also shown with the central epicenter.   
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Table 65: Building Damage by Count and Seismic Code Level – SW Level I 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 273,453 167,221 45,984 2,031 126
Total Low Code Buildings 2,192,669 59,995 12,437 542 6
Total Buildings 2466122 227216 58421 2573 132
2754464
%Total Buildings 89.532% 8.249% 2.121% 0.093% 0.005%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 21724 9110 16019 10164 2641
Total Low Code Buildings 169733 6150 2244 549 74
Total Pre-Code Buildings 253770 16064 8517 5627 3019
Total Buildings 445227 31324 26780 16340 5734
525405
%Total Buildings 84.740% 5.962% 5.097% 3.110% 1.091%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 19054 9202 12136 4362 635
Total Low Code Buildings 144877 16423 8717 807 7
Total Pre-Code Buildings 169596 36416 47399 12840 2182
Total Buildings 333527 62041 68252 18009 2824
484653
%Total Buildings 68.818% 12.801% 14.083% 3.716% 0.583%
Light Wood Frame
Total Number of Building Type:
Unreinforced Masonry
Total Number of Building Type:
Mobile Homes
Total Number of Building Type:
 
  
While the damage probability map for mobile homes showed very few census 
tracts likely to experience at least moderate damage, the damaged building counts 
presented here show that over 30% of the entire mobile home inventory incurs damage, 
while nearly 60% of damaged buildings fall into the ‘moderate or greater’ category.  
With over 89,000 mobile homes showing at least moderate damage it is relevant to 
determine the locations of this extensive damage.  Figure 90 illustrates the number of 
mobile homes incurring moderate damage.  Some of the tracts nearest the epicenter do 
not show any moderate damage due to the extensive or complete nature of damage there.  
Moderate damage, however; extends far beyond the area shown to have greater than 10% 
likelihood of experiencing at least moderate damage.   
The building count damage distributions with regard to damage state are not as 
clearly reflected in square footage damaged as was the case with previous epicenters.  
Table 66 delineates the square footage in each damage state by seismic code level.  
Damage to regional building square footage shows roughly the same percentages as the 
regional building count. 
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Figure 90: Number of Mobile Homes with Moderate Damage – SW Level I 
 
Table 66: Building Damage by Square Footage – SW Level I 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Square Footage 476,414,670 300,933,900 84,268,010 3,648,860 234,550
Total Low Code Square Footage 3,887,406,200 102,583,480 21,213,750 925,510 11,620
Total Square Footage 4,363,820,870 403,517,380 105,481,760 4,574,370 246,170
4,877,640,550
%Total Square Footage 89.466% 8.273% 2.163% 0.094% 0.005%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Square Footage 50326280 23786610 47580240 32012490 8137570
Total Low Code Square Footage 393863410 15177610 5622220 1449920 199370
Total Pre-Code Square Footage 692411900 48469980 26433340 17876700 9604960
Total Square Footage 1,136,601,590 87,434,200 79,635,800 51,339,110 17,941,900
1,372,952,600
%Total Square Footage 82.785% 6.368% 5.800% 3.739% 1.307%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Square Footage 20930240 10140200 13273470 4764250 698600
Total Low Code Square Footage 157691020 17870770 9491550 891820 10950
Total Pre-Code Square Footage 185158240 39565570 51528500 13939270 2414410
Total Square Footage 363,779,500 67,576,540 74,293,520 19,595,340 3,123,960
528,368,860
%Total Square Footage 68.850% 12.790% 14.061% 3.709% 0.591%
Total Number of Square Footage Type:
Total Number of Square Footage Type:
Unreinforced Masonry





Damage characterizations by state are displayed in Table 67.  The southern 
epicenter shifts extensive and complete damage to the southern states; Mississippi, 
Arkansas, and more in Alabama, than in previous scenarios.  Northern states such as 
Illinois and Indiana experience relatively minimal damage when compared to the 
- 123 - 
northeast of central epicenters.  This regional distribution of damage is intuitive, 
however; based on the location of the epicenter.   
Table 67: Building Damage by Count and State – SW Level I 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 204,691 778 27 0 0 205,496
Arkansas 310,168 28,939 5,287 320 10 344,724
Illinois 332,773 224 7 0 0 333,005
Indiana 128,435 15 0 0 0 128,450
Kentucky 190,766 596 23 0 0 191,385
Mississippi 174,531 39,693 16,512 1,582 88 232,406
Missouri 668,430 979 56 0 0 669,465
Tennessee 505,384 12,108 1,884 90 1 519,466
Code Total 2,515,177 83,331 23,797 1,992 99 2,624,396
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 73,972 37,670 25,049 6,897 1,793 145,380
Illinois 10,911 127 7 0 0 11,045
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 9,776 236 17 0 0 10,028
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 88,704 6,147 1,196 37 0 96,083
Tennessee 132,688 142,630 49,426 10,091 1,663 336,498
Code Total 316,049 186,809 75,695 17,024 3,457 599,035
Region Total 2,831,227 270,141 99,492 19,017 3,556 3,223,431





Table 68: Building Damage by General Occupancy – SW Level I 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Agriculture 2,113 0.06% 42 0.01% 35 0.02% 13 0.03% 2 0.02%
Commercial 28,550 0.87% 3,077 0.95% 3,169 2.01% 1,489 3.86% 496 5.39%
Education 242 0.01% 26 0.01% 21 0.01% 7 0.02% 3 0.03%
Government 1,427 0.04% 142 0.04% 115 0.07% 37 0.10% 13 0.14%
Industrial 4,251 0.13% 601 0.19% 806 0.51% 370 0.96% 91 0.99%
Other Residential 450,930 13.75% 71,962 22.19% 73,048 46.37% 19,749 51.25% 3,431 37.29%
Religion 2,196 0.07% 202 0.06% 176 0.11% 91 0.24% 33 0.36%
Single Family 2,790,733 85.07% 248,316 76.55% 80,165 50.89% 16,775 43.54% 5,131 55.77%
TOTAL 3,280,442 324,368 157,535 38,531 9,200
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
 
  
Damage is also categorized by general occupancy and appears in Table 68.  
Residential buildings comprise nearly 99% of all undamaged buildings, while only 
accounting for 92% of all completely damaged buildings.  A large number of commercial 
building also see significant collapse rates, or over 5% of all commercial buildings.  This 
is in contrast to agricultural, religious, and educational buildings which show a collapse 
rate much less than 1%.  Industrial buildings appear to undergo extensive amounts of 
slight and moderate damage with 601 and 806 buildings in those damage states, 
respectively.  This equates to 14% of all industrial buildings showing slight damage and 
19% showing moderate damage.   
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6.1.3.3 Essential Facilities 
 Essential facilities damage state probability distributions for moderate, extensive 
and complete damage mimic the trends shown by the general building stock, in particular 
unreinforced masonry buildings.  Figure 91 illustrates the likelihood of at least moderate 
damage to regional schools.  The highest damage state probabilities, greater than 85%, 
occur in or near Memphis, Tennessee, subjecting a major city to intense shaking which 
damages the dense urban fabric of the city.  As shown in this figure all the schools in the 
Memphis area are likely to sustain heavy damage.  The distribution of damage for 
schools is replicated, without major deviation, for the remaining essential facility types. 
The location of Memphis in relation to the epicenter is of the utmost concern, as all 
essential facilities in that urban area are likely to experience extensive or complete 
damage, rendering them useless in an emergency.   
 
Figure 91: At Least Moderate Damage - Schools – SW Level I 
  
The damage of essential facilities, particularly in Memphis, is reflected in the 
functionalities for each facility type.  Table 69 details the functionality of each facility 
type at six periods after the earthquake.  Hospitals and police stations exhibit the lowest 
functionalities the day after the earthquake, which is a major concern.  With decreased 
medical and security aid fewer injured persons are able to receive the care they need and 
a reduced police force may not be able to maintain order in the chaotic aftermath of a 
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catastrophe.  Essential facilities do not recover as quickly from the southwest scenario 
earthquake as the region does from the previous two earthquakes.  Only after a month of 
recovery efforts are 90% of all essential facilities functional.  With the majority of the 
non-operational buildings nearest the epicenter this means Memphis and its surrounding 
areas are likely to go without these services for an extended period of time.  
Table 69: Essential Facilities Functionalities – SW Level I 
No. 
Functional












% of Total 
Functional
Day 1 258 83.77% 1253 85.53% 1006 83.35% 4028 85.79%
Day 3 259 84.09% 1254 85.60% 1008 83.51% 4036 85.96%
Day 7 275 89.29% 1356 92.56% 1099 91.05% 4231 90.12%
Day 14 275 89.29% 1356 92.56% 1099 91.05% 4234 90.18%
Day 30 303 98.38% 1426 97.34% 1153 95.53% 4513 96.12%
Day 90 307 99.68% 1450 98.98% 1195 99.01% 4660 99.25%
Hospitals Fire Stations Police Stations Schools
308 Total Strucutres 1465 Total Strucutres 1207 Total Strucutres 4695 Total Strucutres
 
 
 Essential facilities damage is depicted in Table 70 by facility type.  Schools show 
the greatest amount of damage occurrences at each damage level.  This equates to 
roughly 10% and less than 1% of all schools experiencing at least moderate and complete 
damage, respectively.  As with the previous scenarios no hospitals experience complete 
damage, nor do EOCs.  Only ten total essential facilities collapse and these lie nearest the 
source of seismic activity.   






Hospitals 308 33 0
Schools 4,695 461 4
EOCs 92 4 0
Police Stations 1,207 108 2




6.1.3.4 Transportation Systems 
 Highway bridge damage is not confined to areas near the epicenter, as building 
damage appears to be.  Bridges at least 20% likely to experience moderate damage or 
greater are located as far as 200 km from the epicenter.  These probabilities are seen on 
bridges to the north and east of the southwest scenario epicenter.  Despite the large 
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number of bridges and expansive area over which bridges are likely to incur damage, 
only 52 bridges are more than 50% likely to collapse all of which are located within 30 
km of the epicenter.  Further evidence to this is seen through regional bridge 
functionalities.  Table 71 quantifies the operational highway bridges throughout the 
region.  While over 98% of all bridges are functional the day after the earthquake there 
are still 376 bridges that are not operational.  These bridges are located within 75 km of 
the epicenter, which encompasses Memphis, Tennessee.  The majority of bridges in that 
city will not be functioning immediately after the earthquake which will hinder the 
evacuation of victims and the movement of supplies and aid into the heavily damaged 
city.  This damage equates to over $310 million in economic losses, which is significantly 
higher than the two previous epicenters.   
 Damage to regional transportation facilities is quantified in Table 72 by facility 
type.  At least moderate damage occurs to only 420 total transportation facilities which 
equates to just over 1% of all 32,500 facilities.  Railway facilities show roughly 5% 
occurrence of at least moderate damage, which is much greater than other facility types.  
Complete damage is much less likely, with only 12 total facilities experiencing this type 
of damage.     
Table 71: Highway Bridge Functionalities – SW Level I 
Time No. Functional % Total Functional
Day 1 29938 98.76%
Day 3 30021 99.03%
Day 7 30119 99.36%
Day 14 30130 99.39%
Day 30 30148 99.45%




Table 72: Transportation System Damage - SW Level I 
Region 
Total




Highway Bridges 30,314 371 7
Railway Bridges 425 0 0
Railway Facilities 393 20 0
Bus Facilities 84 1 0
Ferry Facilities 5 5 5
Port Facilities 691 17 0
Airport Facilities 637 6 0  
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Figure 92: At Least Moderate Damage - Airports – SW Level I 
 
Damage to railway bridges and facilities occurs only to the several inventory 
items in and around Memphis, though these types of transportation inventory are densely 
packed within urban Memphis.  Railway bridges incur only $150,000 in losses, however; 
railways facilities account for nearly $47.3 million in economic losses.  Distribution 
patterns for at least moderate damage for all transportation facilities are similar to the 
damage seen in Figure 92 for airport facilities.  All airports more than 25% likely to 
experience moderate damage or greater are confined to within 50 km of the epicenter.  
Trends like this one hold true for bus, railway and port facilities.  Losses associated with 
this damage reach nearly $575 million.  Related losses include bus facility losses at 
nearly $3.43 million, port facilities at $70.5 million and ferry facilities at $5.57 million, 
which is true of all epicenters.   
 
6.1.3.5 Utility Systems  
 Utility facilities, like all other facilities and buildings, experience significant 
damage in and around the Memphis area.  The large urban population places high 
demands on all utilities, thus requiring more facilities and distribution lines than the 
average Midwestern community.  Damage state probabilities for at least moderate 
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damage are similar for all facilities and are represented by the damage patterns shown in 
Figure 93 for communications facilities.  Damage probabilities are substantial to the 
northwest.  Further utility facilities damage is characterized in Table 73.  Numerous 
waste water facilities also experience moderate damage.  It is important to note, though, 
that no utility facilities collapse which is reflected in the functionalities of these facilities.   
 
Figure 93: Communication Facilities - At Least Moderate Damage – SW Level I 
 
Table 73: Utility Facilities Damage and Functionalities – SW Level I 
Region 
Total




Day 1 Day 7
Potable Water 249 1 0 248 249
Waste Water 1,646 31 0 1,568 1,643
Natural Gas 114 0 0 114 114
Oil 49 8 0 40 49
Electric Power 158 5 0 152 158
Communications 940 21 0 935 940
With > 50% Functionality
 
 
The previous table, in addition to Table 74, quantify the facilities that are 
operational at various intervals after an earthquake.  As with the two previous epicenters, 
waste water facilities suffer the greatest functional loss immediately after an earthquake.  
More than 5% of all waste water facilities are not in operation immediately after the 
southwest scenario earthquake. The loss of oil facilities functionalities is uncommon of 
the previous two analysis cases.  Only 81%, or 40 facilities, are functional the day after 
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the earthquake.  While these facilities recover quickly the initial level of damage is 
unusual based on previous earthquake analyses.   
Table 74: Utility Systems Functionalities – SW Level I 
Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 14 Day 30 Day 90 Total
Potable Water 248 249 249 249 249 249 249
Waste Water 1568 1631 1643 1643 1643 1646 1646
Natural Gas 114 114 114 114 114 114 114
Oil Systems 40 49 49 49 49 49 49
Electric Power 152 158 158 158 158 158 158




Service disruptions and distribution network damage also impact the functionality 
of utility systems.  Water, oil and gas pipelines experience damage which is characterized 
by the amount of breaks and leaks in Table 75.  As with the previous epicenters, potable 
water lines experience the greatest number of leaks and breaks at 25,727 and 6,932, 
respectively.  Natural gas lines have the highest leak and break rates at 0.109 leaks/km 
and 0.027 breaks/km.  The lowest rates belong to potable water system pipelines.  
Additional service disruptions for potable water and electricity are shown in Table 76.  
The day after the earthquake 4.2% of households are without potable water while 3.0% 
are without electricity.  After 90 days all households have potable water service restored 
while 182 households are still without electricity.  Long durations without these utilities, 
however; increases the number of displaced residents as they are not able to use their 
homes without critical services.   







Potable Water 500,560 25,727 6,432
Waste Water 300,336 20,347 5,087
Natural Gas 200,224 21,751 5,438
Oil 0 0 0  
 
Table 76: Potable Water and Electricity Service Disruptions – SW Level I 
Total No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 Day 90
Potable Water 179,530 151,206 110,354 9,926 0
Electric Power 128,802 66,976 19,696 2,715 182
4,236,197
No. of Households without Service
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Table 77: Utility System Losses – SW Level I 
Utility System Loss % Total
Potable Water Facility $57,880,000 2.85%
Potable Water Lines $115,770,000 5.69%
Waste Water Facility $1,448,670,000 71.25%
Waste Water Lines $91,560,000 4.50%
Oil Facilities $180,000 0.01%
Nautral Gas Facilities $1,090,000 0.05%
Natural Gas Lines $97,880,000 4.81%
Electric Systems $218,610,000 10.75%
Communication $1,460,000 0.07%
Total $2,033,100,000  
 
Finally, utility system losses are determined by economic loss values for each 
subsystem.  Waste water system experience the greatest loss at over $1.5 billion, which is 
more than 76% of all utility losses.  Electric systems sustain the second largest economic 
loss at 13% of all utility losses.  The remaining subsystems pale in comparison as their 
individual subsystems do not contribute significant losses to the overall value of utility 
system losses (See Table 77).  
 
6.1.3.6 Induced Damage 
Fires ignited from the initial earthquake are most prevalent in areas of significant 
shaking.  HAZUS-MH predicts 56 ignitions that burn 0.48 square miles.  This is fewer 
ignitions and less burned area than the previous earthquakes.  The water demand to 
extinguish the fires following the earthquake is shown in Figure 94.  Most census tracts 
with fires and water demand are in Arkansas and Mississippi, with some of the highest 
demands occurring in northeastern Arkansas.  Fires are estimated to affect 304 people 
and damage $19 million of inventory value.   
 Debris generation is focused in northeastern Arkansas, Memphis, Tennessee, and 
northwestern Mississippi (See Figure 95).  It is interesting to note the dark blue census 
tract in Mississippi that shows 93 thousand tons of debris.  Without a thorough 
investigation of the county’s inventory it is difficult to speculate as to the reason for such 
large debris values there, though there may be a large number of structures in that 
specific  area.  HAZUS-MH estimates a total of 7 million tons of debris, with 3.64 tons 
attributed to brick and wood.  The remaining 3.36 tons is due to concrete and steel.  With 
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debris removal occurring in 25 ton truckloads approximately 280,000 truckloads are 
required to remove all the debris generated from the southwest scenario earthquake.   
 
Figure 94: Fire Demand (gpm) – SW Level I 
 
Figure 95: Total Debris (Thousands of Tons) – SW Level I 
 
6.1.3.7 Social and Economic Losses 
 Displaced households and temporary housing requirements are key values for 
response and recovery planning as they determine the amount and locations of temporary 
housing for a given hazard.  For the southwest epicenter displaced households and 
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temporary housing needs are quantified in Table 78.  Arkansas, Mississippi and Missouri 
see nearly all the housing demand.  The large housing need in Tennessee is due almost 
entirely to the extensive damage in Memphis.  Being so close to the southwest epicenter 
the city experiences some of the highest levels of damage in the region which is 
compounded by its urban nature.  As a result over 99% of all Tennessee’s housing needs 
are located there.   













Total 18,836 5,849  
 
Table 79: Casualties - 2 PM – SW Level I 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Commercial 6,570 1,603 221 428
Commuting 6 7 12 2
Educational 1,288 312 45 87
Hotels 36 9 1 2
Industrial 849 200 26 51
Other-Residential 657 144 18 34
Single Family 769 171 24 45
TOTAL 10,175 2,446 347 649  
  
The greatest number of casualties occurs at 2 PM, as is the case with the two 
previous epicenters.  Total casualties are reported at 13,616, with the 5 PM estimate 
second at 11,683.  The night time estimate, at 2 AM, is a distant third at 8,659 casualties.  
The worst case scenario is delineated in Table 79.  Approximately 75% of all casualties 
are minor injuries, with only 7% attributed to major injuries and fatalities.  Commercial 
buildings experience 65% of all minor injuries, with schools second at 13%.  Commuting 
injuries are least, which is expected since not many people are commuting to and from 
work at this time of day.   
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Alabama $2,849 $12,262 $5,456 $262 0.06 $43 $692 $988 $791 $23,343
Arkansas $517,693 $1,494,550 $466,048 $18,058 3.27 $12,739 $120,857 $168,595 $165,211 $2,963,750
Illinois $1,645 $5,825 $2,802 $68 0.02 $15 $159 $210 $348 $11,072
Indiana $246 $620 $382 $36 0.00 $1 $17 $20 $33 $1,356
Kentucky $3,070 $11,375 $5,347 $184 0.05 $41 $551 $743 $752 $22,063
Mississippi $303,736 $825,625 $267,295 $16,337 2.26 $7,082 $99,555 $140,979 $99,083 $1,759,692
Missouri $20,898 $55,806 $23,259 $1,004 0.16 $363 $4,139 $5,707 $5,205 $116,382
Tennessee $1,317,392 $3,920,022 $1,319,629 $48,383 0.81 $31,091 $403,972 $539,447 $464,701 $8,044,636
TOTAL $2,167,528 $6,326,085 $2,090,218 $84,332 $51,375 $629,942 $856,688 $736,124 $12,942,294
Capital Losses Income Losses
 
 
Table 81: Direct Economic Losses by General Occupancy ($ millions) – SW Level I 
Single Family Other Residential Commercial Industrial Others TOTAL
Income Losses Wage $0.00 $57.70 $732.47 $38.10 $28.42 $856.69
Capital-Related $0.00 $24.88 $573.56 $23.23 $8.28 $629.95
Rental $164.31 $230.83 $304.70 $14.86 $12.21 $726.91
Relocation $18.13 $6.32 $21.48 $1.12 $4.33 $51.38
SUBTOTAL $182.44 $319.73 $1,632.21 $77.31 $53.24 $2,264.93
Capital Stock Losses Structural $801.88 $384.99 $730.78 $144.51 $105.37 $2,167.53
Non-Structural $2,846.04 $1,365.42 $1,565.63 $319.24 $229.76 $6,326.09
Content $855.73 $269.99 $670.19 $194.04 $100.27 $2,090.22
Inventory $0.00 $0.00 $30.80 $51.11 $2.43 $84.34
SUBTOTAL $4,503.65 $2,020.40 $2,997.40 $708.90 $437.83 $10,668.18
TOTAL $4,686.09 $2,340.13 $4,629.61 $786.21 $491.07 $12,933.11  
  
Economic losses for buildings are divided by state in Table 80.  Tennessee sees 
the greatest loss in every category with total state losses estimated at over $8 billion 
which equates to two-thirds of all building losses.  Arkansas in second with over $2.9 
million or 23% of all building losses.  Northern states such as Illinois and Indiana and 
Kentucky experience minimal losses in comparison to the southern states.  Additional 
building loss characterizations are presented in Table 81.  All residential buildings 
comprise 54% of all building losses, while 35% is attributed to commercial buildings.  
Industrial and other buildings contribute roughly 10% of all building losses at $1.3 
million.   
 Transportation losses follow similar trends to those shown for building direct 
losses.  Table 82 highlights transportation losses by state.  Arkansas shows the greatest 
transportation lost at $262 million which translates to 45% of regional transportation 
losses.  Tennessee follows with $203 million at 35% of overall transportation losses.  As 
expected, northern states incur much smaller losses due to their great distance from the 
epicenter.  Losses are also broken down by subsystem type, as seen in Table 83.  
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Highway systems show the greatest loss value at $310 millions which is attributes solely 
to bridges.  This equates to 1.2% of the total value of bridge inventory.  Again, ferry  
facilities are showing complete damage to all facilities which was shown in the analysis 
of the central epicenter to be incorrect.  Railway facilities also show a high loss ratio of 
5.7, followed closely by port facilities at 5.0 and airport facilities at 4.1.  The 
transportation system overall, however; gives a loss ratio of 3%. 
Table 82: Direct Transportation Losses by State ($ thousands) – SW Level I 
Highway Railway Light Rail Bus Facility Ports Ferries Airports Total
Alabama $1,447 $268 $0 $30 $1,285 $0 $1,359 $4,389
Arkansas $167,351 $11,738 $0 $674 $17,057 $0 $65,761 $262,581
Illinois $1,293 $401 $0 $101 $1,696 $2,420 $3,655 $9,566
Indiana $23 $86 $0 $2 $270 $0 $510 $892
Kentucky $1,141 $710 $0 $54 $3,714 $1,068 $2,524 $9,212
Mississippi $25,264 $1,169 $0 $468 $2,650 $0 $23,524 $53,076
Missouri $8,507 $2,041 $0 $618 $5,644 $1,123 $14,170 $32,103
Tennessee $105,157 $30,992 $0 $1,478 $38,208 $959 $26,516 $203,309




Table 83: Direct Transportation Losses by Subsystem Component – SW Level I 
Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio
Highway Bridges $25,505,730,000 $310,180,000 1.22%
Railway Bridges $53,160,000 $150,000 0.28%
Railway Facilities $830,860,000 $47,260,000 5.69%
Bus Facilities $90,310,000 $3,430,000 3.80%
Ferry Facilities $5,570,000 $5,570,000 100.00%
Port Facilities $1,413,120,000 $70,520,000 4.99%
Airport Facilities $3,366,410,000 $138,020,000 4.10%  
 
Utility systems losses are illustrated by state in Table 84 & Table 85.  Arkansas 
incurs the greatest loss at $1.14 billion, followed by Tennessee with $422 million and 
another 21% of total utility losses.  Additional losses are divided up by subsystem type.  
Waste water facilities show the greatest losses at $1.45 billion and loss ratios of 1.34 and 
1.52 for facilities and distribution lines, respectively.  Oil system facilities are another 
critical loss group with the largest loss ratio, 3.75.  Natural gas distribution lines exhibit a 
loss ratio of 2.44, though pipeline runs are based on numerous assumptions within 
HAZUS-MH and thus the uncertainty in that value is high.   
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Table 84: Utility System Losses by State ($ thousands) – SW Level I 
Potable Water Waste Water Oil Systems Natural Gas Electric Power Communication Total
Alabama $2,672 $6,199 $0 $1,962 $2,094 $10 $12,937
Arkansas $81,209 $898,397 $31 $50,359 $107,640 $603 $1,138,238
Illinois $3,819 $12,356 $0 $2,402 $1,286 $6 $19,870
Indiana $520 $540 $0 $420 $82 $0 $1,562
Kentucky $3,094 $11,400 $0 $1,823 $1,654 $12 $17,983
Mississippi $17,919 $206,700 $0 $14,810 $34,856 $203 $274,489
Missouri $19,257 $100,923 $0 $7,980 $17,711 $69 $145,941
Tennessee $45,160 $303,716 $152 $19,216 $53,287 $559 $422,090




Table 85: Direct Utility Losses by Subcomponent – SW Level I 
Inventory Value Economic Loss Loss Ratio
Potable Water Facilities $8,314,300,000 $57,880,000 0.70%
Potable Water Distribution Lines $10,011,200,000 $115,770,000 1.16%
Waste Water Facilities $108,128,400,000 $1,448,670,000 1.34%
Waste Water Distribution Lines $6,006,700,000 $91,560,000 1.52%
Natural Gas Facilities $117,100,000 $1,090,000 0.93%
Natural Gas Distribution Lines $4,004,500,000 $97,880,000 2.44%
Oil Facilities $4,800,000 $180,000 3.75%
Electric Power Facilities $17,087,400,000 $218,610,000 1.28%
Communication Facilities $89,600,000 $1,460,000 1.63%  
 
Regional losses are totaled by state and type and appear in Table 86.  Tennessee 
incurs the greatest direct economic loss of any state, by far.  Over $8.6 billion in total 
losses occur there, which translates to 58% of regional losses.  Arkansas contributes 
another $4.36 billion and 28% of total regional direct losses.  Illinois, Indiana and 
Kentucky are again shown to incur minimal losses with overall values less than 3% each.  
The southwest epicenter generates over $12.9 billion of direct building economic losses 
over the entire study region.  This equates to almost 83% total direct losses.  The ratio of 
losses represented here is much different than the previous epicenter, as buildings 
account for such a larger percentage and utilities are only 16% of all losses.   
 Induced losses for the southwest scenario earthquake show significant 
employment gains in the first year.  Employment is more than doubled due to recovery 
efforts and related jobs.  Economic losses from business interruptions, however; generate 
over $18 billion in losses.  It is not until the fourth year after the earthquake that the 
region stops losing money and does not require the large number of jobs for rebuilding 
and other recovery efforts.  The economic and employment recovery timeline is outlined 
in Table 87. 
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Table 86: Total Direct Economic Loss – SW Level I 














Total $15.6  
 
Table 87: Indirect Economic Losses without Aid – SW Level I 
Loss Total %
First Year Employment Impact 5,639,544 189.37
Income Impact 18,530 13.07
Second Year Employment Impact 2,239,230 75.19
Income Impact 10,492 7.40
Third Year Employment Impact 53,048 1.78
Income Impact 2,669 1.88
Fourth Year Employment Impact 2,989 0.10
Income Impact -227 -0.16
Fifth Year Employment Impact 170 0.01
Income Impact -390 -0.27
Years 6 to 15 Employment Impact 9 0.00
Income Impact -399 -0.28  
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6.2 Improved Level I Analysis  
 
 Improved Level I analysis still maintains almost all the HAZUS-MH default 
settings used in the Level I analysis, though now the regional hazard is updated with 
NEHRP site classes.  While NEHRP recognizes site classes ‘A’ thru ‘F’ with site class 
‘F’ being soils that require special evaluation, HAZUS-MH only permits that use of 
classes ‘A’ thru ‘E’, where ‘E’ represents very soft soils.  The incorporation of these site 
class factors adjusts the ground motion to reflect the manner in which these soil types 
affect the attenuation of ground shaking.  This level of analysis was completed for each 
of the three regional epicenters and comparisons are made between the baseline Level I 
and the updated hazard data in preliminary work.  
 As discussed earlier the regional hazard maps developed by USGS account for 
regional site class variations in the determination of ground motion.  A second set of 
Improved Level I analyses are completed with USGS ground motions and compared to 
the analyses completed with the ground motions developed by scaling CEUS attenuations 
by the applicable site class factors.  USGS-developed ground motions employing a line 
source event are more intense for seismic event on all three fault extensions; northeast, 
central and southwest.  More intense ground motions generate more damage and greater 
losses and thus the USGS ground motions (considering site affects) are employed for all 
Improved Level I analyses. 
 
6.2.1 Northeast Epicenter 
 
6.2.1.1 Ground Motion 
 Ground motions are directly affected by the incorporation of site class 
information.  Modified ground shaking maps are illustrated in Figure 96 -Figure 99.  
Based on the site class maps data obtained during map development the northeast source 
fault segment is located in a region of intense ground shaking.  Maximum peak ground 
acceleration at the source is increased significantly to 1.38g.  This is a 57% amplification 
of maximum peak ground acceleration.  No longer is PGA attenuated in concentric  
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Figure 96: Improved Site Class PGA – NE Improved 
 
Figure 97: Improved Site Class PGV – NE Improved 
 
circles, radiating from the epicenter, but rather a range of moderate to intense shaking 
values between 0.3g and 1.2g surrounding the proposed northeast extension of the New 
Madrid Fault.  Maximum peak ground velocity is amplified to 47 in./sec. at the epicenter, 
which is a 23% increase over the default maximum PGV.  Peak ground velocities 
decrease rapidly in all directions except the southwest direction, which may indicate 
some directivity of fault rupture. Overall, however, PGV values are significantly higher 
for the improved site class scenario.  Short-period spectral acceleration is roughly the 
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same nearest the source through greater in the southwest portion of the region than in the 
previous default case.  Default maximum Sa 0.3 sec. of 2.2g drops to 2.1g when site class 
data is added.  Long-period spectral accelerations increase to a maximum of 1.28g from 
0.8g in the default case.  Additionally, long- period accelerations show greater values in 
the northeast near the fault and in the southwest, along the more southern extensions of 
the proposed fault.  Northern and western portions of the region show much lesser 
shaking at long periods than 0.15g.  
 
Figure 98: Improved Site Class Sa 0.3 Sec. – NE Improved 













Figure 99: Improved Site Class Sa 1.0 Sec. – NE Improved 
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Spectral displacements at short-periods are reduced to 4.0-inches from 4.19-inches in the 
default case.  While displacements do not decrease in a radial pattern as in the default 
case, typical short-period spectral displacements still remain between ¼- and ¾-inches 
throughout the majority of the region.  As with other ground motion parameters, 
displacements increase in northeast Arkansas and western Tennessee and reach 
displacement values much greater than the default case in those areas.  Long-period 
spectral displacements increase dramatically with the incorporation of site class data (See 
Figure 100 & Figure 101).  Maximum displacement at the source increase to eight-inches  













Figure 100: Improved Site Class Sd 0.3 Sec. – NE Improved 













Figure 101: Improved Site Class Sd 1.0 Sec. – NE Improved 
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from 5.04-inches in the default case.  This is an amplification of nearly 60%.  Regional 
displacements also increase and are more randomly dispersed as site classes vary across 
the region.   
 
6.2.1.2 General Building Stock 
 Structural damage to the three primary building types increases, not only with 
regard to damage state probability, but also in terms of area where damage occurs.  Light 
wood frames see the least increase in structural damage of the three primary site class 
factors the map representing the likelihoods of at least moderate damage are building 
types. While damage state probabilities increase slightly with the addition of similar to 
the figure shown for the default case (Figure 102).  Unreinforced masonry buildings and 
mobile homes, however; show substantial differences in at least moderate damage state 
probabilities.  These new damage trends are illustrated in Figure 103 & Figure 104.   
 
Figure 102: At Least Moderate Structural Damage - W1 - NE Improved 
 
Both building types show the highest probabilities of reaching this damage state nearest 
the source similar to the default case, though census tracts outside the immediate vicinity  
of the source experience much higher likelihoods of damage than the default case.  Both 
URMLs and mobile homes show higher damage probabilities extending to the northeast 
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and southwest, with numerous census tracts in the southwestern Kentucky showing 
higher likelihoods of reaching this damage state.  The map of mobile home damage state 
probabilities is particularly helpful in illustrating this trend.  Southern Illinois shows 
much more damage than the default case for the northeast source.  Also, high- and mid-
range damage state probabilities extend south into southern Missouri as well as 
Tennessee and northern Arkansas.  This behavior is attributed solely to site class 
information as such extensive damage is not seen in the default case.   
 
Figure 103: At Least Moderate Structural Damage - URML – NE Improved 
 
Figure 104: At Least Moderate Structural Damage - MH – NE Improved 
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 Non-structural damage probability distributions for moderate or greater damage 
are similar to those seen for structural damage.  Light wood frames show similar damage 
trends to those shown in the default case, though minor increases in the area likely to 
experience damage are evident.  Unreinforced masonry buildings and mobile homes 
exhibit nonstructural acceleration- and drift-sensitive damage probability patterns similar 
to those shown early for structural damage. Though not illustrated here, the highest 
probabilities of at least moderate damage are confined to a small area in the immediate 
vicinity of the fault rupture.  Structural damage indicates a larger area where damage is 
highly likely, though for non-structural damage this area is reduced by roughly half.   
Table 88: Building Damage by Building Count and Seismic Code Level – NE Improved 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 395,204 73,905 16,893 2,556 277
Total Low Code Buildings 2,141,386 94,400 26,370 3,465 165
Total Buildings 2536590 168305 43263 6021 442
2754621
%Total Buildings 92.085% 6.110% 1.571% 0.219% 0.016%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 28574 13376 9141 3823 4715
Total Low Code Buildings 161035 11115 4645 1465 515
Total Pre-Code Buildings 232980 31164 13326 5412 4216
Total Buildings 422589 55655 27112 10700 9446
525502
%Total Buildings 80.416% 10.591% 5.159% 2.036% 1.798%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 12379 10770 13080 5936 3204
Total Low Code Buildings 143048 16799 8577 2110 215
Total Pre-Code Buildings 171036 51593 28206 11409 6218
Total Buildings 326463 79162 49863 19455 9637
484580
%Total Buildings 67.370% 16.336% 10.290% 4.015% 1.989%
Light Wood Frame
Total Number of Building Type:
Unreinforced Masonry
Total Number of Building Type:
Mobile Homes
Total Number of Building Type:
 
 
Damage to regional building types is presented in Table 88.  Light wood frame 
structures are affected by the addition of site class information.  Approximately 92% of 
all light wood frames still exhibit no damage, significantly larger numbers populate the 
remaining damage categories; slight, moderate, extensive and complete.  There are over 
60,000 additional cases of slight damage and 300 more collapses.  Conversely, moderate 
damage occurrences decrease by over 50%.  Unreinforced masonry buildings show a 
reduction in buildings experiencing slight damage.  This amounts to nearly 13,000 
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structures.  The number of buildings that collapse, however; increases significantly.  An 
additional 4,867 URMs, or 106% more buildings, collapse with the inclusion of site class 
data.  This is the case with mobile homes as well though collapse occurrences increase by 
170%.  While the overall percentage of mobile homes that show complete damage 
increases by 1.2%, this equates to an additional 6,100 collapsed structures.  Evidently the 
amplification of ground motion at greater source-to-site distances dramatically impacts 
unreinforced masonry buildings and mobile homes much more so than light wood frames. 
Table 89: Building Damage by State – NE Improved 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 204,322 1,103 70 0 0 205,496
Arkansas 333,701 10,157 855 12 0 344,724
Illinois 314,766 13,846 3,658 652 83 333,005
Indiana 124,927 3,250 268 4 0 128,450
Kentucky 137,448 25,580 22,227 5,317 813 191,385
Mississippi 210,404 20,139 1,841 21 0 232,406
Missouri 661,321 7,588 547 9 0 669,465
Tennessee 466,544 41,086 10,597 1,201 39 519,466
Code Total 2,453,433 122,750 40,063 7,216 935 2,624,396
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 106,389 27,173 9,986 1,773 59 145,380
Illinois 3,902 1,831 2,592 1,467 1,252 11,045
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 504 2,558 4,171 1,832 964 10,028
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 51,259 22,105 12,073 5,077 5,568 96,083
Tennessee 277,460 45,313 10,872 2,403 450 336,498
Code Total 439,515 98,980 39,694 12,553 8,293 599,035
Region Total 2,892,947 221,730 79,757 19,769 9,228 3,223,431





Building damage in northern states is affected by the addition of site class data, as 
well as southern states show little to no change with regard to building damage 
distributions for low seismic code level.  Illinois, for example, shows nearly 24,000 fewer 
slightly damaged buildings and almost 33 collapses.  Arkansas shows 9,500 more slightly 
damaged buildings and 800 more cases of moderate damage at the low-code level.  The 
inclusion of site classes dramatically increases the building damage in the small portion 
of Indiana included in this study region.  Kentucky shows major increases at more severe 
damage levels, most notably though are the additional 800 collapses (See Table 89).  
Over 25,000 fewer building incur damage in Missouri, while Tennessee exhibits 
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increases in slight and moderate damage at low seismic code levels.  State damage 
changes for low seismic code are similar to those shown by moderate code buildings.  At 
the regional level changes in state damage distributions are almost negligible, with each 
damage state changing by small margins with the exceptions of Arkansas and Tennessee, 
which show severe increases in all levels of damage at the moderate-code level.  
Table 90: Building Damage by General Occupancy – NE Improved 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Agriculture 2,018 0.06% 93 0.03% 49 0.04% 25 0.07% 22 0.11%
Commercial 29,706 0.89% 3,429 1.12% 2,118 1.72% 1,003 2.66% 526 2.61%
Education 252 0.01% 24 0.01% 14 0.01% 6 0.02% 2 0.01%
Government 1,431 0.04% 154 0.05% 86 0.07% 42 0.11% 22 0.11%
Industrial 4,690 0.14% 671 0.22% 475 0.39% 209 0.56% 75 0.37%
Other Residential 446,887 13.45% 88,159 28.73% 53,382 43.39% 20,517 54.50% 10,176 50.50%
Religion 2,245 0.07% 242 0.08% 124 0.10% 53 0.14% 34 0.17%
Single Family 2,835,162 85.33% 214,096 69.77% 66,777 54.28% 15,791 41.95% 9,295 46.12%
TOTAL 3,322,391 306,868 123,025 37,646 20,152
Extensive CompleteNone Slight Moderate
 
   
General building stock damage by occupancy shows an increase in the number of 
collapsed buildings, while moderate damage is reduced.  Table 90 shows that while 
single family homes show 18,000 additional instances of moderate damage.  ‘Other 
residential’ buildings with moderate damage decrease by 33,000 structures.  Some of 
these buildings now collapse, while most of the buildings experience no damage.  While 
the number of buildings with no damage increases by 47,000 this is less than 0.5% 
increase on the regional level.  
 
6.2.1.3 Essential Facilities 
 Damage to essential facilities is more extensive when site classes are updated.  
Figure 105 & Figure 106 illustrate revised damage state probabilities for schools and 
hospitals with at least moderate damage, respectively.  Schools exhibit damage 
probability trends similar to URML buildings discussed for the general building stock.  
Damage probabilities in excess of 55% extend into the northern tip of Arkansas and 
southwest Tennessee, with lesser probabilities occurring in Indiana and other northern 
portions of the study region.  The outlying facilities in the north show high likelihoods of 
at least moderate damage.  These schools lie outside the extents of the FEMA hazard 
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maps and are assigned zero ground motions values.  As was discussed in the previous 
section this assignment of ground motion results in random damage to essential facilities.  
Since this applies to a small number of facilities the increase in regional economic loss is 
minimal and does not change results significantly.  The FEMA maps are used for all 
improved Level I and Level II analyses which will generate this same behavior in all 
subsequent regional analyses.   
 
Figure 105: At Least Moderate Damage - Schools – NE Improved 
 
Figure 106: At Least Moderate Damage - Hospitals – NE Improved 
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Hospitals show similar damage trends.  The few hospitals near the source are 
more than 85% likely to experience at least moderate damage, though these high damage 
state probabilities extend farther east to Tennessee.  Increases in damage are due to two 
critical factors; site class and building type.  The hospitals along Tennessee lie on the 
banks of the Mississippi River where soils are soft, which amplifies the short-period 
shaking value which affect these low-rise buildings.  In addition, hospitals are 
categorized as precast concrete buildings with tilt-up walls, PC1.  Structural fragilities for 
building type PC1 indicate moderate damage occurring at a median PGA value of 0.14g.  
Low-rise unreinforced masonry buildings, however; require a 0.17g median value to 
reach moderate damage.  The western Tennessee area experiences 0.14g to 0.16g when 
soil amplification is included.  These PGA values generate moderate damage in PC1 
buildings, though shaking values are not intense enough to generate damage in URML 
structures.  This inclusion of site class factors and the small difference in median fragility 
values for PC1 and URML buildings account for the vast difference in damage state 
probabilities for these two essential facility types.  Since fire and police stations are 
classified as URML buildings damage trends will be the same as those shown for schools.   
Table 91: Essential Facilities Damage – NE Improved 
Classification Total





>50% at Day 1
Hospitals 308 22 3 211
Schools 4,695 460 139 4,170
EOCs 92 19 10 71
Police Stations 1,207 177 50 1,003




Regional damage totals are shown in Table 91.  The increased damage state 
probabilities shown previously are reflected in the number of fire stations with moderate  
damage or greater.  96 additional fire stations meet this damage state, which equates to 
over 6.5% of regional fire stations.  The remaining essential facility types experience 
similar increases in regional building damage with the exception of hospital damage, 
which decreases.  Regional facilities damage is reflected in the functionalities displayed 
in Table 92.  Hospitals are greatly affected by the intensified shaking due to the inclusion 
of site class factors.  Day 1 functionalities drop from 81% of regional hospitals operating 
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to 69%.  The recovery timeline functions in HAZUS-MH are not changed thus the 
recovery of hospitals and all other essential facilities maintain their initial functional 
percentage differences throughout the 90-day recovery timeline.  Police stations and 
schools also show small reductions in Day 1 functionality, with regional operation 
dropping to 82.8% and 88.8%, respectively.  These estimations show the affect of the 
modified ground motion on regional recovery and the reduced capacity of regional 
essential facilities that result.   
Table 92: Essential Facilities Functionalities – NE Improved 
No. 
Functional












% of Total 
Functional
Day 1 211 68.51% 1213 82.80% 1003 83.10% 4170 88.82%
Day 3 211 68.51% 1215 82.94% 1004 83.18% 4170 88.82%
Day 7 286 92.86% 1247 85.12% 1030 85.34% 4235 90.20%
Day 14 286 92.86% 1247 85.12% 1030 85.34% 4235 90.20%
Day 30 291 94.48% 1383 94.40% 1143 94.70% 4522 96.32%
Day 90 305 99.03% 1401 95.63% 1157 95.86% 4556 97.04%
Hospitals Fire Stations Police Stations Schools
308 Total Strucutres 1465 Total Strucutres 1207 Total Strucutres 4695 Total Strucutres
 
 
6.2.1.4 Transportation Systems 
 Highway bridge damage increases with the incorporation of site affects as well.  
Greater probabilities of at least moderate damage exist along the length of the Mississippi 
River where soils are soft and primarily sediment.  Over 830 bridges are expected to 
reach moderate damage or greater, while 283 of those, or 34% of these damaged bridges 
are predicted to collapse.  This amounts to an additional 481 bridges with more than 
moderate damage over the default case, and almost 242 more collapses.  Increased 
amounts of damage affect bridge functionalities, which are expressed in Table 93.  Over 
400 fewer bridges are functional the day after the earthquake, and 489 fewer bridges after 
Table 93: Highway Bridge Functionalities – NE 
Improved 
Time No. Functional % Total Functional
Day 1 29538 97.44%
Day 3 29642 97.78%
Day 7 29662 97.85%
Day 14 29665 97.86%
Day 30 29669 97.87%
Day 90 29921 98.70%
Highway Bridge Fuctionality
 
Table 94: Transportation Subsystem Losses – 
NE Improved 
Component Loss % Loss
Highway Bridges $430,720,000 37.21%
Railway Bridges $580,000 0.05%
Railway Facilities $118,530,000 10.24%
Airport Facilities $337,410,000 29.15%
Bus Facilities $11,580,000 1.00%
Port Facilities $253,290,000 21.88%
Ferry Facilities $5,570,000 0.48%
Total $1,157,680,000  
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one month.  Despite the lesser number of bridges operational after the earthquake the 
larger inventory only alters regional functionality percentages by less than 2%.   
 Highway bridges are greatly affected by the amplification of ground motion due 
to site affects, similar to the remaining types of transportation; railway, port, ferry, bus 
and airport facilities.  Railway and port facilities experience 34 and 92 additional 
occurrences of at least moderate damage, respectively.  Moreover, 26 more airports show 
the same level of damage.  Transportation losses related to the damage generated by the 
improved northeast scenario event are shown in Table 94.  Bridge losses nearly double 
from the default case while airport facilities generate $181 million in additional damage.  
The remaining transportation categories see similar changes in loss.   
Table 95: Transportation Facilities Damage – NE Improved 
Region Total




Highway Bridges 30,314 831 283
Railway Bridges 425 8 0
Railway Facilities 393 46 0
Bus Facilities 84 6 0
Ferry Facilities 5 5 5
Port Facilities 691 114 5
Airport Facilities 637 31 0  
 
 Damage to transportation facilities is illustrated in Table 95 by facility type.  
Roughly 3% of all highway bridges experience at least moderate damage while less than 
1% experience collapse.  Over 16% of all port facilities experience at least moderate 
damage, while the occurrence of collapse is much less prevalent.  In addition there are no 
cases in which railway bridges, railway facilities, bus facilities and airports collapse.    
 
6.2.1.5 Utility Systems 
 Damage to utility systems is also vastly altered by the affects of regional site data.  
Most utility subsystems show significant increases in the number of facilities 
experiencing moderate damage.  This includes 115 additional waste water facilities, 73 
communications facilities and 28 potable water facilities.  Contrary to the baseline Level 
I analysis two waste water facilities are expected to collapse.  As a result utility system 
functionalities break down as shown in Table 96.  First day functionalities are much less 
than in the default case.  Improving regional site information results in over 250 fewer 
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operational waste water facilities the day after an earthquake.  By the seventh day, 
however; functionalities are close to those for the default case, though still lower.   
Table 96: Utility Facility Functionalities – NE Improved 
Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 14 Day 30 Day 90 Total
Potable Water 213 236 244 244 245 249 249
Waste Water 1295 1532 1592 1592 1608 1644 1646
Natural Gas 102 110 111 114 114 114 114
Oil Systems 48 49 49 49 49 49 49
Electric Power 130 152 157 158 158 158 158




Table 97: Transportation Facilities Damage - NE Improved 
Region 
Total 




Potable Water 249 36 0
Waste Water 1,646 162 2
Natural Gas 114 12 0
Oil Systems 49 1 0
Electric Power 158 16 0
Communication 940 98 0  
 
 Transportation facilities damage is illustrated in Table 97 by type.  Waste water 
facilities show the greatest number of at least moderate damage cases, though this is 
roughly 10% of the total regional waste water facility inventory.  Potable water facilities 
show the greatest rate of at least moderate damage at roughly 14% of the total inventory.  
Oil facilities are virtually unaffected by regional ground shaking with only one facility 
with at least moderate damage.  Complete damage only occurs with two waste water 
facilities which is reflected in the functionality of all facility types.   
 Service disruptions increase by 45%-75% for pipeline networks.  Potable water, 
waste water and natural gas pipelines are estimated to incur approximately 16,000 to 
20,000 additional leaks and 4,000 to 5,000 additional leaks.  As shown in Table 98, 
potable water pipelines experience over 46,000 leaks in the estimated distribution 
network.  The highest leak rate is still seen in natural gas lines, at 0.19 leaks/km, which is 
almost 73% greater than the 0.11 leaks/km for the default case.  Waste water and potable 
water lines increase by only 0.05 leaks/km, which is over 75% of the initial leak rate.  
Break rates increase as well, with the greatest break rate occurring with natural gas lines.  
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Nearly 0.049 breaks/km are expected for natural gas lines.  This is a 75% increase in 
break rate from the 0.028 breaks/km seen in the default case.     







Potable Water 500,560 46,111 11,528
Waste Water 300,336 36,470 9,117
Natural Gas 200,224 38,985 9,746
Oil 0 0 0  
 
Table 99: Electric and Potable Water Service Disruptions – NE Improved 
Total No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 Day 90
Potable Water 129,833 102,610 71,793 12,843 0
Electric Power 220,247 144,165 63,994 13,953 271
4,236,197
No. of Households without Service
 
  
Further service disruptions for potable water and gas are shown in Table 99.  
Potable water service is impacted dramatically as nearly 73,000 additional service 
outages occur at Day 1 when site affects are considered.  Default case estimations 
indicate that potable water service is fully restored after 30 days.  This improved hazard 
analysis, however, shows that nearly 13,000 households are still without potable water a 
month after the earthquake.  Electric service shows 174,000 more outages the day after 
the earthquake, which is down to an additional 116,000 bridges after three days.  Fewer 
households have power restored after 30 days for the improved hazard case, though there 
are still 271 households without power after three months.  With the default analysis 
almost all power is restored within this three month recovery period.   
 Significant increases in utility facility damage generate large increases in utility 
system losses.  While oil system losses increase 35 times with the improved hazard this is 
still only and additional $140,000.  Oil losses, as well as all other utility subsystems are 
shown in Table 100.  Overall utility losses increase over $5.9 billion, which translates to 
a nearly 170% increase in total utility system losses.   
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Table 100: Utility Subsystem Losses – NE Improved 
Utility System Loss % Total
Potable Water Facility $681,930,000 7.24%
Potable Water Lines $207,500,000 2.20%
Waste Water Facility $7,103,990,000 75.45%
Waste Water Lines $164,110,000 1.74%
Oil Facilities $180,000 0.00%
Nautral Gas Facilities $7,050,000 0.07%
Natural Gas Lines $175,430,000 1.86%
Electric Systems $1,069,700,000 11.36%
Communication $6,000,000 0.06%
Total $9,415,890,000  
6.2.1.6 Induced Damage 
 Fires following the earthquake increases as well with improved site information.  
Over 120 ignitions are expected in this improved analysis.  This is much more than the 50 
expected ignitions for the default case.  No estimations are provided for affected residents, 
burned area and economic loss due to fire and thus no comparisons can be made between 
the improved and default cases for these parameters. 
 More debris is generated with improved site information.  Seven million tons of 
debris are created in the improved case, as oppose to the five million tons expected with 
the default case.  Approximately 49% of all debris is attributed to concrete and steel with 
the remainder going to brick and wood.  Roughly 280,000 truckloads are required to 
remove regional debris for the improved case, which is 40% more loads than are required 
for the default case (See Figure 107). 
 
Figure 107: Total Debris (Thousands of Tons) - NE Improved 
- 153 - 
6.2.1.7 Social and Economic Losses 
Updating the site information also increases shelter estimates.  Nearly 8,000 additional 
households are displaced, totaling over 18,500 for the Improved Level I analysis.  Table 
101 delineates shelter requirements by state.  Temporary housing estimates increase by 
93% from 2,758 people in need of temporary housing.   
Again, casualties are the worst at 2 PM.  This analysis shows 12,962 total 
casualties, which is illustrated in Table 102.  Level I estimates only 6,673 casualties, thus 
the modification of site data contributes and additional 6,300 casualties, or a 94% 
increase.  Most additional casualties are Level I minor injuries, though almost 400 more 
fatalities are expected with the improvements made.   













Total 18,508 5,313  
 
Table 102: Casualties - 2 PM – NE Improved 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Commercial 5,450 1,421 201 389
Commuting 7 9 16 3
Educational 1,272 343 53 103
Hotels 19 5 1 2
Industrial 759 191 26 50
Other-Residential 720 170 19 35
Single Family 1,225 328 51 95
TOTAL 9,452 2,467 367 677  
  
Finally losses by infrastructure components are considered.  Building direct losses 
are illustrated in Table 103.  All categories of capital and income losses increase in 
roughly the same proportion, resulting in an overall direct building loss increase of 
approximately $5.47 billion.  Overall, improving the site data across the region increases 
building losses by 74%.  The most notable state change is in Tennessee, where building 
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losses increase over five times to $3.85 billion from $600 million.  Arkansas losses 
increase to $1.08 billion while Kentucky losses increase to $3.72 billion, or by 232%.  
Illinois losses, however, are reduced by $910 million, or 39%.  Though not pictured here, 
building-related losses categorized by building type show increases for single family 
homes and maximum increases for other buildings, though this is $4.2 billion for all 
residential losses.   






















Alabama $3,142 $17,072 $8,518 $378 0.08 $39 $498 $741 $753 $31,141
Arkansas $175,263 $514,391 $203,861 $9,862 0.91 $4,102 $49,674 $68,264 $56,144 $1,081,562
Illinois $180,558 $803,609 $355,369 $7,376 3.88 $3,892 $23,748 $31,051 $47,329 $1,452,933
Indiana $15,228 $89,713 $55,712 $3,182 0.33 $263 $2,848 $4,093 $3,744 $174,784
Kentucky $570,279 $1,981,278 $679,309 $21,828 7.47 $12,795 $122,082 $172,151 $158,590 $3,718,312
Mississippi $49,986 $183,317 $87,676 $5,040 0.59 $1,131 $16,322 $24,388 $16,898 $384,760
Missouri $462,978 $1,759,945 $732,174 $27,039 3.98 $9,598 $73,533 $102,840 $123,184 $3,291,291
Tennessee $600,890 $1,797,914 $722,199 $32,388 3.05 $14,081 $204,638 $278,936 $194,099 $3,845,147
TOTAL $2,058,325 $7,147,240 $2,844,819 $107,093 $45,902 $493,344 $682,465 $600,743 $13,979,930
Capital Losses Income Losses
 
 
Table 104: Direct Transportation Losses - NE Improved ($ thousands) 
Highway Railway Light Rail Bus Facility Ports Ferries Airports Total
Alabama $2,338 $511 $0 $48 $2,107 $0 $2,514 $7,518
Arkansas $62,046 $5,779 $0 $495 $9,393 $0 $44,389 $122,102
Illinois $104,228 $23,164 $0 $2,473 $47,716 $2,420 $85,238 $265,238
Indiana $440 $8,405 $0 $114 $11,611 $0 $19,985 $40,555
Kentucky $38,417 $29,022 $0 $1,118 $83,920 $1,068 $40,557 $194,103
Mississippi $4,610 $527 $0 $136 $2,248 $0 $13,727 $21,248
Missouri $129,431 $37,150 $0 $5,603 $73,506 $1,123 $84,596 $331,410
Tennessee $89,207 $14,550 $0 $1,596 $22,793 $959 $46,402 $175,507












Airport Fcilities 10.02%  
  
Transportation losses increase by nearly 120% from the default case to $1.16 
billion, as shown in Table 104.  Bus and airport facilities show large changes in loss 
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values, while railway and port subsystems increase by roughly 190% and 153%, 
respectively.  Highways show the greatest change with $294 million in losses.  The 
additional $251 million translates to 140% of initial highway losses seen in the default 
case.  Illinois and Missouri show the most significant changes, with transportation losses 
more than twice that of the default case.  Kentucky and Tennessee also show sizeable loss 
increases.  Loss ratios for transportation system components are also shown in Table 105. 
 Changes in utility system losses are comparable to the previous two infrastructure 
systems.  Table 106 delineates utility system losses for the improved site analysis case.  
A total loss of $9.42 billion is nearly one billion more than the default case.  This equates 
to a 170% increase in utility losses.  While Illinois and Missouri utility losses double, 
losses in Tennessee increase 4.75 times to one billion.  Small additions to losses in the 
remaining states contribute to the overall increase in utility losses.  Potable and waste 
water, natural gas and electric facilities contribute to almost all of the changes in utility 
losses.   
Table 106: Direct Utility Losses - NE Improved ($ thousands) 
Potable Water Waste Water Oil Systems Natural Gas Electric Power Communication Total
Alabama $2,189 $9,688 $1 $1,250 $5,647 $21 $18,795
Arkansas $33,279 $580,895 $21 $18,369 $83,959 $449 $716,972
Illinois $252,011 $2,107,217 $39 $21,732 $267,240 $1,273 $2,649,512
Indiana $14,424 $63,650 $23 $775 $31,179 $146 $110,198
Kentucky $151,925 $976,789 $4 $26,804 $203,334 $1,265 $1,360,121
Mississippi $8,385 $116,964 $0 $5,199 $13,532 $139 $144,219
Missouri $351,432 $2,571,633 $31 $85,272 $401,149 $1,678 $3,411,196
Tennessee $75,785 $841,269 $59 $23,076 $63,661 $1,032 $1,004,882




Table 107: Direct Economics Losses by State – NE Improved 
Improved Diff. from Default % Difference
Alabama $0.0575 $0.0444 0.37%
Arkansas $1.9206 $1.6712 13.84%
Illinois $4.3677 $0.5985 4.96%
Indiana $0.3255 $0.0471 0.39%
Kentucky $5.2725 $3.7554 31.09%
Mississippi $0.5502 $0.5071 4.20%
Missouri $7.0339 $1.2843 10.63%
Tennessee $5.0255 $4.1703 34.53%
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Total direct losses are shown by state in Table 107.  Overall, direct economic 
losses increase by $12 billion, with roughly one-third of that increase occurring in both 
Kentucky and Tennessee.  The modification of site data also generates sizeable loss 
changes in Arkansas, Illinois and Missouri.  Missouri losses increase by over $1.3 billion, 
while Arkansas shows an additional $1.6 billion in state losses.  Furthermore, system loss 
increases are delineated in Table 108.  All systems show increases, though the majority of 
regional loss increases are attributed to building and utility damage.  These two systems 
comprise nearly 95% or all regional loss increases which equates to $11.4 billion.  It is 
critical to note here, though, that soil amplification generates an additional $12.08 billion 
in loss for a total regional loss of $24.55 billion for the northeast extension.   
Table 108: Direct Economic Losses by Infrastructure System – NE Improved 
Improved Diff. from Default % Difference
Buildings $14.0 $5.5 24.31%
Transporation $11.6 $11.1 49.29%





Finally indirect economic losses increase each year after the earthquake.  The first 
year shows roughly a 50% increase in losses and 2.3 million additional jobs as seen in 
Table 109.  Greater indirect losses persist into the third year after the earthquake.  By the 
fourth year positive economic impacts begin and numerous recovery-related jobs are no 
longer required.   
Table 109: Indirect Economic Loss - NE Improved ($ millions) 
Loss Total %
First Year Employment Impact 7,412,850 248.92
Income Impact 24,597 17.35
Second Year Employment Impact 3,430,614 115.20
Income Impact 16,387 11.56
Third Year Employment Impact 78,613 2.64
Income Impact 4,123 2.91
Fourth Year Employment Impact 4,428 0.15
Income Impact -176 -0.12
Fifth Year Employment Impact 251 0.01
Income Impact -419 -0.30
Years 6 to 15 Employment Impact 13 0.00
Income Impact -432 -0.30  
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6.2.2 Central Epicenter 
 
6.2.2.1 Ground Motion 
 As with the northeast epicenter, modifying the site data to more accurately portray 
the soil composition of the region alters the ground shaking significantly.  Figure 108-
Figure 111 shown the new ground motion for the central epicenter.  Maximum peak 
ground acceleration increases to 1.25g from 0.67g in the default case.  Regionally, though, 
PGA values are greater in the central portion of the region near the source.  Generally 
regional values increase, particularly at mid- and long-range distances.  Accelerations 
greater than 0.1g exist in central Arkansas which is not true of the default case.  The 
northern portion of the region feels more intense shaking as well due to the new line 
source rupture mechanism.  Peak ground velocities increase, with the maximum PGV 
reaching 47 in./sec.  This is a 57% increase from the 29.9 in./sec. seen in the default case 
for the same epicenter.  Despite the drastic increase in maximum PGV, most census tracts  
 
Figure 108: Central Epicenter – Improved PGA 
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Figure 109: Central Epicenter - Improved PGV 
 
experience 2-15 in./sec., if not less.  The southwest shows PGV increase while the eastern 
and western portions of the region show no change or even a slight PGV reduction.   
Maximum short-period spectral acceleration is roughly the same for the improved case, 
with 1.7g near the fault and 1.67g for the default case.  Southern and southwest areas 
experience more intense short-period spectral accelerations in excess of 0.3g, where they 
previously felt between 0.1g and 0.2g.  Maximum long-period spectral accelerations are 
also 88% greater for this case with modified site information, reaching 1.5g.  Northern  
 
Figure 110: Central Epicenter - Improved Sa 0.3 Sec. 
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Figure 111: Central Epicenter - Improved Sa 1.0 Sec. 
 
spectral values remain relatively constant with site affects.  Increases of 0.05g to 0.1g are 
seen in northeast Arkansas and western Tennessee for long-period spectral acceleration.   
Structural spectral displacements are altered in a manner similar to that seen for short-and 
long-period spectral accelerations.  Figure 112 & Figure 113 show regional displacement 
trends for both short- and long-period spectral values.  The maximum short-period 
displacement shows a negligible increase of 0.05-inches with improved site information.  
Outlying portions of Kentucky and Missouri show slightly reduced short-period 
displacements less than 0.25-inches, while eastern Arkansas, western Tennessee and 
Alabama show minor increases.  Long-period spectral displacements increase region-
wide, with the exception of extreme northern areas.  Maximum long-period 
displacements increase to 9.43-inches from 5.04-inches in the default case.  This 
represents an 87% increase in maximum displacement.  The Mississippi Embayment 
region shows typical long-period displacements of 1.5- to 3-inches here, with 
surrounding areas experiencing lesser long-period displacements of 0.25- to 0.75 inches.   
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Figure 112: Central Epicenter - Improved Sd 0.3 Sec. 
 
Figure 113: Central Epicenter - Improved Sd 1.0 Sec. 
 
6.2.2.2 General Building Stock 
 Resulting structural damage is spread over a larger area than the default case.  
Figure 114 illustrates the extents of at least moderate structural damage to light wood 
frame construction.  In the default case only the census tracts in the immediate vicinity of 
the epicenter were more than 50% likely to reach this damage state.  Modifying the site 
characteristics, however; expands the region in which moderate or greater damage occurs.  
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Greater than 50% likelihood of reaching this damage state extends west into Tennessee, 
with very little damage appearing north of the source fault.  Lesser damage likelihoods 
(<25%) are apparent in southeast Missouri which expands on the damage region shown 
in the default case.  Unreinforced masonry buildings and mobile homes show similar 
trends for at least moderate damage, with higher likelihoods extending westward into 
Tennessee.  Though not shown here, both types of non-structural damage encompass 
areas similar to those seen for structural damage.   
 
Figure 114: At Least Moderate Structural - W1 - Central Improved 
  
Damage to the three primary building types is delineated in Table 110.  
Modifying regional site characteristics increases damage to light wood frames, as 
nearly10% of all buildings are left undamaged, whereas the default case left 5% 
undamaged.  Most damage increases occur with slight and moderate categories where an 
additional 90,000 and 37,000 buildings, incurring damage, respectively.  Moreover, there 
are over 300 additional collapses of light wood frame buildings with site modifications.  
Unreinforced masonry buildings experience more damage in this analysis case as nearly 
20% of all buildings see some form of damage.  Most notably, the number of URM 
collapses increases nearly five times, to 10,300 from 2,146 structures.  Extensive damage 
cases more than doubles to 11,930 buildings, while slightly damaged building counts 
decrease by 15%.  This indicates that the increases in regional shaking have a significant 
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impact of unreinforced masonry construction.  On the contrary, mobile homes experience 
less damage with over 30% left undamaged in this analysis case, as oppose to 40% 
undamaged in the default case.  Despite the overall decrease in damage, only slight and 
moderate damage occurrences decrease.  The number of extensively and completely 
damaged structures increases by nearly 8,200 and 8,500 buildings, respectively.   
Table 110: Damage by Building Count and Seismic Design Level- Central Improved 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 355,087 104,610 25,718 3,157 277
Total Low Code Buildings 2,138,408 99,464 25,731 2,085 95
Total Buildings 2493495 204074 51449 5242 372
2754632
%Total Buildings 90.520% 7.408% 1.868% 0.190% 0.014%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 19369 13597 14852 6169 5668
Total Low Code Buildings 163664 8769 4682 1381 272
Total Pre-Code Buildings 238709 24033 12646 7380 4389
Total Buildings 421742 46399 32180 14930 10329
525580
%Total Buildings 80.243% 8.828% 6.123% 2.841% 1.965%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 10704 9658 13897 7051 4045
Total Low Code Buildings 141963 16106 10543 2051 78
Total Pre-Code Buildings 173468 47363 26289 15318 6006
Total Buildings 326135 73127 50729 24420 10129
484540
%Total Buildings 67.308% 15.092% 10.470% 5.040% 2.090%
Light Wood Frame
Total Number of Building Type:
Unreinforced Masonry
Total Number of Building Type:
Mobile Homes
Total Number of Building Type:
 
  
Further damage determinations are carried out on a state level.  Table 111 details 
the number of buildings at various damage levels and classified by state.  At low code 
levels damage to Tennessee buildings increases significantly at the moderate and 
extensive levels.  Kentucky experiences much more extensive and complete damage 
which is a trend shared by most states.  Overall, the frequency of low-code level building 
collapses and extensive damage cases increase dramatically. At moderate code levels 
Arkansas collapses increase by 960% to 488 from 46.  Also, extensive damage roughly 
triples in Arkansas.  Tennessee shows substantial increases in extensive and complete 
damage as well.  Missouri shows five times as many collapses with modified site data.  
When both code levels are considered the number of collapses increases to 0.33% of the 
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general building stock, which means an additional 10,500 buildings region-wide.  
Extensive damage cases also increase by 13,000 across over the entire study region.   
Table 111: Building Damage by State - Central Improved 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 203,275 2,035 184 2 0 205,496
Arkansas 329,801 13,704 1,202 17 0 344,724
Illinois 326,566 5,461 893 83 2 333,005
Indiana 127,541 851 57 1 0 128,450
Kentucky 162,361 21,175 6,940 883 26 191,385
Mississippi 199,552 28,777 3,823 250 5 232,406
Missouri 665,881 3,390 193 2 0 669,465
Tennessee 437,043 49,360 28,159 4,448 457 519,466
Code Total 2,452,019 124,752 41,450 5,684 490 2,624,396
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 96,070 32,243 13,068 3,511 488 145,380
Illinois 7,837 2,147 898 157 6 11,045
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 2,693 3,923 2,522 663 227 10,028
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 53,330 22,543 9,913 5,076 5,222 96,083
Tennessee 227,876 68,199 28,967 7,270 4,187 336,498
Code Total 387,806 129,056 55,368 16,677 10,129 599,035
Region Total 2,839,825 253,808 96,818 22,361 10,620 3,223,431





Lastly, the general building stock is classified by general occupancy class and 
damaged divided on that basis.  Single family homes show increases in damage at all 
levels, particularly with extensive and complete damage.  Complete damage cases 
increase by nearly 400% with 9,800 additional collapses.  Commercial damage, however; 
shows little change at lesser damage levels, though extensive damage and collapse cases 
increase significantly.  All other damage states show more collapses than the default case, 
while slight and moderate damage levels tend to decrease.  Damage trends all occupancy 
types are illustrated in Table 112.   
Table 112: Building Damage by General Occupancy - Central Improved 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Agriculture 2,025 0.06% 83 0.03% 40 0.03% 23 0.05% 35 0.16%
Commercial 29,179 0.89% 3,227 0.99% 2,518 1.83% 1,265 2.74% 593 2.75%
Education 252 0.01% 22 0.01% 15 0.01% 7 0.02% 3 0.01%
Government 1,424 0.04% 147 0.04% 91 0.07% 45 0.10% 29 0.13%
Industrial 4,521 0.14% 637 0.19% 529 0.39% 289 0.63% 144 0.67%
Other Residential 444,046 13.55% 82,923 25.36% 55,338 40.29% 25,900 56.04% 10,915 50.67%
Religion 2,203 0.07% 230 0.07% 153 0.11% 73 0.16% 39 0.18%
Single Family 2,794,284 85.25% 239,759 73.31% 78,677 57.28% 18,615 40.28% 9,784 45.42%
TOTAL 3,277,934 327,028 137,361 46,217 21,542
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
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6.2.2.3 Essential Facilities 
At least moderate damage state probabilities for hospitals and police stations 
are displayed in Figure 115 & Figure 116.  Hospitals show higher damage probabilities 
for central census tract due to the peak ground acceleration at which these precast 
buildings expected to incur damage.  Higher damage likelihoods appear south and west of 
the source primarily, though there are a few hospitals in Missouri with a damage 
probabilities greater than 85%.  Police station damage patterns represent those of school  
 
Figure 115: At Least Moderate Damage - Hospitals - Central Improved 
 
Figure 116: At Least Moderate Damage - Police Stations - Central Improved 
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and fire stations as all three are unreinforced masonry buildings.  Seemingly random 
damage is illustrated in the extreme north as was discussed previously.  The highest 
probabilities of damage are confined to a region in western Tennessee and northeast 
Arkansas, and stretching north to Missouri.  All essential facilities show more damage 
when site affects are considered, with the URM facilities seeing the greatest damage 
increase.  An additional 118 police stations, 152 fire stations and 413 schools experience 
at least moderate damage.  Hospitals experience only two more cases of at least moderate 
damage, though there are only 308 regional hospitals, so this small number has a much 
greater impact than it would on a facility type with a larger inventory (See Table 113).   






Hospitals 308 30 4
Schools 4,695 633 124
EOCs 92 20 4
Police Stations 1,207 221 50




Table 114: Essential Facilities Functionalities - Central Improved 
No. 
Functional












% of Total 
Functional
Day 1 222 72.08% 1163 79.39% 962 79.70% 3994 85.07%
Day 3 222 72.08% 1164 79.45% 963 79.78% 3994 85.07%
Day 7 278 90.26% 1212 82.73% 986 81.69% 4062 86.52%
Day 14 278 90.26% 1212 82.73% 986 81.69% 4062 86.52%
Day 30 288 93.51% 1404 95.84% 1136 94.12% 4562 97.17%
Day 90 304 98.70% 1422 97.06% 1156 95.77% 4571 97.36%
Schools
308 Total Strucutres 1465 Total Strucutres 1207 Total Strucutres 4695 Total Strucutres
Hospitals Fire Stations Police Stations
 
 
Regional percentages of functioning facilities decrease by several percentage 
points at each post-earthquake interval, as shown in Table 114.  Fire and police stations 
show the significant reduction in the number of operational regional facilities the day 
after the earthquake approximately 50 each.  These facility also recovery more slowly 
than the default case, with roughly 40 facilities still not operational three months after an 
earthquake.  Over 180 fewer schools are operational the day after an earthquake, though 
this only drops to about 100 after three months.   
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6.2.2.4 Transportation Systems 
The transportation system also experiences substantially more damage.  Highway 
bridges alone show 563 more cases of at least moderate damage and 287 more collapses.  
Railway bridges, however; show negligible moderate or complete damage, even when 
site class modifications are made.  Highway bridges are the only transportation 
component to experience changes in the number of damaged structures.  Railways 
facilities show nine more instances of moderate of more severe damage while port and 
airport facilities report 29 and 28 additional facilities in the same damage state, 
respectively (See Table 115).   








Highway Bridges 30,314 934 294
Railway Bridges 425 2 0
Railway Facilities 393 29 0
Bus Facilities 84 6 0
Ferry Facilities 5 5 5
Port Facilities 691 46 0




Table 116: Highway Bridges Functionalities - 
Central Improved 
Time No. Functional % Total Functional
Day 1 29442 97.12%
Day 3 29520 97.38%
Day 7 29552 97.49%
Day 14 29556 97.50%
Day 30 29559 97.51%
Day 90 29870 98.54%
Highway Bridge Fuctionality
 
Table 117: Transportation System Losses - 
Central Improved 
Component Loss % Loss
Highway Bridges $436,120,000 41.47%
Railway Bridges $290,000 0.03%
Railway Facilities $97,520,000 9.27%
Airport Facilities $318,610,000 30.30%
Bus Facilities $10,060,000 0.96%
Port Facilities $183,430,000 17.44%
Ferry Facilities $5,570,000 0.53%
Total $1,051,600,000  
 
Over 500 fewer bridges are functional the day after the earthquake, with only 
29,442 bridges functioning.  Table 116 also indicates that 444 bridges are still not 
operational three months after an earthquake, which is over seven times as many as 
predicted for the default case.  Port and airport facilities show more than 25 fewer 
facilities operational the day after the earthquake when compared to the default case. 
 Losses that result from regional damage to the transportation system are 
delineated in Table 117.  Bridges experience a $259 million increase in loss, while 
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railways show only $59 million more for the modified site data case. Port and airport 
facilities incur an additional $100 million and $172 million in loss, respectively.  Ferry 
and bus losses remain unchanged or increase slightly.   
 
6.2.2.5 Utility Systems  
Utility facilities damage trends are illustrated by Figure 117, where at least 
moderate damage for communication facilities is shown.  Clearly, the soft soils and more 
intense ground motion of the Mississippi Embayment contribute to increased damage 
state probabilities in that area.  Damage is also confined to this small region, whereas 
other buildings and bridges types show damage extending into extreme northern and 
southern portions of the study region.  
While damage is confined to the central portion of the study region the severity of 
damage from more intense shaking is evident.  Table 118 highlights the numbers of 
buildings with at least moderate damage as well as collapses.  Waste water facilities 
damage increases dramatically, from 22 to 163 facilities, as does communication 
facilities damage, 11 to 100 facilities when site affects are introduced.  Electric power 
facilities show 13 more locations of at least moderate damage while oil facilities are 
relatively are unaffected by the improved analysis.  Despite the increases in moderate and 
extensive damage there are no additional collapses caused by the addition of regional site 
affects.   
 
Figure 117: At Least Moderate Damage - Communication Facilities - Central Improved 
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Table 118: Utility Facility Damage - Central Improved 
Total No.




After Day 1 After Day 7
Potable Water 249 23 0 226 243
Waste Water 1,646 163 0 1,319 1,618
Natural Gas 114 7 0 107 112
Oil Systems 49 1 0 48 48
Electric Power 158 15 0 131 157
Communication 940 100 0 915 936




Functionalities of utility facilities are altered from the default case particularly 
near the source fault.  Table 119 displays the functionalities of each utility subsystem at 
various periods after an earthquake.  The day after the earthquake nearly 250 fewer waste 
water facilities are functioning, when compared to the default case.  Also, 18 fewer 
potable water facilities are operational.  Communication, electric power and natural gas 
systems show similar changes to potable water facilities. 
Table 119: Utility Functionalities - Central Improved 
Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 14 Day 30 Day 90 Total
Potable Water 226 241 243 243 246 249 249
Waste Water 1319 1560 1618 1618 1624 1646 1646
Natural Gas 107 111 112 114 114 114 114
Oil Systems 48 48 48 49 49 49 49
Electric Power 131 155 157 158 158 158 158











Potable Water 500,560 46,133 11,533
Waste Water 300,336 36,487 9,122
Natural Gas 200,224 39,004 9,751
Oil 0 0 0  
  
Service disruptions increase by 17,000 to 22,000 leaks for various networks, and 
at least 4,300 pipeline breaks.  Table 120 shows the breakdown of pipeline damage.  The 
greatest leak rate is still exhibited by natural gas pipelines, though now there are 0.19 
leaks/km instead of 0.10 leaks/km as with the default case.  Potable and waste water leak 
rates of 0.09 leaks/km and 0.12 leaks/km are also greater than the default case, though by 
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lesser margins.  Moreover, natural gas break rate nearly doubles to 0.049 breaks/km as a 
worst case of all break rates.   
 Further service interruptions by number of households are shown in Table 121.  
Day 1 service losses triple for potable water service while electric power losses increase 
by 650%.  At three days after an earthquake there are more than four times the default 
estimate of potable water outages, and eight times as many electricity outages still.  Even 
three months after an earthquake there are still 287 households without power, which is 
far more than are estimated in the default case.   
Table 121: Electric and Potable Water Service Disruptions - Central Improved 
Total No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 Day 90
Potable Water 129,834 102,610 71,793 12,842 0
Electric Power 227,389 143,704 61,274 13,364 287
4,236,197
No. of Households without Service
 
  
Finally, utility losses are shown by subsystem in Table 122.  Waste water system 
damage is the most prominent with $5.8 billion, or 77% of all utility losses.  Electric 
systems show the second greatest loss at $834 million.  Most utility subsystems exhibit 
100% - 300% loss increases over the default case, except for oils systems which 
experience a 400% increase.  Since the overall loss percentage for oil systems is 
negligible even this large percentage gain is hardly noticed in comparison to total utility 
systems losses.  Overall, utility systems experience a 200% increase in regional loss.   
Table 122: Utility Systems Losses - Central Improved 
Utility System Loss % Total
Potable Water Facility $485,470,000 6.41%
Potable Water Lines $207,600,000 2.74%
Waste Water Facility $5,692,780,000 75.19%
Waste Water Lines $164,190,000 2.17%
Oil Facilities $200,000 0.00%
Nautral Gas Facilities $5,420,000 0.07%
Natural Gas Lines $175,520,000 2.32%
Electric Systems $834,400,000 11.02%
Communication $5,250,000 0.07%
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6.2.2.6 Induced Damage 
 Estimates of fire ignitions following the earthquake 136 ignitions occurring with 
improved site data.  Again, burned area, exposed population and economic impact are not 
determined.  Based on the far greater number of ignitions, however; it can be inferred that 
these values will be much greater that the default case as well.   
 Debris generation increases by 200% in this case.  Only three million tons of 
debris are created in the default case, but site improvements add six million tons of debris 
from more intense shaking in certain areas.  This additional debris requires 240,000 more 
truckloads for debris removal, totaling 360,000 truckloads for the improved case.   
 
6.2.2.7 Social and Economic Losses 
 Shelter requirements are greatly impacted, along the order of four to five times the 
estimates shown in the default case.  While Alabama still experiences no temporary 
housing needs, every other state’s needs increase dramatically.  Missouri alone has nearly 
5,000 more displaced households and 1,400 temporary housing needs Tennessee 
contributes half of all regional shelter needs in both categories, showing 400% more need 
than in the default case.  Table 123 highlights this as well as the increased shelter needs 
in each state.  Also worth noting, Arkansas’ shelter requirements increase four-fold in 
both categories.   













Total 21,382 6,242  
 
Casualties resulting from the scenario earthquake triple as well.  The worst-case is 
still 2 PM, though now 15,467 casualties are predicted instead of the 4,184 from the 
default case.  Injury level breakdowns are shown in Table 124 for the 2 PM interval.  
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Minor injuries comprise an additional 10,000 casualties, or a 26% jump.  Fatalities also 
increase more than 450% from 143 in the default scenario to 798 here.   
Table 124: Casualties - 2 PM - Central Improved 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Commercial 6,413 1,643 230 445
Commuting 9 12 21 4
Educational 1,675 453 70 135
Hotels 20 5 1 2
Industrial 981 250 34 66
Other-Residential 869 206 24 44
Single Family 1,344 355 54 102
TOTAL 11,311 2,924 434 798  
  
Direct economic losses for buildings are delineated in Table 125.  Overall 
buildings losses go up for nearly $9.5 billion dollars, from $5.8 to $15.3 billion.  This is a 
180% increase in building-related losses. Other notable changes include Arkansas 
building losses which more than double to $1.16 billion, or 11% of all building losses.  
Tennessee losses increase significantly to $8.38 billion, which is over half of all regional 
building losses.  Though losses in Mississippi are small compared to other states, 
introducing regional site affects increases building losses more than four times.  
Kentucky incurs nearly an additional $1 billion, contributing 9% of all building losses.   























Alabama $4,595 $24,972 $12,641 $540 0.14 $67 $709 $1,123 $1,096 $45,742
Arkansas $262,609 $791,230 $302,328 $14,141 1.45 $6,028 $65,863 $89,391 $83,271 $1,614,861
Illinois $43,406 $166,825 $78,329 $1,719 0.61 $834 $7,412 $8,925 $11,420 $318,868
Indiana $5,202 $24,621 $15,251 $962 0.11 $55 $582 $738 $969 $48,380
Kentucky $234,821 $665,654 $242,646 $8,190 3.19 $5,469 $65,588 $93,684 $70,876 $1,386,928
Mississippi $113,003 $372,358 $172,878 $11,490 1.38 $2,463 $41,412 $57,485 $34,539 $805,627
Missouri $424,047 $1,427,955 $544,218 $23,110 3.62 $8,640 $65,557 $94,165 $109,766 $2,697,459
Tennessee $1,259,471 $4,211,047 $1,614,977 $66,830 7.25 $30,495 $334,915 $464,659 $402,205 $8,384,598
TOTAL $2,347,153 $7,684,660 $2,983,269 $126,983 $54,051 $582,037 $810,168 $714,142 $15,302,463
Capital Losses Income Losses
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Table 126: Direct Transportation Losses ($ thousands) - Central Improved 
Highway Railway Light Rail Bus Facility Ports Ferries Airports Total
Alabama $2,361 $736 $0 $64 $2,820 $0 $3,365 $9,347
Arkansas $79,359 $11,586 $0 $534 $18,120 $0 $58,114 $167,714
Illinois $16,300 $8,157 $0 $1,178 $18,419 $2,420 $38,565 $85,040
Indiana $426 $2,899 $0 $37 $5,451 $0 $9,826 $18,637
Kentucky $13,818 $14,769 $0 $563 $40,341 $1,068 $26,032 $96,591
Mississippi $10,028 $1,255 $0 $310 $3,786 $0 $23,376 $38,754
Missouri $129,188 $30,152 $0 $4,487 $57,348 $1,123 $85,625 $307,923
Tennessee $184,635 $28,257 $0 $2,887 $37,189 $959 $73,707 $327,634
TOTAL $436,115 $97,810 $0 $10,061 $183,475 $5,570 $318,610 $1,051,641
Transportation 
 








Airport Fcilities 9.46%  
 
Transportation direct losses experience a 130% gain overall, which equates to an 
additional $595 million in loss.  Table 126 illustrates transportation losses by component.  
Most notable is the tripling of Tennessee’s total transportation loss to nearly $328 million.  
Other states contributing substantially to the regional increase are Missouri and Arkansas 
at $148 million and $103 million, respectively.  In addition, transportation loss ratios are 
shown in Table 127. 
Utility losses show approximately a 200% gain over the default case.  Table 128 
illustrates utility losses by state for the improved site analysis.  Missouri incurs roughly 
one-third of all utility losses while also experiencing a $1.68 billion increase over the 
default case.  Another $640 million gain in economic loss is felt by Arkansas, while 
Kentucky and Tennessee show substantial increases as well.   
Table 128: Direct Utility Losses ($ thousands) - Central Improved 
Potable Water Waste Water Oil Systems Natural Gas Electric Power Communication Total
Alabama $2,700 $24,119 $1 $1,281 $9,417 $38 $37,555
Arkansas $45,290 $782,872 $21 $18,551 $121,533 $635 $968,903
Illinois $84,778 $625,306 $8 $19,583 $80,040 $344 $810,060
Indiana $5,164 $25,289 $9 $746 $8,083 $34 $39,323
Kentucky $77,361 $487,688 $1 $26,100 $95,828 $519 $687,496
Mississippi $9,494 $222,767 $0 $5,391 $34,888 $274 $272,814
Missouri $331,838 $2,010,853 $6 $85,087 $355,331 $1,264 $2,784,380
Tennessee $136,440 $1,678,078 $151 $24,200 $129,285 $2,145 $1,970,298
TOTAL $693,065 $5,856,972 $196 $180,939 $834,405 $5,252 $7,570,829
Utility Systems
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Total regional losses are expressed in Table 129.  Over $15 billion of losses are 
added to this study region with the incorporation of regional site affects.  With the 
exceptions of Alabama and Indiana, all states show dramatic increases in economic loss.  
As with previous loss categories, Arkansas, Missouri and Tennessee incur the greatest 
increases in loss, with Tennessee contributing half of all additional losses due to building 
losses primarily.  Building losses account for the majority of the loss increase to the 
region with over $9.5 billion falling in that category.  Utility losses contribute an 
additional $5 billion, leaving transportation systems less than 4% of regional losses.   
Table 129: Total Direct Economic Losses - Central Improved 
Improved Diff. from Default % Difference
Alabama $0.09 $0.05 0.34%
Arkansas $2.75 $1.81 11.89%
Illinois $1.21 $0.63 4.16%
Indiana $0.11 $0.05 0.34%
Kentucky $2.17 $1.40 9.19%
Mississippi $1.12 $0.87 5.74%
Missouri $5.79 $2.93 19.27%




Improved Diff. from Default % Difference
Buildings $15.30 $9.52 62.64%
Transporation $1.05 $0.59 3.92%





Finally, indirect economic losses increase, especially in the first year after the 
scenario earthquake.  Over $14.6 million additional jobs are required and $14.8 billion 
more lost in this first year alone.  Table 130 highlights the income and employment  
breakdown in the first 15 years following the scenario earthquake.  Each year indirect 
losses are 120% in the first year to 180% greater introducing site affects.  As with the 
default case though, the region begins to see positive returns by the fourth year.    
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Table 130: Indirect Economic Losses ($ millions) - Central Improved 
Loss Total %
First Year Employment Impact 8,134,923 273.17
Income Impact 26,300 18.55
Second Year Employment Impact 3,461,549 116.24
Income Impact 16,363 11.54
Third Year Employment Impact 78,100 2.62
Income Impact 4,049 2.86
Fourth Year Employment Impact 4,400 0.15
Income Impact -217 -0.15
Fifth Year Employment Impact 250 0.01
Income Impact -458 -0.32
Years 6 to 15 Employment Impact 12 0.00
Income Impact -471 -0.33  
 
6.2.3 Southwest Epicenter 
 
6.2.3.1 Ground Motion 
 Modified ground motion maps for the southwest extension are shown in Figure 
118 - Figure 121Error! Reference source not found..  Maximum peak ground 
acceleration nearest the source is amplified to 0.18g- 1.23g.  Peak ground accelerations 
decrease rapidly as the source-to-site distance increases.  Ground motions drop off 
quickly to the east and west of the fault, while a greater distance is required to reach 
negligible accelerations in the northeast and  
 
Figure 118: Southwest Epicenter - Improved PGA 
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Figure 119: Southwest Epicenter - Improved PGV 
 
southwest directions.  Peak ground velocity reaches a maximum of 52 in./sec., which is 8 
in./sec. greater than the default case.  This is an 18% increase in maximum PGV.  The 
majority of the default region experiences peak ground velocities less than 15 in./sec. 
while common PGV values for the improved site class region are between  2 in./sec. and 
7.5 in./sec.  Both short- and long-period spectral accelerations display attenuation trends 
similar to peak ground velocity.  Default case short-period spectral accelerations reach a 
maximum of 2.62g, while the improved site data case only reaches 1.51g.  This is a 42%  
 
Figure 120: Southwest Epicenter - Improved Sa 0.3 Sec. 
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Figure 121: Southwest Epicenter - Improved Sa 1.0 Sec 
decrease in maximum Sa 0.3 at seconds.  This type of reduction is not common of the two 
previous fault extensions where short-period acceleration correlated closely between 
CEUS attenuation maximum and finite fault rupture maximum values.  Despite this 
initial difference the majority of the region shows similar short-period acceleration values 
to the default case.  Long-period spectral accelerations increase region-wide, with a 
maximum of 1.43g which is greater than the 1.2g in the default case.  Most of the region 
does not experience such high ground shaking, however; with long-period spectral values 
less than 0.4g.   
 
Figure 122: Southwest Epicenter - Improved Sd 0.3 Sec. 
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Figure 123: Southwest Epicenter - Improved Sd 1.0 Sec. 
Spectral displacements change in the same manner as spectral accelerations with 
respect to short- and long-period values.  Figure 122 & Figure 123 show both spectral 
displacement values region-wide.  The short-period maximum is less with improved site 
classes, 2.85-inches instead of 4.9-inches.  The long-period maximum displacement is 
greater by 20%; 7.48-inches amplified to 9-inches.  Regional long-period displacements 
increase by roughly 1.0- to 1.5-inches within 300 km of the epicenter.   
 
6.2.3.2 General Building Stock 
 Updated structural damage patterns for at least moderate damage to light wood 
frames are used to represent typical structural damage for the three primary building 
types.  The area showing the highest damage probabilities, greater than 70%, is much 
greater than the default case.  In addition, structural damage propagates to the southwest 
and cuts off in central Arkansas.  Structural damage probabilities do not propagate to the 
east and north experiences minimal probability of reaching this damage state.  At least 
moderate damage patterns for URML buildings are similar to those of W1 buildings, 
whereas mobile home damage probabilities are confined to a small region in the 
immediate vicinity of the source (See Figure 124).  Both non-structural acceleration and 
non-structural drift damage patterns for at least moderate damage are similar to W1 
damage show above.   
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Figure 124: At Least Moderate Structural Damage - W1 – Southwest Improved 
  
The number of damaged buildings in each of the three primary buildings types is 
displayed in Table 131.  The distribution of damage to light wood frames changes 
slightly from the default case.  Here 264 collapses and 4,060 cases of extensive damage 
are expected which is 100% and 58% larger than default case estimates, respectively.  
Unreinforced masonry structures show that the occurrence of slight damage increases by 
15,000 buildings when site affects are considered.  Incidents of moderate damage 
increase by nearly 13,000 buildings, extensive damage cases increase by 3,500 while 
collapses increasing by 140%.  Cases of moderate damage to mobile homes drops by 
nearly 15,000 through slightly and moderately damaged structures increase by 8,000 and 
13,700 buildings, respectively. 
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Table 131: Building Damage by Count and Seismic Code Level – Southwest Improved 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 294,618 148,340 41,978 3,649 261
Total Low Code Buildings 2,122,931 124,697 17,747 411 3
Total Buildings 2417549 273037 59725 4060 264
2754635
%Total Buildings 87.763% 9.912% 2.168% 0.147% 0.010%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 10594 12541 19609 9015 7935
Total Low Code Buildings 161304 10291 5808 1271 79
Total Pre-Code Buildings 233529 23500 14683 9712 5740
Total Buildings 405427 46332 40100 19998 13754
525611
%Total Buildings 77.134% 8.815% 7.629% 3.805% 2.617%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 9184 5994 13238 10664 6270
Total Low Code Buildings 137895 17879 12887 2088 3
Total Pre-Code Buildings 168380 46149 27379 18994 7566
Total Buildings 315459 70022 53504 31746 13839
484570
%Total Buildings 65.101% 14.450% 11.042% 6.551% 2.856%
Light Wood Frame
Total Number of Building Type:
Unreinforced Masonry
Total Number of Building Type:
Mobile Homes
Total Number of Building Type:
 
   
Table 132: Building Damage by State – Southwest Improved 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 203,832 1,542 120 1 0 205,496
Arkansas 309,367 30,961 4,127 263 7 344,724
Illinois 329,632 2,895 432 44 1 333,005
Indiana 127,541 851 57 1 0 128,450
Kentucky 165,232 19,880 5,523 729 21 191,385
Mississippi 176,120 46,115 9,222 927 21 232,406
Missouri 666,602 2,742 121 1 0 669,465
Tennessee 451,667 48,352 17,374 1,993 80 519,466
Code Total 2,429,991 153,338 36,977 3,959 130 2,624,396
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 49,158 47,479 30,349 10,280 8,114 145,380
Illinois 8,974 1,652 379 39 2 11,045
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 3,895 3,782 1,853 406 93 10,028
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 61,384 18,168 9,736 3,706 3,090 96,083
Tennessee 192,648 97,210 33,879 9,385 3,376 336,498
Code Total 316,059 168,291 76,197 23,814 14,674 599,035
Region Total 2,746,051 321,629 113,174 27,773 14,804 3,223,431





Building damage by state is shown in Table 132.  The number of low-code 
collapses increase by roughly 30 across the entire study region.  This is due to moderate-
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code designation being the primary classification in the areas of the most intense shaking. 
Arkansas and Missouri show substantial collapses of moderate-code buildings with 6,300 
and 1,400 more than the Level I cases in each respective state.  The frequency of 
extensive damage to low-code buildings shows an additional 2,000 cases while moderate-
code buildings show 6,800 more cases of extensive damage. 
General building stock damage is further categorized by general occupancy type 
and is displayed in Table 133.  Incidents of slight damage increase in every category, 
with the exception of ‘educational’ buildings.  Overall, moderate damage is largely 
unchanged, though here single family homes comprise a larger percentage of moderately 
damaged structures.  Extensively damaged buildings increase by 50%, while completely 
damaged buildings triple.  “Other residential” buildings experiencing collapse nearly 
quadruple while commercial collapses increase by roughly 60%.   
Table 133: Building Damage by General Occupancy – Southwest Improved 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Agriculture 2,006 0.06% 80 0.02% 44 0.03% 31 0.05% 45 0.16%
Commercial 27,470 0.87% 3,496 0.89% 3,312 2.11% 1,701 2.95% 803 2.79%
Education 246 0.01% 23 0.01% 17 0.01% 9 0.02% 4 0.01%
Government 1,370 0.04% 156 0.04% 116 0.07% 59 0.10% 34 0.12%
Industrial 4,280 0.13% 640 0.16% 639 0.41% 370 0.64% 192 0.67%
Other Residential 430,092 13.55% 81,325 20.69% 59,065 37.63% 33,681 58.34% 14,958 52.00%
Religion 2,109 0.07% 245 0.06% 190 0.12% 101 0.17% 53 0.18%
Single Family 2,705,995 85.27% 307,094 78.13% 93,570 59.62% 21,784 37.73% 12,677 44.07%
TOTAL 3,173,568 393,059 156,953 57,736 28,766
CompleteNone Slight Moderate Extensive
 
 
6.2.3.3 Essential Facilities 
 At least moderate damage to schools is illustrated in Figure 125.  The highest 
damage probabilities extend farther to the south and west in this improved case.  In 
addition, moderate damage probabilities extend even farther southwest to the region 
boundary, which is not true of the default case.  Damage to all essential facilities occurs 
in similar manners with the greatest probabilities of damage occurring along the 
Arkansas/Tennessee border and into central Arkansas.   
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Figure 125: At Least Moderate Damage - Schools – Southwest Improved 
 
 Damage to all essential facilities is catalogued in Table 134.  Hospitals experience 
significant changes in damage, with nine more cases of moderate damage and three 
collapses.  An additional 196 fire and 168 police stations see at least moderate damage, 
while another 424 schools reach this same damage state.  The frequency of collapse 
increases from four to 117 buildings for schools while police stations report nearly 60 
additional collapses for each facility type.   
Table 134: Essential Facilities Damage – Southwest Improved 
Classification Total





>50% at Day 1
Hospitals 308 42 3 200
Schools 4,695 884 117 3,680
EOCs 92 23 1 66
Police Stations 1,207 276 62 888




 Facility functionalities decrease by several percentage points when regional site 
affects are added.  Regionally, only 65% of hospitals are operational the day after an 
earthquake here, while the default case estimates over 83%.  The same is true of fire and 
police stations where the improved analysis reduces the number of operational facilities 
by 154 and 118 facilities, respectively.  Even after three months fewer facilities are 
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functional, this translates to 49 fewer fire stations, 51 fewer police stations and 82 less 
schools.  These functionalities, as well as those at various other time intervals are shown 
in Table 135. 
Table 135: Essential Facilities Functionalities – Southwest Improved 
No. 
Functional












% of Total 
Functional
Day 1 200 64.94% 1099 75.02% 888 73.57% 3680 78.38%
Day 3 200 64.94% 1099 75.02% 890 73.74% 3682 78.42%
Day 7 266 86.36% 1160 79.18% 931 77.13% 3810 81.15%
Day 14 266 86.36% 1160 79.18% 931 77.13% 3810 81.15%
Day 30 283 91.88% 1369 93.45% 1113 92.21% 4485 95.53%
Day 90 305 99.03% 1401 95.63% 1144 94.78% 4578 97.51%
Hospitals Fire Stations Police Stations Schools
308 Total Strucutres 1465 Total Strucutres 1207 Total Strucutres 4695 Total Strucutres
 
 
6.2.3.4 Transportation Systems 
Transportation components incur vast amounts of damage over the default case.  
An additional 800 bridges experience at least moderate damage while the number of 
highway bridge collapses jumps to 331.  As with the previous epicenter analysis, other 
forms of transportation show marked increases in damage with the incorporation of 
regional site affects.  Moderate damage cases increase by six railway facilities, 15 port 
facilities and 42 airports.  This translates to 7.5% of all regional airports, as oppose to the 
less than 1% damaged in the default case (See Table 136).   








Highway Bridges 30,314 1,179 331
Railway Bridges 425 4 0
Railway Facilities 393 36 0
Bus Facilities 84 2 0
Ferry Facilities 5 5 5
Port Facilities 691 53 0
Airport Facilities 637 48 1
No. Facilities
 
Table 137: Highway Bridge Functionalities – 
Southwest Improved 
Time No. Functional % Total Functional
Day 1 29194 96.31%
Day 3 29280 96.59%
Day 7 29308 96.68%
Day 14 29313 96.70%
Day 30 29319 96.72%
Day 90 29885 98.58%
Highway Bridge Fuctionality
 
Table 138: Transportation System Component 
Losses – Southwest Improved 
Component Loss % Loss
Highway Bridges $600,510,000 46.66%
Railway Bridges $380,000 0.03%
Railway Facilities $110,290,000 8.57%
Airport Facilities $364,840,000 28.35%
Bus Facilities $9,800,000 0.76%
Port Facilities $195,510,000 15.19%
Ferry Facilities $5,570,000 0.43%
Total $1,286,900,000  
- 183 - 
The result of more bridge damage is a less functional highway systems which 
results when bridge functionalities decrease.  Table 137 details functionality of the 
regional bridge system.  There are approximately 850 fewer functional bridges the day 
after an earthquake and 800 less after one week.  Even after three months nearly 350 
additional bridges are not operational.   
 Transportation losses show increases in all categories, though a substantial 
amount of additional economic loss is attributed to highway bridges.  Approximately 
$290 million in additional loss is incurred by highway bridges along.  This is a 94% 
increase in highway bridge losses.  Port facilities show an additional $425 million, while 
airports contribute another $227 million.  Table 138 shows the loss values for various 
other transportation system components.  Overall transportation losses increase by $712 
million, or 124% of default scenario transportation losses.   
 
6.2.3.5 Utility Systems 
 Only communication and waste water facilities are affected most by improved site 
data.  Table 139 shows utility damage for the improved case.  Waster water facilities 
show 149 additional incidents of at least moderate damage, while communication 
facilities experience 90 more cases of the same damage type.  All other facility type 
estimate more than the default case, though no collapses occur with utility facilities for 
either analysis level.   
Table 139: Utility System Damage – Southwest Improved 
Total No.




After Day 1 After Day 7
Potable Water 249 19 0 230 245
Waste Water 1,646 180 0 1,280 1,604
Natural Gas 114 6 0 108 114
Oil Systems 49 12 0 37 48
Electric Power 158 17 0 123 156
Communication 940 111 0 910 934
With Functionality > 50%
# of Facilities
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Table 140: Utility Facilities Functionalities – Southwest Improved 
Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 14 Day 30 Day 90 Total
Potable Water 226 241 243 243 246 249 249
Waste Water 1,319 1,560 1,618 1,618 1,624 1,646 1,646
Natural Gas 107 111 112 114 114 114 114
Oil Systems 48 48 48 49 49 49 49
Electric Power 131 155 157 158 158 158 158




Changes in utility system functionalities are most prominent the day after an 
earthquake.  Potable water, oil, electric and communication facilities show minor 
decreases in regional functionalities at Day 1, while the most prominent functional loss is 
incurred by waste water facilities which report nearly 300 fewer operational facilities the 
day after the earthquake (See Table 140).  







Potable Water 500,560 79,350 19,838
Waste Water 300,336 62,759 15,690
Natural Gas 200,224 67,087 16,772
Oil 0 0 0  
 
Table 142: Electric and Potable Water Service Disruptions – Southwest Improved 
Total No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 Day 90
Potable Water 329,000 286,057 231,964 49,865 18,860
Electric Power 404,033 242,848 94,948 19,074 523
4,236,197
No. of Households without Service
 
 
Table 143: Utility System Losses – Southwest Improved 
Utility System Loss % Total
Potable Water Facility $439,850,000 5.17%
Potable Water Lines $357,080,000 4.20%
Waste Water Facility $6,190,310,000 72.77%
Waste Water Lines $282,410,000 3.32%
Oil Facilities $310,000 0.00%
Nautral Gas Facilities $4,980,000 0.06%
Natural Gas Lines $301,890,000 3.55%
Electric Systems $924,460,000 10.87%
Communication $5,680,000 0.07%
Total $8,506,970,000  
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Damage rates to pipelines roughly triple as the frequency of breaks and leaks 
increase.  Again, potable water lines show the greatest number of both breaks and leaks, 
though the greatest damage rates occur in natural gas lines. The leak rate increases to 
0.335 leaks/km from 0.109 leaks/km, while the break rate increases over 200% to 0.084 
breaks/km.  Break rates for potable and waste water increase by roughly the same margin 
though the actual rates are less than natural gas damage rates.  Table 141 details the 
damage to regional pipelines.   
 Further service disruptions are shown in Table 142 for potable water and 
electricity distribution.  The day after the earthquake service outages for potable water  
and electricity increase by roughly 150,000 and 275,000 outages, respectively.  Most 
notable, however; is the large number of potable water outages after three months.  The 
default case predicts none at this time period, though this improved site class case shows 
nearly 19,000 outages.   
 Finally, utility losses increase by approximately 320%.  Potable water losses show 
the greatest increase or nearly $625 million.  The waste water subsystem adds $4.9 billion 
to its damage estimate, or 320% more than the default case. Table 143 shows the 
remaining systems and their loss values.  Overall the utility system show nearly $6.5 
billion in additional economic losses.  
 
6.2.3.6 Induced Damage 
Fires induced by earthquake damage jump to 155 total ignitions or nearly 100 
additional ignitions.  Further induced damage is characterized by debris generation, 
which increases to 12 million tons from the 7 million tons estimated in the default case.  
This equate to an additional 200,000 truckloads to required to remove the debris, totaling 
480,000 truckloads across the entire region.   
 
6.2.3.7 Social and Economic Losses 
 Shelter requirements go up with the addition of regional site affects in shelter 
estimates for previous extensions.  Both displaced households and temporary housing 
increase by 40%-45%, with the greatest increases seen in Tennessee.  Table 144 
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highlights both shelter categories by state.  Missouri incurs numerous additional housing 
needs, which is in direct contrast to the negligible needs estimated in the default case.  
The greater needs in Arkansas and Tennessee, however; add several thousands 
households and persons to the overall housing need and thus must be considered.   













Total 27,514 8,095  
 
 The updated soil information produces over 7,400 more casualties, which 
translates to nearly 55% more than the default case.  Table 145 shows casualty estimates 
for the worst-case at 2 PM.  Three-quarters of all casualties are minor injuries, which is 
true of the default case as well.  Fatalities increase by over 450 to 1,107 total fatalities. 
Table 145: 2 PM – Southwest Improved 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Commercial 8,862 2,298 327 634
Commuting 13 16 29 6
Educational 2,225 596 91 176
Hotels 33 8 1 2
Industrial 1,460 389 56 109
Other-Residential 1,124 269 32 58
Single Family 1,601 423 65 122
TOTAL 15,318 3,999 601 1,107  
 Regional losses increase due to larger amounts of regional damage.  Direct losses 
to buildings alone are illustrated in Table 146.  Most states experience major proportional 
increases building losses, however; Mississippi reports a reduction in building losses of 
$250 million.  Arkansas incurs an additional $2.7 billion while Tennessee adds 
another $1.2 billion in building losses.  Building losses increase by $6.7 billion overall, 
which indicates a 52% increase in building-related losses from the default case.  
Transportation losses are estimated at $1.29 billion for the improved site class case, 
which is a $715 million increase from the default case.  Table 147 illustrates the 
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breakdown of transportation losses by state.  Again, Arkansas and Tennessee show the 
most prominent changes in transportation loss value by adding $142 million and $174 
million, respectively.  Mississippi also contributes an additional $203 million to regional 
transportation losses.   Transportation loss ratios for the southwest rupture scenario with 
soil amplification are shown in Table 148. 




















Alabama $3,946 $22,809 $11,863 $520 0.12 $56 $676 $1,073 $989 $41,933
Arkansas $845,824 $2,960,873 $1,099,899 $53,819 5.33 $19,147 $173,559 $233,510 $255,950 $5,642,581
Illinois $24,947 $107,738 $54,434 $1,385 0.39 $450 $4,295 $5,142 $6,540 $204,932
Indiana $5,202 $23,771 $14,617 $953 0.10 $55 $582 $738 $969 $46,886
Kentucky $196,808 $542,995 $198,898 $6,783 2.17 $4,563 $56,444 $82,798 $57,716 $1,147,005
Mississippi $231,039 $705,268 $286,634 $17,487 2.48 $5,310 $78,583 $111,602 $75,795 $1,511,717
Missouri $297,649 $972,548 $381,966 $17,067 2.58 $6,176 $45,511 $64,755 $77,896 $1,863,567
Tennessee $1,397,325 $4,459,288 $1,784,278 $70,689 5.44 $33,155 $420,403 $575,945 $457,108 $9,198,191
TOTAL $3,002,741 $9,795,291 $3,832,588 $168,703 $68,912 $780,051 $1,075,563 $932,962 $19,656,813
Capital Losses Income Losses
 
 
Table 147: Direct Transportation Losses ($ thousands) – Southwest Improved 
Highway Railway Light Rail Bus Facility Ports Ferries Airports Total
Alabama $2,355 $736 $0 $64 $2,820 $0 $3,365 $9,340
Arkansas $230,710 $21,435 $0 $1,042 $32,972 $0 $118,104 $404,262
Illinois $15,134 $7,050 $0 $1,011 $15,657 $2,420 $31,018 $72,291
Indiana $425 $2,899 $0 $37 $5,451 $0 $8,662 $17,473
Kentucky $11,748 $12,606 $0 $490 $35,730 $1,068 $21,664 $83,305
Mississippi $25,029 $1,973 $0 $566 $5,241 $0 $33,951 $66,760
Missouri $104,549 $25,257 $0 $3,887 $48,097 $1,123 $73,394 $256,306
Tennessee $210,559 $38,708 $0 $2,701 $49,542 $959 $74,683 $377,152
TOTAL $600,508 $110,664 $0 $9,797 $195,509 $5,570 $364,841 $1,286,889
Transportation 
 








Airport Fcilities 10.84%  
 
- 188 - 
Table 149: Direct Utility Losses ($ thousands) – Southwest Improved 
Potable Water Waste Water Oil Systems Natural Gas Electric Power Communication Total
Alabama $2,756 $17,626 $1 $1,328 $9,417 $38 $31,165
Arkansas $245,782 $2,227,959 $67 $146,752 $343,537 $1,585 $2,965,682
Illinois $47,199 $457,171 $8 $3,341 $56,250 $284 $564,254
Indiana $5,197 $20,327 $9 $774 $8,083 $34 $34,423
Kentucky $51,724 $342,668 $1 $7,273 $59,322 $433 $461,421
Mississippi $20,863 $372,853 $0 $15,302 $59,601 $381 $469,000
Missouri $245,330 $1,491,679 $6 $64,950 $253,786 $962 $2,056,712
Tennessee $178,074 $1,542,443 $219 $67,146 $134,469 $1,962 $1,924,314




Utility losses increase by roughly $6.48 billion from the default case, which 
translates to a 320% change.  Table 149 illustrates utility losses by state and shows  
over half of all utility losses occurring in Arkansas and Missouri.  Losses in Arkansas 
double while Missouri losses jump by nearly $1.9 billion.  Also worth noting are utility 
losses in Tennessee which increase to $1.92 billion from $422 million.   
Finally, regional direct losses are calculated and shown in Table 150.  Each state 
shows positive changes in loss value, meaning more loss in each state, with the exception 
of Mississippi which decreases slightly.  The most significant increase occurs in 
Arkansas, which accounts for 33% of the total increase attributed to the addition of 
regional site classes.  Mississippi is second with $3.88 billion in additional damage and 
28% of the regional loss increase.  Overall, regional losses increase by approximately 
$13.9 billion, which still qualifies the southwest epicenter as the worst-case scenario on 
the New Madrid Fault with $29.5 billion of total direct economic loss.   
 Also worth noting are regional indirect losses, which show increases of nearly 9% 
for both jobs and economic loss.  The southwest epicenter with improved site class data 
estimates that 6.16 million jobs are required in the first year following the earthquake, 
though the default case estimates only 5.64 million jobs.  The difference between the 
default case and the improved case decrease as time passes, and by the fourth year both 
cases show regional recovery and positive earnings.  The indirect economic losses for the 
improved southwest region are illustrated in Table 151. 
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Table 150: Direct Economic Losses – Southwest Improved 
Improved Diff. from Default % Difference
Alabama $0.08 $0.04 0.41%
Arkansas $9.01 $4.65 45.83%
Illinois $0.84 $0.80 7.90%
Indiana $0.10 $0.09 0.94%
Kentucky $1.69 $1.64 16.20%
Mississippi $2.05 -$0.04 -0.39%
Missouri $0.42 $0.12 1.22%




Improved Diff. from Default % Difference
Buildings $19.66 $6.71 48.31%
Transporation $1.29 $0.71 5.12%





Table 151: Indirect Economic Losses – Southwest Improved 
Loss Total %
First Year Employment Impact 6,155,668 206.71
Income Impact 21,050 14.85
Second Year Employment Impact 3,671,771 123.30
Income Impact 17,763 12.53
Third Year Employment Impact 96,103 3.23
Income Impact 4,955 3.49
Fourth Year Employment Impact 5,413 0.18
Income Impact -289 -0.20
Fifth Year Employment Impact 307 0.01
Income Impact -584 -0.41
Years 6 to 15 Employment Impact 15 0.00
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6.3 Level II Analysis 
 Level II analysis includes numerous hazard, inventory and fragility improvements.  
The first of which is the addition of a liquefaction susceptibility map covering most of the 
study region.  As mentioned in previous sections this liquefaction susceptibility map was 
also developed by FEMA in their baseline study of the New Madrid Seismic Zone (See 
Figure 16), though this map has been updated since the original baseline study.  Some 
concern on the part of Memphis, Tennessee, area geologists lead to the updating to 
liquefaction susceptibilities in that area via the development of a new liquefaction proxy 
(Bausch, November, 2006).  Again, developed by Doug Bausch, the new proxy reflects 
lesser susceptibilities in the Memphis due to the soft upper soils (with NEHRP 
classification ‘D’) under bluffs and deeper ground water elevations.  The new 
liquefaction proxy changes site class ‘D’ from “HIGH” liquefaction susceptibility to 
“LOW.” Further adjustments are made to site class “E’ which becomes “MODERATE” 
as oppose to the “VERY HIGH” classification in the previous liquefaction susceptibility 
map.   
Table 152: Updated Liquefaction Proxy 
Soil Type Description Liquefaction Susceptibility HAZUS-MH Value
A Hard Rock NONE 0
B Rock NONE 0
C Very Dense Soil & Soft Rock NONE 0
D Stiff Soils LOW 2
E Soil Soils MODERATE 3
F Soils Requiring Site-Specific Evaluation VERY HIGH 5  
 
Table 152 illustrates the full updated liquefaction proxy.  Regional inventory is improved 
by adding natural gas and oil distribution and transmission lines.  By adding these 
pipelines HAZUS-MH assumptions and estimations of local pipelines are negated.  
Lastly, parameterized fragilities developed by the MAE Center are incorporated.  These 
fragilities are applied to all code levels and specific building types in the General 
Building Stock.  Each component is analyzed separately to determine the impact of a 
single improvement on regional damage and losses.  A discussion of each epicenter with 
the addition of liquefaction susceptibility follows.  These analyses build on the Improved 
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Level I analyses discussed previously, meaning regional site effects are also included in 
the determination of liquefaction results.  Discussions of utility and fragility impacts are 
included following liquefaction results.   
 
6.3.1 Northeast Epicenter 
 
6.3.1.1 Liquefaction Susceptibility and Permanent Ground Deformation 
 The addition of liquefaction susceptibility does not change the ground motion 
parameters presented in the Improved Level I analysis for the northeast extension.  All 
regional PGA, PGV, spectral accelerations and spectral displacements that apply to this 
Level II analysis of the northeast extension are found in the improved Level I, northeast 
extension section.  Liquefaction susceptibility does, however; generate liquefaction 
probability, permanent ground deformation due to settlement and permanent ground 
deformation due to lateral spreading.  Regional liquefaction probabilities are illustrated in 
Figure 126.  Regions with liquefaction probabilities greater than 5% correspond to census 
tracts with a liquefaction susceptibility classification of ‘Very High’ which is the greatest  
susceptibility value that HAZUS-MH permits.  These census tracts also correspond to 
locations of softer, highly-variable soil.  The northern-most census tracts with  
 
Figure 126: Northeast Epicenter - Probability of Liquefaction 
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liquefaction probabilities greater than 12% lie along the western side of the Mississippi 
River while the centrally located census tracts near the northeast extension are located in 
the Mississippi Embayment.  Census tracts in the northeast portion of the study region lie 
along the Ohio River.  The sediment found in these river basins is soft and notorious for 
liquefying.  In that regard the locations with high liquefaction susceptibility and resulting 
high liquefaction probabilities are regionally appropriate with an epicenter in the north.   
 
Figure 127: Permanent Ground Deformation due to Settlement (in.) – NE 
 
Figure 128: Permanent Ground Deformation due to Lateral Spreading (in.) - NE 
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Permanent ground deformations due to settlement and lateral spreading from 
liquefaction are shown in Figure 127 & Figure 128, respectively.  The greatest amount of 
settlement appears where liquefaction susceptibilities are highest.  In this case maximum 
settlements equal 12-inches and are depicted in blue.  The remaining regions shown in 
light green indicate one-inch of settlement.  Permanent lateral deformations reach a 
maximum of 9.5-feet near the epicenter with lateral spreading decreasing to only five-
inches along the southern portion of the Mississippi River.  Additional census tracts in 
the north and east show lateral deformations of 2.5- to five-inches in local riverbeds.   
 
6.3.1.2 General Building Stock and Essential Facilities 
 Distributions of damage for slight, moderate or extensive damage does not change 
drastically from the improved case for the northeast extension.  Light wood frames, 
URMs and mobile homes show decreases of 5%-10% for all of the damage levels except 
complete from the improved case.  All three primary building types show significant 
increases in the number of collapsed structures.  Light wood frames experience nearly 
63,000 more collapses, URMs see 11,400 additional collapses and mobile homes show 
nearly 10,000 more cases of complete damage.  This generates much higher collapse 
percentages for regional buildings when compared to the improved case.  Table 153 
illustrates updated damage states for the three primary building types when liquefaction 
Table 153: Building Damage by Building Count and Seismic Code Level – NE Level II 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 373202 65914 14087 2155 33495
Total Low Code Buildings 2117904 91103 23836 3200 29747
Total Buildings 2491106 157017 37923 5355 63242
2754643
%Total Buildings 90.433% 5.700% 1.377% 0.194% 2.296%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 27307 12451 8031 3176 8677
Total Low Code Buildings 159104 10885 4459 1329 3002
Total Pre-Code Buildings 229798 30448 12741 4945 9144
Total Buildings 416209 53784 25231 9450 20823
525497
%Total Buildings 79.203% 10.235% 4.801% 1.798% 3.963%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 11575 9762 11409 4928 7699
Total Low Code Buildings 142051 16469 8204 1895 2139
Total Pre-Code Buildings 169930 50869 27465 10527 9652
Total Buildings 323556 77100 47078 17350 19490
484574
%Total Buildings 66.771% 15.911% 9.715% 3.580% 4.022%
Light Wood Frame
Total Number of Building Type:
Unreinforced Masonry
Total Number of Building Type:
Mobile Homes
Total Number of Building Type:
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susceptibility is added to improved soil information.  Light wood frame moderate- and 
low-code buildings increase by roughly the same margin, with damage split almost 
evenly between them.  The same is true of unreinforced masonry buildings and mobile 
homes.  Most damage states decrease by a small margin (less than 2%), while the 
incidence of collapse appears to increase exponentially.  Of the 11,400 URM collapses 
low-code collapses go up six-fold and pre-code collapses double.  The number of 
moderate-code collapses increases by over 4,000.  Mobile homes at the low-code level 
show the greatest increase at ten times as many structures collapsing as in the improved 
case.  These three building types incur over 89,000 more completely damaged structures 
than the improved Level I analysis for this fault extension.  It has been shown for 
previous extensions that square footage damage distributions mimic those seen in 
building count damage and thus are not discussed or illustrated here.   
Table 154: Building Damage by State – NE Level II 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 204,322 1,103 70 0 0 205,495
Arkansas 332,774 10,017 838 12 1,083 344,724
Illinois 308,031 13,424 3,189 539 7,821 333,004
Indiana 119,393 3,051 251 6 5,749 128,450
Kentucky 131,494 23,541 19,888 4,755 11,705 191,383
Mississippi 209,484 20,018 1,830 21 1,053 232,406
Missouri 656,407 7,572 548 12 4,926 669,465
Tennessee 464,971 40,151 10,347 1,255 2,743 519,467
Code Total 2,426,876 118,877 36,961 6,600 35,080 2,624,394
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 91,409 23,154 8,429 1,523 20,866 145,381
Illinois 3,839 1,780 2,240 1,216 1,969 11,044
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 464 2,380 3,807 1,645 1,732 10,028
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 47,366 18,427 9,487 3,878 16,925 96,083
Tennessee 272,204 43,243 10,082 2,198 8,771 336,498
Code Total 415,282 88,984 34,045 10,460 50,263 599,034
Region Total 2,842,158 207,861 71,006 17,060 85,343 3,223,428





State-level damage estimates add another dimension to regional damage values, 
as various damage levels are assigned frequencies in specific areas.  Table 154 divides 
regional damage by state.  Both moderate- and low-code buildings support the previous 
trend of substantial structural collapse.  Moderate-code buildings realize nearly an 
additional 42,000 collapses while low-code buildings see only 34,500 more cases of 
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complete damage.  Roughly over 45 % of these additional collapses occur in Missouri 
alone, with over 16,000 of the 34,000 new cases of complete damage coming from low-
code buildings.  Kentucky and Illinois add 11,700 and 9,600 structural failures 
respectively, with most occurring in low-code buildings.  All states experience significant 
increases in the occurrence of collapse.   
 Damage to general occupancy classes shows the same trends as damage to 
building types, though now damage is divided based on building use.  Residential 
collapses increase by over 84,000 buildings, or 440%.  Agricultural collapses show an 
increase of 1132% which equates to only 249 buildings.  This is not much when 
compared to the tens of thousands of additional residential collapses, though this 
reduction in agricultural capacity may affect regional production.  Table 155 highlights 
the remaining general occupancy categories and the damage predicted for each.  
Table 155: Building Damage by General Occupancy Type – NE Level II 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Agriculture 1,787 0.05% 82 0.03% 42 0.04% 21 0.06% 271 0.26%
Commercial 29,181 0.89% 3,313 1.14% 2,005 1.78% 928 2.77% 1,355 1.29%
Education 248 0.01% 23 0.01% 13 0.01% 6 0.02% 7 0.01%
Government 1,408 0.04% 149 0.05% 81 0.07% 37 0.11% 59 0.06%
Industrial 4,608 0.14% 650 0.22% 451 0.40% 193 0.58% 218 0.21%
Other Residential 440,095 13.47% 85,539 29.34% 50,282 44.54% 18,314 54.63% 24,891 23.63%
Religion 2,212 0.07% 235 0.08% 117 0.10% 49 0.15% 85 0.08%
Single Family 2,787,277 85.32% 201,523 69.13% 59,910 53.06% 13,976 41.69% 78,434 74.47%
TOTAL 3,266,816 291,514 112,901 33,524 105,320
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
 
  
As with general building stock damage patterns, essential facilities damage 
distributions and locations do not change much with the addition of liquefaction 
information.  There are actually no changes in the number of facilities experiencing 
moderate damage and collapse (See Table 156).  Without any change in regional damage 
essential facilities functionalities are the same as shown in the improved Level I analysis. 








Hospitals 308 22 3
Schools 4,695 460 139
EOCs 92 19 10
Police Stations 1,207 177 50
Fire Stations 1,465 218 64
No. of Facilities
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Table 157: Essential Facilities Functionalities - NE Level II 
No. 
Functional












% of Total 
Functional
Day 1 211 68.51% 1,179 80.48% 980 81.19% 4,082 86.94%
Day 3 211 68.51% 1,181 80.61% 981 81.28% 4,082 86.94%
Day 7 286 92.86% 1,247 85.12% 1,030 85.34% 4,235 90.20%
Day 14 286 92.86% 1,247 85.12% 1,030 85.34% 4,235 90.20%
Day 30 290 94.16% 1,354 92.42% 1,127 93.37% 4,472 95.25%
Day 90 304 98.70% 1,389 94.81% 1,149 95.19% 4,525 96.38%
Hospitals Fire Stations Police Stations Schools
308 Total Strucutres 1,465 Total Strucutres 1,207 Total Strucutres 4,695 Total Strucutres
 
 
 Essential facilities functionalities show minimal change from the values displayed 
with the addition of liquefaction data.  Hospitals indicate virtually no change with the 
exception to the Day 30 and Day 90 estimations.  The remaining three facility types Fire 
and police stations show approximately a 2% decrease in functionalities in the first few 
days after the earthquake which drops as time passes.  Nearly 100 fewer schools are 
functional the day after the earthquake though after 90 days this is reduced to only 30 
fewer functional schools (See Table 157).   
 
6.3.1.3 Transportation Systems 
 The transportation damage model is greatly improved with the addition of 
liquefaction susceptibility information.  All roads, runways and railways are now 
assessable since ground deformations are available.  Damage and loss to these 
components was not considered previously, thus their inclusion now substantially boosts 
damage and loss estimates.  Figure 127, for example, illustrates the regional highway 
network and damage probabilities for roadways reaching at least moderate damage.  The 
area south of the source which experiences the greatest settlement and lateral spreading 
shows the greatest likelihood of moderate damage or greater.  Damage also extends north 
along the Mississippi River where liquefaction is likely.  The Illinois/Kentucky border 
shows lesser likelihoods of damage, though these must be considered as well.  Railway 
segments reflect the same damage patterns as highway segment and thus are not 
illustrated here.  At least moderate damage probabilities for airport runways are shown in 
Figure 130.  These paved surfaces show high likelihoods of damage in the same locations  
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as highway segments, though their probabilities are lower.  For example, the greatest 
probability of at least moderate damage for highways is 0.25 while the same location 
predicts only 0.18 probability of damage for airport runways.   
 
Figure 129: Highway Segment Damage – At Least Moderate – NE Level II 
 
Table 158: Transportation System Damage - NE Level II 
Region 
Total








Highway Bridges 30,314 1,511 443 28,826 29,490
Highway Segments 10,325 0 0 10,314 10,314
Railway Bridges 425 425 8 417 417
Railway Facilities 393 393 55 350 381
Railway Segments 8,885 0 0 8,885 8,885
Bus Facilities 84 7 1 78 83
Ferry Facilities 5 5 5 0 0
Port Facilities 691 138 20 577 652
Airport Facilities 637 43 3 609 629





The inclusion of liquefaction contributes to damage gains in other areas of 
transportation as well.  Highway bridges exhibit 680 more instances of moderate damage 
and nearly 160 more collapses, all in areas of high liquefaction susceptibility.  Airports 
and port facilities show minor damage changes, 12 and 14 more facilities with at least 
moderate damage, respectively, as shown in Table 158.  In terms of functionality, though, 
bridge functionalities decrease by roughly 800 bridges on a regional level the day after an 
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earthquake.  As time passes this margin between the liquefaction and improved Level I 
analyses decreases, only 200 more bridges after one week.  Also, all paved segments are 
considered functional the day after the earthquake since no paved section is more than 
50% likely to incur at least moderate damage.  Losses resulting from regional 
transportation damage are shown in Table 159.  The first item to note is the addition of 
highway, railway and airport runway segments.  These new loss categories contribute 
63% of all transportation losses, meaning that transportation system losses increase by 
over 300% from the improved Level I analysis.  Further components showing modified 
loss values include; highway bridges = +$515 million, port facilities = +$34.5 million 
and airport facilities = +$27 million.   
 
Figure 130: Airport Runway Damage - At Least Moderate – NE Level II 
 
Table 159: Transportation System Losses by Component – Level II NE 
Component Loss % Loss
Highway Bridges $945,330,000 19.99%
Highway Segments $2,518,750,000 53.26%
Railway Bridges $1,500,000 0.03%
Railway Segments $167,290,000 3.54%
Railway Facilities $134,780,000 2.85%
Airport Facilities $364,140,000 7.70%
Airport Runways $291,850,000 6.17%
Bus Facilities $12,350,000 0.26%
Port Facilities $287,800,000 6.09%
Ferry Facilities $5,600,000 0.12%
Total $4,729,390,000  
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6.3.1.4 Utility Systems 
 Changes to utility facilities damage are similar to changes shown by essential 
facilities where no additional structures experience moderate damage or more (See Table 
160).  Even categories with the greatest inventory, such as waste water facilities and 
communication facilities, show no increase in damage at the moderate or complete levels.    
Utility system functionalities show minor changes in facility operation.  Communication 
facilities are slightly less functional the week after an earthquake which will impact the 
ability to coordinate response efforts.  Additionally, more potable and waste water 
facilities are non-operational, though by only six or seven facilities in the first two weeks 
after the earthquake (See Table 161). 








Potable Water 249 36 2
Waste Water 1,646 162 13
Natural Gas 114 12 0
Oil Systems 49 1 0
Electric Power 158 16 0
Communication 940 98 3
No. Facilities
 
Table 161: Utility Facilities Functionality - NE Level II 
Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 14 Day 30 Day 90 Total
Potable Water 213 232 238 238 245 249 249
Waste Water 1,295 1,504 1,577 1,577 1,598 1,639 1,646
Natural Gas 102 109 111 114 114 114 114
Oil Systems 47 49 49 49 49 49 49
Electric Power 130 149 155 158 158 158 158




 Liquefaction susceptibility does affect utility service dramatically even though 
facilities are not impacted.  The improved Level I analysis showed roughly four times as 
many leaks as breaks, though now breaks greatly outnumber leaks as expressed in Table 
162.  The number of leaks is reduced by over half of the values delineated in the 
improved analysis, though with the addition of liquefaction leaks become breaks in 
pipelines.  The number of breaks in potable water pipelines is now over 43,000 which is 
an increase of 275%.  Waste water and natural gas pipeline show similar increases.  
While potable water systems exhibit the most breaks and leaks the greatest damage rates 
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still belong to natural gas lines.  Over 0.107 leaks/km and 0.183 breaks/km are expected 
for natural gas distribution lines.   
Table 162: Pipeline Damage – Level II NE 






Potable Water 500,560 25,240 43,320
Waste Water 300,336 19,962 34,262
Natural Gas 200,224 21,339 36,625
Oil 0 0 0  
  
Disruptions to potable water distribution increase by over 300% the day after the 
earthquake, while only marginal changes in electric service are predicted.  Liquefaction 
susceptibilities produce 401,000 more potable water outages the day after an earthquake 
than the improved Level I analysis.  Table 163 highlights this change as well as the 
increase in service disruptions at various other intervals after an earthquake.  Another 
point of concern is the number of households without water after 90 days.  The improved 
Level I analysis estimated that service would be fully restored after three months, while 
the liquefaction analysis estimates that nearly 36,000 households will still be without 
water at this time period.  Electric outages increase by approximately 2,700 households 
the day after the earthquake and are nearly twice as much at 30 days after the earthquake, 
though with regard to the total number of water outages these numbers pale in 
comparison.   
Table 163: Potable Water and Electricity Service Disruptions – Level II NE 
Total No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 Day 90
Potable Water 530,887 429,928 319,088 167,456 36,131




Table 164: Utility System Losses by Component – Level II NE 
Utility System Loss % Total
Potable Water Facility $790,190,000 6.84%
Potable Water Lines $483,680,000 4.19%
Waste Water Facility $8,192,710,000 70.92%
Waste Water Lines $382,550,000 3.31%
Oil Facilities $200,000 0.00%
Nautral Gas Facilities $7,940,000 0.07%
Natural Gas Lines $408,930,000 3.54%
Electric Systems $1,279,190,000 11.07%
Communication $6,680,000 0.06%
Total $11,552,070,000  
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 Liquefaction susceptibilities throughout the region now permit the determination 
of buried pipeline loss.  While pipeline networks are still estimated by HAZUS-MH, 
losses can be calculated based on these assumptions.  Losses for utility system 
components are then determined based on updated damage to these components, as 
illustrated in Table 164.  The addition of all pipelines contributes another $730 million to 
total utility system losses.  This equates to 6% of all utility losses.  Waste water facilities 
losses increase by nearly $1.1 billion with potable water and electric facilities adding 
another $108 million and $210 million, respectively.  Overall, utility system losses 
increase by $2.13 billion when liquefaction susceptibility is included.   
 
6.3.1.5 Induced Damage and Social Losses 
 Induced damage models for fire following the scenario earthquake do not change 
significantly with the addition of liquefaction, though debris estimates increase.  The fire 
model predicts the same number of ignitions, burnt area and exposed population 
regardless of liquefaction.  Debris estimates nearly double in this Level II analysis as 16 
million tons of debris are expected as oppose to only 7 million for the improved Level I 
scenario.  Debris removal now requires 640,000 truckloads, or 360,000 additional 
truckloads.   
 Displaced resident estimates are as much as ten times greater in this analysis case 
than the improved site class scenario.  Table 165 shows updated estimates of displaced 
households and temporary housing requirements.  There are over 118,000 displaced 
households in this earthquake scenario when only 18,500 were expected previously.  
Furthermore, there are an additional 29,000 cases of temporary housing need than before.  
The greatest increases are seen in Missouri and Arkansas, though both states experience 
roughly the same margin of increase.  Only 8,345 displaced households are estimated in 
the improved Level I case for these states, though here there are over 56,000 displaced 
households.  The same follows for temporary housing, where 2,438 cases for temporary 
housing become 16,759 when liquefaction susceptibilities are added to the study region.   
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Total 118,742 34,181  
 
Table 166: Casualties - 2 AM – Level II NE 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Commercial 181 53 8 16
Commuting 2 3 5 1
Educational 0 0 0 0
Hotels 323 96 14 26
Industrial 220 64 10 19
Other-Residential 7,930 2,117 232 434
Single Family 17,443 4,773 529 988
TOTAL 26,099 7,106 798 1,484  
  
Casualty estimates nearly triple with the addition of liquefaction and the worst-
case time of day changes as well.  The 2 AM estimation is now the greatest at 35,487 
casualties.  The commuting time, 5 PM, is now second with 31,920 casualties and 2 PM 
shows the least casualties at 31,915.  Table 148 expresses the estimates at the four 
severity levels for the new worst-case scenario, 2 AM.  Each severity level shows roughly 
the same margin of increase (See Table 166).   
 
6.3.1.6 Economic Losses 
Regional building losses are divided by capital and income loss subcomponents in 
Table 167.  Structural damage more than doubles with the inclusion of liquefaction while 
non-structural damage and contents damage increase 2.5 times.  Losses in Arkansas 
increase by 365%, or $3.9 billion and Indiana exhibits a 1450% higher loss value, which 
equates to $2.54 billion in additional building damage.  Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri and 
Tennessee show losses doubling from the improved site class case, which equates to 
roughly $12.2 billion.    
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Alabama $3,142 $17,072 $8,518 $378 0.08 $39 $498 $741 $753 $31,141
Arkansas $833,902 $2,830,212 $862,087 $33,449 5.83 $18,789 $89,242 $122,193 $235,665 $5,025,540
Illinois $523,069 $2,045,937 $699,953 $12,484 5.49 $10,773 $47,281 $63,289 $136,785 $3,539,573
Indiana $510,749 $1,421,832 $551,360 $46,529 3.13 $6,321 $44,923 $52,653 $83,694 $2,718,061
Kentucky $989,488 $3,493,152 $1,108,174 $30,490 11.73 $21,051 $153,558 $215,729 $265,178 $6,276,820
Mississippi $88,593 $326,769 $129,433 $6,269 1.32 $1,957 $24,348 $36,606 $31,138 $645,113
Missouri $1,166,384 $4,619,210 $1,609,149 $55,033 6.70 $23,597 $178,885 $230,500 $378,366 $8,261,125
Tennessee $999,143 $3,263,385 $1,163,257 $46,947 5.07 $22,409 $251,815 $340,778 $311,749 $6,399,483
TOTAL $5,114,472 $18,017,568 $6,131,930 $231,580 $104,936 $790,551 $1,062,489 $1,443,329 $32,896,855
Capital Losses Income Losses
 
  
The addition of segment losses dramatically increase the transportation loss 
estimate, as discussed earlier.  Table 168 illustrates transportation losses by state.  Illinois 
and Tennessee nearly triple their transportation losses while Missouri and Arkansas show 
much greater losses, between four and six times greater than the improved Level I 
scenario.  Overall, transportation losses increase by $3.28 billion, which is more than 
twice the transportation estimate in the previous analysis case.   
Table 168: Direct Transportation Losses - NE Liquefaction ($ thousands) – Level II NE 
Highway Railway Light Rail Bus Facility Ports Ferries Airports Total
Alabama $2,338 $511 $0 $48 $2,107 $0 $2,514 $7,518
Arkansas $640,138 $26,480 $0 $555 $10,976 $0 $52,248 $730,397
Illinois $436,637 $54,291 $7 $2,549 $52,591 $2,420 $87,568 $636,063
Indiana $46,321 $11,730 $0 $114 $14,208 $0 $20,656 $93,029
Kentucky $716,281 $64,025 $0 $1,339 $98,700 $1,068 $43,152 $924,565
Mississippi $19,656 $734 $0 $136 $2,248 $0 $13,922 $36,696
Missouri $1,048,673 $110,871 $51 $5,947 $81,615 $1,123 $95,450 $1,343,730
Tennessee $554,034 $34,927 $0 $1,664 $25,393 $959 $48,649 $665,626




The loss breakdown for utility systems is shown in Table 169.  Most states show 
moderate gains of roughly 20-25%, though Alabama actually reduces its losses.  
Reductions like this are uncommon as loss models incorporate more detailed information.  
These reductions in loss are relatively the same margin for each type of system.  Since 
losses in Alabama are such a small proportion of regional losses the reduction within the 
state has only a minor affect on regional utility losses.   
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Table 169: Direct Utility Losses - NE Liquefaction ($ thousands) – Level II NE 
Potable Water Waste Water Oil Systems Natural Gas Electric Power Communication Total
Alabama $1,228 $8,927 $1 $438 $5,647 $21 $16,262
Arkansas $120,153 $856,254 $22 $88,952 $112,531 $582 $1,178,494
Illinois $289,286 $2,268,137 $44 $41,167 $299,880 $1,355 $2,899,869
Indiana $23,870 $77,932 $30 $6,117 $36,182 $150 $144,281
Kentucky $200,943 $1,169,435 $5 $51,877 $248,982 $1,421 $1,672,663
Mississippi $8,759 $118,926 $0 $5,522 $13,532 $140 $146,879
Missouri $527,366 $3,021,138 $33 $181,663 $497,355 $1,920 $4,229,475
Tennessee $102,268 $1,054,507 $62 $41,135 $65,086 $1,091 $1,264,149




Finally, regional losses are calculated with all infrastructure components.  Table 
170 illustrates regional losses and loss changes by state.  Differences between this 
analysis case and the improved Level I analysis indicate that nearly 30% of the difference 
in regional loss occurs in Missouri.  Arkansas, Kentucky and Tennessee follow with large 
proportions of the total regional loss difference.  Alabama, however; reduces its total 
losses by 5%.  Losses to buildings account for a smaller percentage of total regional 
losses due to the inclusion of losses for paved surfaces and pipeline networks.  Building 
losses nearly double while the two remaining categories increase by lesser margins.  The 
earthquake scenario here produces regional losses of $48.9 billion, which is $24.4 billion 
more than the improved Level I analysis of the same epicenter.   
Indirect economic patterns are similar to direct economic loss patterns.  Table 171 
shows economic losses and regional employment needs for the Level II analysis.  
Employment needs and indirect economic losses (shown in millions of dollars) are twice 
the values expected for the improved Level I case.  This trend continues throughout the 
first three years of regional recovery.  Indirect economic impacts turn positive in the 
fourth year, as with the other analysis case, though impacts are still double that of the 
improved analysis case.   
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Table 170: Total Direct Economic Losses – Level II NE 
Liquefaction Diff. from Improved % Difference
Alabama $0.05 $0.00 -0.01%
Arkansas $6.93 $5.01 20.60%
Illinois $7.08 $2.71 11.13%
Indiana $2.96 $2.63 10.81%
Kentucky $8.87 $3.60 14.80%
Mississippi $0.83 $0.28 1.14%
Missouri $13.83 $6.80 27.95%




Liquefaction Diff. from Improved % Difference
Buildings $32.90 $18.92 77.74%
Transporation $4.44 $3.28 13.48%





Table 171: Indirect Economic Loss - NE Liquefaction – Level II NE 
Loss Total %
First Year Employment Impact -2,825,562 -94.88
Income Impact -5,158 -3.64
Second Year Employment Impact 1,503,010 50.47
Income Impact 11,069 7.81
Third Year Employment Impact 168,070 5.64
Income Impact 8,651 6.10
Fourth Year Employment Impact 9,466 0.32
Income Impact -540 -0.38
Fifth Year Employment Impact 534 0.02
Income Impact -1,057 -0.75
Years 6 to 15 Employment Impact 26 0.00
Income Impact -1,086 -0.77  
 
6.3.2 Central Epicenter 
 
6.3.2.1 Liquefaction Susceptibility and Permanent Ground Deformation 
 As with the northeast extension, central extension ground shaking does not  
change with the addition of liquefaction susceptibilities.  Existing PGAs are used, 
however; to determine the probability of liquefaction which is shown in Figure 131.  The 
greatest likelihoods of liquefaction still lie along the western edge of the Mississippi 
River, though these probabilities are still low (< 0.25).  The northeast extension shows 
the highest probabilities confined to the southern-most tip of Illinois and eastern Missouri, 
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while the central extension permits these high probabilities to extend into northeastern 
Arkansas.  Few census tracts in the north and east (northern Kentucky) show more than 
negligible probabilities of liquefactions as was the case with the northeast epicenter.  
 
Figure 131: Probability of Liquefaction - Central Epicenter 
L e g e n d
PGD from Liquefaction











Figure 132: Permanent Ground Deformation due to Settlement (in.) – Level II Central 
  
 Permanent ground deformations for vertical settlement and lateral spreading are 
illustrated in Figure 132 & Figure 133, respectively.  The greatest settlements of 12-
inches are confined to southeastern Missouri and eastern Arkansas.  Vertical 
deformations of one-inch are experienced all around the Mississippi Embayment 
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(Mississippi riverbed) and far to the north of the source fault.  Lateral spreading reaches a 
maximum of 114.1-inches nearest the extension in southeastern Missouri.  Numerous 
tracts experience the maximum lateral deformation.  It is more common, though, for 
region census tracts to experience less than an inch, if not zero, lateral deformation.  The 
Mississippi Embayment, however; sees lateral spreading in excess of five-inches, even in 
more southern census tracts.   
 
Figure 133: Permanent Ground Deformation due to Lateral Spreading (in.) – Level II Central 
 
6.3.2.2 General Building Stock and Essential Facilities 
 The improved Level I and analysis for the central source presented numerous 
figures detailing the probabilities and corresponding distributions for moderate damage or 
greater.  These figures do not change noticeably with the addition of regional liquefaction 
susceptibilities, though the actual damage count for each HAZUS-MH damage state 
shows significant changes.  Table 172 details the damage distribution of the three primary 
building types in the study region.  The incidence of collapse in light wood frame 
construction increases by 54,600 cases.  Almost 75% of these collapses occur with  
moderate-code buildings.  Cases of moderate and slight damage are reduced by 4,900 and 
15,400 structures, respectively.  Complete damage to unreinforced masonry buildings 
increases, from 10,300 to 18,000.  Extensive damage cases are cut by 1,600, moderate 
damage reduced by 2,500 buildings and slight damage cases decrease by over 1,400.  
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This permits the number of buildings experiencing no damage to increase by 3,000 
structures.  Mobile homes show an additional 9,000 cases if complete damage, while 
extensive and moderate damage counts decrease by 2,700 and 3,200, respectively.  When 
these changes are combined with fewer cases of slight damage, the number of mobile 
homes with no damage actually increases.   
Table 172: Building Damage by Count and Seismic Code Level – Level II Central 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 329020 93172 22197 3020 41446
Total Low Code Buildings 2130389 95472 24351 2051 13511
Total Buildings 2459409 188644 46548 5071 54957
2754629
%Total Buildings 89.283% 6.848% 1.690% 0.184% 1.995%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 18346 12521 13293 5282 10239
Total Low Code Buildings 163359 8579 4433 1300 1107
Total Pre-Code Buildings 238172 23647 11924 6738 6653
Total Buildings 419877 44747 29650 13320 17999
525593
%Total Buildings 79.886% 8.514% 5.641% 2.534% 3.425%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 10100 8721 11918 5790 8853
Total Low Code Buildings 141539 15784 10021 1925 1482
Total Pre-Code Buildings 173110 47027 25574 14061 8679
Total Buildings 324749 71532 47513 21776 19014
484584
%Total Buildings 67.016% 14.762% 9.805% 4.494% 3.924%
Light Wood Frame
Total Number of Building Type:
Unreinforced Masonry
Total Number of Building Type:
Mobile Homes




 Damage is also characterized by state and appears in Table 173.  As discussed 
previously, the number of collapses increases, though most of these occur Kentucky and 
Tennessee with respect to low-code buildings.  Kentucky alone goes from only 26 
collapses to nearly 5,500.  Extensive and moderate damage estimates are reduced by 
roughly the same margin in every state when compared to the improved analysis.  
Moderate-code buildings show even more dramatic increases, in particular Arkansas 
which only incurred 488 cases of complete damage in the improved Level I analysis, 
though adding liquefaction produces a total of 23,700 collapses.  Other drastic increases 
include collapses in Missouri and Tennessee going up to 16,000 and 19,450, respectively.   
Cases of complete damage increased six-fold at the moderate-code level, while states 
with lesser damage change by 10% - 20%.   
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 The final form of building damage predictions are divided by general occupancy.  
Table 174 illustrates the overwhelming proportion of residential buildings experiencing 
damage at all levels.  Commercial buildings comprise the second largest damage category 
this is still only 1% - 3% of all damage cases for a given damage state.   
Table 173: Building Damage by Building Count and State – Level II Central 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 203,275 2,035 184 2 0 205,496
Arkansas 327,994 13,445 1,173 17 2,094 344,724
Illinois 325,716 5,109 770 65 1,345 333,005
Indiana 127,321 823 55 1 251 128,450
Kentucky 159,222 19,518 6,322 837 5,485 191,385
Mississippi 198,494 28,598 3,797 271 1,245 232,406
Missouri 665,874 3,388 193 3 7 669,465
Tennessee 435,362 47,328 26,793 4,253 5,731 519,466
Code Total 2,443,258 120,243 39,287 5,449 16,159 2,624,396
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 81,244 26,799 10,812 2,853 23,673 145,380
Illinois 7,357 1,919 773 134 862 11,045
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 2,391 3,631 2,332 617 1,056 10,028
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 49,676 18,720 7,795 3,876 16,016 96,083
Tennessee 219,250 64,430 26,508 6,861 19,451 336,498
Code Total 359,918 115,499 48,220 14,340 61,057 599,035
Region Total 2,803,176 235,742 87,507 19,789 77,217 3,223,431





Table 174: Building Damage by General Occupancy – Level II Central 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Agriculture 2,022 0.06% 80 0.03% 35 0.03% 20 0.05% 49 0.05%
Commercial 28,978 0.89% 3,099 1.01% 2,361 1.87% 1,168 2.80% 1,176 1.26%
Education 251 0.01% 21 0.01% 14 0.01% 7 0.02% 6 0.01%
Government 1,415 0.04% 142 0.05% 84 0.07% 40 0.10% 54 0.06%
Industrial 4,495 0.14% 614 0.20% 495 0.39% 267 0.64% 249 0.27%
Other Residential 441,330 13.62% 80,641 26.17% 51,742 40.89% 23,134 55.52% 22,273 23.87%
Religion 2,188 0.07% 22 0.07% 145 0.11% 68 0.16% 76 0.08%
Single Family 2,759,676 85.17% 223,379 72.48% 71,672 56.64% 16,966 40.72% 69,426 74.41%
TOTAL 3,240,355 307,998 126,548 41,670 93,309
Extensive CompleteNone Slight Moderate
 
 
The frequency of essential facilities damage does not increase, similar to that 
shown with the northeast extension at this level of analysis (See Table 175).  The lack of 
change in essential facilities damage translates to no change in regional hospital 
functionality.  Table 176, however; shows the updated functionalities of the remaining 
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essential facility types even though there are no changes as a result of liquefaction 
susceptibilities.  
Table 175: Essential Facilities Damage - Central Level II 
Region 
Total




Hospitals 308 30 4
Schools 4,695 633 124
EOCs 92 20 4
Police Stations 1,207 221 50




Table 176: Essential Facilities Functionalities – Level II Central 
No. 
Functional












% of Total 
Functional
Day 1 222 72.08% 1132 77.27% 939 77.80% 3949 84.11%
Day 3 222 72.08% 1133 77.34% 940 77.88% 3949 84.11%
Day 7 278 90.26% 1212 82.73% 986 81.69% 4062 86.52%
Day 14 278 90.26% 1212 82.73% 986 81.69% 4062 86.52%
Day 30 287 93.18% 1343 91.67% 1104 91.47% 4423 94.21%
Day 90 302 98.05% 1410 96.25% 1148 95.11% 4537 96.63%
308 Total Strucutres 1465 Total Strucutres 1207 Total Strucutres 4695 Total Strucutres
Hospitals Fire Stations Police Stations Schools
 
 
6.3.2.3 Transportation Systems 
 Damage changes to the transportation system consist of new estimates for 
highway, railway and airport runway segments.  In addition to these new damage 
calculations permitted by the inclusion of liquefaction susceptibilities, highway bridges 
incur greater levels of damage.  This Level II analysis predicts 1,754 highway bridges 
realize at least moderate damage with 525 of those being collapse cases as shown in 
Table 177.  This is roughly 80%-85% more than the improved Level I estimates of 934 
and 294 bridges, respectively.  The number of port and airport facilities experiencing at 
least moderate damage increase, resulting in 83 ports and 47 airports reaching that 
damage state.  Figure 134 provides a map of at least moderate damage state probabilities 
for highway segments in the study region.  Railway segments also experience damage in 
this pattern, though maximum  
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Figure 134: Highway Segments - At Least Moderate Damage – Level II Central 
 
Table 177: Transportation System Damage - Central Level II 
Region 
Total








Highway Bridges 30,314 1,754 525 28,586 29,369
Highway Segments 10,325 0 0 10,314 10,314
Railway Bridges 425 2 0 423 423
Railway Facilities 393 46 0 365 378
Railway Segments 8,885 0 0 8,885 8,885
Bus Facilities 84 7 0 79 82
Ferry Facilities 5 5 5 0 0
Port Facilities 691 83 13 646 663
Airport Facilities 637 47 1 608 629




probabilities are slightly lower; 0.20. The highest probabilities of reaching this damage 
state exist at and southwest of the source fault in the Mississippi Embayment region.  
Airport runways in the central portion of the study region display the same damage 
patterns, though the maximum probability of at least moderate damage is just under 0.18.   
Transportation components show lower regional functionalities, which is 
exemplified by bridges in Table 178.  The day after the earthquake over 850 fewer 
bridges are operational which decreases to 180 bridges after a week.  This still indicates 
that over 96% of all regional bridges are operational. 
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Table 178: Highway Bridge Functionalities – Level II Central 
No. Functional % Total Functional
Day 1 28601 94.35%
Day 3 29203 96.34%
Day 7 29369 96.88%
Day 14 29402 96.99%
Day 30 29443 97.13%




Table 179: Transportation Losses by Component – Level II Central 
Component Loss % Loss
Highway Bridges $921,340,000 19.57%
Highway Segments $2,619,680,000 55.63%
Railway Bridges $970,000 0.02%
Railway Segments $162,350,000 3.45%
Railway Facilities $112,430,000 2.39%
Airport Facilities $348,040,000 7.39%
Airport Runways $314,530,000 6.68%
Bus Facilities $10,730,000 0.23%
Port Facilities $213,400,000 4.53%
Ferry Facilities $5,600,000 0.12%
Total $4,709,070,000  
  
Losses relating to transportation system components are displayed in Table 179.  
Highway bridge losses double from the improved Level I analysis, and now comprise 
nearly 20% of new transportation losses.  Port and airport facilities show additional losses 
of approximately $30 million each.  The greatest change in transportation loss come from 
the addition of losses related to paved surfaces and rails.  Highway, railway and airport 
runway segments add $3.1 billion in regional losses, which accounts for a majority of the 
change in losses to the transportation system.  Highway related components comprise the 
most of the total system losses by far, at nearly 75% of all transportation losses.  
 
6.3.2.4 Utility Systems 
 Utility facilities do not show any additional damage past that experienced in the 
improved Level I analysis. This is similar to the damage seen for all the utility facilities 
in the northeast extension Level II analysis.  With damage to utility facilities not 
changing their functionalities are left unaltered (See Table 180).   There are relatively 
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little changes in utility system functionalities, though some type decrease by a few 
facilities in the first two weeks after the earthquake (See Table 181). 








Potable Water 249 23 3
Waste Water 1,646 163 9
Natural Gas 114 7 0
Oil Systems 49 1 0
Electric Power 158 15 1




Table 181: Utility Facilities Functionalities - Central Level II 
Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 14 Day 30 Day 90 Total
Potable Water 226 240 241 241 245 249 246
Waste Water 1,319 1,514 1,602 1,602 1,619 1,643 1,646
Natural Gas 107 110 112 114 114 114 114
Oil Systems 45 48 48 49 49 49 49
Electric Power 131 148 157 158 158 158 158




Pipeline damage estimates, however; change substantially with the inclusion of 
liquefaction susceptibility.  Thousands of leaks from the improved Level I analysis 
become breaks and more than triples regional break rates for this source.  Potable water 
pipelines, for example, experience 32,900 more breaks in this liquefaction analysis.  The 
number of leaks in potable water lines drops by roughly 26,600, though.  Table 182 
displays the regional performance of pipelines for water and natural gas.  Natural gas 
lines continue to have the highest leak and break rates at 0.108 leaks/km and 0.188 
breaks/km.  
Table 182: Pipeline Damage – Level II Central 






Potable Water 500,560 25,527 44,442
Waste Water 300,336 20,190 35,150
Natural Gas 200,224 21,582 37,574
Oil 0 0 0  
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Table 183: Potable Water and Electricity Service Disruptions – Level II Central 
Total No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 Day 90
Potable Water 523,044 471,128 391,228 196,125 55,125
Electric Power 230,781 152,668 75,885 22,710 287
4,236,197
No. of Households without Service
 
  
Changes to electric and potable water services differ greatly when liquefaction is 
considered.  Electricity outages increase by roughly 3,400 the day after the earthquake in 
this analysis, though potable water disruptions increase by 393,200.  This indicates that 
day-one water outages increase by over 300%.  Table 183 shows the number of service 
disruptions at various periods after the earthquake.  Major differences from the improved 
site affects analysis are reflected at the 90-day interval.  The number of electricity 
disruptions is unchanged, though potable water outages increase from none to nearly 
55,000.  This is due entirely to damage calculations for underground pipelines which are 
only permitted by the determination of settlement and lateral spreading from liquefaction 
susceptibilities.   
Table 184: Utility System Losses by Component – Level II Central 
Utility System Loss % Total
Potable Water Facility $571,670,000 5.83%
Potable Water Lines $496,480,000 5.07%
Waste Water Facility $6,887,060,000 70.27%
Waste Water Lines $391,880,000 4.00%
Oil Facilities $220,000 0.00%
Nautral Gas Facilities $6,250,000 0.06%
Natural Gas Lines $418,900,000 4.27%
Electric Systems $1,023,050,000 10.44%
Communication $6,030,000 0.06%
Total $9,801,540,000  
 
Utility losses show updated estimates of pipelines which contributes an additional 
$760 million to the total estimate of utility system losses.  Pipeline losses equate to over 
15% of all utility losses.  Pipeline and facility loss components for the utility network are 
delineated in Table 184.  Waste water facilities show a $1.19 billion increase, electric and 
potable water facilities contributing another $190 million and $87 million, respectively.  
Waste water facilities are still the prominent loss subcomponent with over 70% of all 
utility losses occurring there.   
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6.3.2.5 Induced Damage and Social Losses 
 Fire following earthquake models do not predict significant change from the 
improved Level I results.  The number of estimated ignitions changes from 136 to 139.  
Greater amounts of collapsed buildings and utility facilities as well as damaged bridges 
and roads cause debris estimates to increase when liquefaction is considered.  Now 
approximately 15 million tons of debris are expected, as oppose to nine million tons 
when only site class factors are included.  This excess debris requires 600,000 truckloads 
for adequate removal, which is 240,000 more than the previous analysis case.   
 The displaced population created by this scenario earthquake is nearly five times 
greater than estimates for the improved Level I case.  Table 185 shows the shelter 
requirements by state for this hazard.  Arkansas exhibits the greatest increase in the 
number of displaced households; 26,816 up from 1,585.  Missouri and Tennessee also 
experience significant changes as each state sees an additional 14,600 and 25,000 
displaced households in this analysis.  The greatest need for temporary housing also 
occurs in the aforementioned states, as well as Kentucky.  As with the overall increase in 
shelter requirements, each of these states incurs at least three times the number of 
temporary shelter needs in this scenario with liquefaction susceptibility.  













Total 99,544 28,765  
 
Table 186: Casualties - 2 AM – Level II Central 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Commercial 150 42 6 12
Commuting 3 3 6 1
Educational 0 0 0 0
Hotels 293 85 12 23
Industrial 221 63 9 18
Other-Residential 6,734 1,739 189 354
Single Family 15,608 4,190 458 856
TOTAL 23,009 6,122 680 1,264  
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 As with the northeast epicenter, the worst-case scenario for casualties changes to 
2 AM.  Casualties for this case are displayed by severity level in Table 186.  Nearly 
31,100 casualties are expected at this early morning hour, while it is estimated that 2 PM 
and 5 PM incur 28,688 and 29,196 casualties, respectively.  The new worst case of 2 AM 
shows a 120% increase in the number of casualties, though 2 PM and 5 PM experience 
only 85% and 105% increases.  Rates of change are roughly the same of each severity 
level, though it is relevant to point out that the previous worst case (2 PM) predicted 798 
fatalities, though this analysis now estimates 1,264 fatalities.  This scenario is much more 
dangerous to regional residents as the increase in deaths alone, not including other serious 
injuries, is 680 cases.   
 
6.3.2.6 Economic Losses 
 Previous discussions of increased damage levels to this central epicenter event 
generate much greater economic losses, some of which are expressed in Table 187.  
Building losses increase substantially due to higher collapse rates, primarily.  Structural, 
non-structural and contents damage more than double when liquefaction is considered.  
Income losses increase as well, though not as much as capital losses.  In the improved 
Level I analysis Arkansas only incurred $1.6 billion in building losses, though that 
estimate is multiplied by four, as $6.1 billion of building losses are predicted.  Missouri 
and Tennessee also show significant increases of roughly $2 and $5 billion, respectively.  
Kentucky adds almost another $1.4 billion, with all other states contributing lesser 
amounts with the exception of Alabama which does not change.  Overall, buildings losses 
increase by $13.3 billion to $28.7 billion.   



















Alabama $4,595 $24,972 $12,641 $540 0.14 $67 $709 $1,123 $1,096 $45,742
Arkansas $1,012,532 $3,434,418 $1,048,283 $39,560 7.08 $22,771 $108,291 $148,031 $286,377 $6,100,264
Illinois $123,141 $457,652 $160,849 $3,250 2.01 $2,468 $12,226 $15,497 $30,868 $805,950
Indiana $16,754 $66,940 $28,051 $1,544 0.43 $276 $1,202 $1,611 $3,795 $120,173
Kentucky $459,081 $1,486,194 $480,186 $13,986 5.99 $10,016 $83,408 $116,987 $129,556 $2,779,415
Mississippi $158,286 $540,298 $222,082 $13,017 2.14 $3,423 $49,439 $69,966 $50,208 $1,106,719
Missouri $726,804 $2,511,399 $858,135 $32,833 6.16 $15,363 $87,064 $126,179 $193,497 $4,551,276
Tennessee $2,017,506 $6,981,865 $2,430,543 $91,212 9.64 $45,669 $418,354 $569,572 $617,807 $13,172,528
TOTAL $4,518,701 $15,503,738 $5,240,770 $195,943 $100,052 $760,693 $1,048,965 $1,313,204 $28,682,067
Capital Losses Income Losses
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Transportation losses are much higher when liquefaction is considered since 
paved segments and railways are now assessed damage and loss values.  Table 188 shows 
the updated losses to the transportation system divided by system and state.  The highway 
system shows eight times more loss resulting from highway segment damage and losses.  
Railways show a similar trend since rail lines are now included.  Transportation losses in 
Arkansas are six times greater here, with $910 million in losses.  Kentucky, Missouri and 
Tennessee also show substantial increases of three to five times the loss values seen in 
the improved Level I analysis.  Overall, transportation losses increase by nearly $3.34 
billion to $4.39 billion region-wide.   
Table 188: Direct Transportation Losses ($ thousands) – Level II Central 
Highway Railway Light Rail Bus Facility Ports Ferries Airports Total
Alabama $2,361 $736 $0 $64 $2,820 $0 $3,365 $9,347
Arkansas $946,405 $45,882 $0 $594 $21,018 $0 $68,850 $1,082,748
Illinois $215,542 $24,867 $0 $1,187 $22,213 $2,420 $41,120 $307,349
Indiana $3,550 $3,139 $0 $37 $5,754 $0 $9,905 $22,384
Kentucky $450,784 $33,823 $0 $683 $48,853 $1,068 $27,148 $562,359
Mississippi $30,425 $1,468 $0 $310 $3,786 $0 $23,571 $59,559
Missouri $1,002,963 $98,922 $0 $4,759 $64,652 $1,123 $96,177 $1,268,595
Tennessee $888,988 $66,914 $0 $3,094 $44,342 $959 $77,902 $1,082,199




Table 189: Direct Utility Losses ($ thousands) – Level II Central 
Potable Water Waste Water Oil Systems Natural Gas Electric Power Communication Total
Alabama $1,731 $23,353 $1 $462 $9,417 $38 $35,002
Arkansas $169,302 $1,183,603 $23 $118,614 $170,423 $840 $1,642,805
Illinois $92,562 $715,189 $8 $21,384 $105,110 $417 $934,670
Indiana $4,989 $25,960 $9 $384 $8,083 $34 $39,460
Kentucky $96,000 $620,441 $1 $34,543 $113,310 $610 $864,904
Mississippi $10,006 $224,838 $0 $5,831 $34,888 $274 $275,838
Missouri $504,888 $2,497,099 $6 $179,909 $444,406 $1,520 $3,627,826
Tennessee $187,670 $1,988,454 $168 $64,030 $137,413 $2,297 $2,380,032




Utility losses are no exception to the trends shown by building and transportation 
losses.  The improved estimates of pipeline damage and loss contribute significantly to 
the change in overall utility losses.  Table 189 illustrates updated utility losses by 
subsystem and state.  Again, Arkansas shows a large change with nearly an additional 
$830 million in losses.  Tennessee losses increase as well; by over $410 million to $2.38 
billion.  Overall, utility losses increase by roughly $2.25 billion.  Proportionally, utility 
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systems experience the least change of the three infrastructure categories, though this 
does not diminish the affect of an additional $2.23 billion loss.  
 Regional losses are displayed in Table 190 by state and major system.  Loss 
increases in Arkansas, Missouri and Tennessee are well documented for the central 
extension, then it only follows that the majority of new losses are incurred by those states.  
Over 80% of all additional losses above the improve Level I analysis are incurred by 
those states.  It is also relevant to note that the inclusion of liquefaction actually reduces 
overall losses in Alabama.  Since losses in that state are such a small proportion of 
regional losses this loss reduction does not impact regional losses substantially.  As with 
the analysis using improved site data only, building losses comprise the majority of 
regional losses.  Transportation and utility losses combine to represent 30% of all 
regional losses.   
Table 190: Total Direct Economic Losses – Level II Central 
Liquefaction Diff. from Improved % Difference
Alabama $0.09 $0.00 -0.01%
Arkansas $8.83 $6.07 32.05%
Illinois $2.05 $0.83 4.40%
Indiana $0.18 $0.08 0.40%
Kentucky $4.21 $2.04 10.74%
Mississippi $1.44 $0.32 1.71%
Missouri $9.45 $3.66 19.30%




Liquefaction Diff. from Improved % Difference
Buildings $28.68 $13.38 70.60%
Transporation $4.39 $3.34 17.64%





Indirect economic losses also change, and new values are shown in Table 191.  
Employment needs actually decrease the first year after the earthquake.  All income 
impacts are less than those seen in the improved case.  In the second year employment 
opportunities increase and income impacts are roughly the same as the improved analysis.  
These changes continue into and past the fourth post-earthquake year when employment 
needs drop off and economic gains begin. 
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Table 191: Indirect Economic Losses without Aid – Level II Central 
Loss Total %
First Year Employment Impact -196,441 -6.60
Income Impact 2,568 1.81
Second Year Employment Impact 2,476,680 83.17
Income Impact 14,444 10.19
Third Year Employment Impact 145,759 4.89
Income Impact 7,507 5.30
Fourth Year Employment Impact 8,209 0.28
Income Impact -466 -0.33
Fifth Year Employment Impact 465 0.02
Income Impact -915 -0.65
Years 6 to 15 Employment Impact 23 0.00
Income Impact -940 -0.66  
 
6.3.3 Southwest Epicenter 
 
6.3.3.1 Liquefaction Susceptibility and Permanent Ground Deformation 
 The final epicenter analyzed with regional liquefaction susceptibilities is located 
in northeastern Arkansas at the southwest tip of the proposed fault.  This source fault is 
situated in the Mississippi Embayment where liquefaction susceptibilities are the greatest.  
Discussions about previous epicenters state that ground shaking parameters are not 
altered by the addition of liquefaction susceptibility.  The same holds for this epicenter.  
Probabilities of liquefaction are determined, though, and appear in Figure 135.  The area 
of greatest probability, 0.25, is located around the southwest extension and extends into 
central Arkansas.  This area corresponds to a region with the greatest liquefaction 
susceptibility, which is then combined with high PGA values in the region which results 
is high likelihoods over such a large area.  Very little liquefaction is expected north of the 
epicenter where soils are stiffer and less susceptible to liquefaction.   
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Figure 135: Probability of Liquefaction - SW Epicenter 
  
Further liquefaction-related values, such as vertical and horizontal ground deformations 
are calculated and the results displayed in Figure 136 & Figure 137.  Vertical permanent 
ground deformation, or settlement, reaches a maximum value of 12-inches in eastern 
Missouri and Arkansas as well as various census tracts to the north of the source fault.  
The tracts depicted in light green represent locations where settlement is estimated at 
one-inch.  All other tracts show no settlement.  Lateral spreading is confined to the 
embayment region, with the largest lateral displacements of 114-inches appearing around 
the fault.  Most non-negligible spreading occurs north of the source in northeastern 
Missouri and almost into southern Illinois.  As with other liquefaction parameters, most 
displacements, lateral and vertical, occur in the embayment region.   
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Figure 136: PGD Settlement from Liquefaction (in) – Southwest Epicenter 
L e g e n d











Figure 137:  PGD Spreading from Liquefaction (in.) - Southwest Epicenter 
 
6.3.3.2 General Building Stock and Essential Facilities 
 As with the other extensions damage probabilities remain relatively unaltered for 
the case of at least moderate damage, though some small differences exist.  Figure 138 
illustrates the extension of mid-range damage north along the Mississippi River.  The 
improved site case shows a small region around the southwest source fault where all 
probabilities of at least moderate damage greater than 10% are confined.  When 
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liquefaction is considered these mid-range (20% - 40%) probabilities extend north over 
the highly liquefiable soils in the central portion of the study region.   Other building 
types show similar trends with extended areas of mid-range damage probability, in 
particular URML and mobile homes.   
 
Figure 138: At Least Moderate Structural Damage - W1 – Level II SW 
  
It is well documented through previous extensions that liquefaction multiplies 
damage estimates, particularly for the complete damage state.  The southwest fault is no 
exception.  Table 192 shows the distribution of building damage for the three primary 
building types.  Light wood frames experience a total of 62,600 collapses in comparison 
to the 264 estimated with improved site data.  This is over 235 times as many collapses as 
the previous analysis case.  All other damage states show lower values in this analysis, 
indicating that most of these losses contribute to the increase in the number of collapses.  
Unreinforced masonry buildings exhibit a greater number of collapses with liquefaction 
incorporated, though not to same extent as light wood frames.  Just over 8,000 additional 
URMs are expected to collapse with all other damage states decreasing slightly.  The 
same is true of mobile homes.  The number of collapses increases as 8,800 more mobile 
homes show complete damage in this analysis.  Extensive, moderate and slight damage 
states show fewer occurrences from the improved Level I estimates.  The incidence of no 
damage decreases by roughly 1,000 cases as oppose to the decreasing behavior that is 
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exhibited by unreinforced masonry buildings.  Building damage by square footage is not 
depicted here as damage trends exhibited by building count are only replicated in 
regional square footage damage estimates.  Also note that low-code damage in Indiana is 
the same as seen with the central extension due to similar shaking in this portion of the 
study region.   
Table 192: Building Damage by Type and Seismic Code Level – Level II SW 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 270773 131394 35125 2969 48584
Total Low Code Buildings 2114648 119670 16879 551 14040
Total Buildings 2385421 251064 52004 3520 62624
2754633
%Total Buildings 86.597% 9.114% 1.888% 0.128% 2.273%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 10128 11401 17583 7866 12699
Total Low Code Buildings 161051 10062 5503 1192 967
Total Pre-Code Buildings 233202 23194 13832 8885 8007
Total Buildings 404381 44657 36918 17943 21673
525572
%Total Buildings 76.941% 8.497% 7.024% 3.414% 4.124%
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse
Total Moderate Code Buildings 8909 5447 11325 8769 10920
Total Low Code Buildings 137577 17511 12176 1957 1544
Total Pre-Code Buildings 168124 45904 26658 17545 10203
Total Buildings 314610 68862 50159 28271 22667
484569
%Total Buildings 64.926% 14.211% 10.351% 5.834% 4.678%
Light Wood Frame
Total Number of Building Type:
Unreinforced Masonry
Total Number of Building Type:
Mobile Homes
Total Number of Building Type:
 
  
State-level damage rates change as well, though with behavior like that exhibited 
in the specific building type analysis.  Low-code buildings in Arkansas show nearly 
4,300 additional collapses above the improved Level I analysis.  Kentucky also shows a 
substantial increase in the occurrence of collapse from 21 to over 40,000.  Moderate-code 
buildings in Arkansas also exhibit the much greater damage as over 33,000 buildings are 
expected to collapse instead of roughly 8,000 as in the previous analysis case.  
Tennessee’s moderate-code buildings exhibit seven times as many collapses in this 
liquefaction analysis, contributing to the overwhelming increase in complete building 
damage.  Table 193 shows this as well as all other damage states.  Damage by general 
occupancy is shown in Table 194 and residential types of construction show the greatest 
percentage of damage for each damage state.  Collapses to residential buildings increase 
by nearly 78,900 which is far more than any other general occupancy type.   
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Table 193: Building Damage by State – Level II SW 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 203832 1542 120 1 0 205495
Arkansas 306611 29819 3795 225 4275 344725
Illinois 328598 2667 360 35 1344 333004
Indiana 127321 823 55 1 251 128451
Kentucky 163220 18356 5024 698 4087 191385
Mississippi 174892 44951 8898 932 2733 232406
Missouri 666602 2742 121 1 0 669466
Tennessee 450046 46803 16716 1998 3904 519467
Code Total 2421122 147703 35089 3891 16594 2624399
None Slight Moderate Extensive Collapse Total
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arkansas 40624 38935 24445 8131 33244 145379
Illinois 8389 1488 325 32 811 11045
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 3575 3529 1725 378 822 10029
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 56647 14956 7513 2820 14148 96084
Tennessee 182118 90639 31255 8660 23826 336498
Code Total 291353 149547 65263 20021 72851 599035
Region Total 2712475 297250 100352 23912 89445 3223434





Table 194: Building Damage by General Occupancy – Level II SW 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Agriculture 2,004 0.06% 77 0.02% 40 0.03% 27 0.05% 57 0.05%
Commercial 27,364 0.87% 3,342 0.91% 3,079 2.16% 1,559 3.03% 1,437 1.32%
Education 245 0.01% 22 0.01% 16 0.01% 8 0.02% 7 0.01%
Government 1,366 0.04% 151 0.04% 106 0.07% 52 0.10% 60 0.06%
Industrial 4,267 0.14% 620 0.17% 600 0.42% 338 0.66% 295 0.27%
Other Residential 428,076 13.64% 79,324 21.55% 55,159 38.71% 30,021 58.26% 26,541 24.45%
Religion 2,097 0.07% 235 0.06% 178 0.12% 94 0.18% 94 0.09%
Single Family 2,673,965 85.17% 284,332 77.24% 83,319 58.47% 19,427 37.70% 80,077 73.76%
TOTAL 3,139,384 368,103 142,497 51,526 108,568
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
 
 
Damage to essential facilities is left unchanged as is shown in Table 195.  This 
replicates behavior illustrated by the previous two fault extensions.  The number of 
functional essential facilities within the study region does change in the first week 
following the earthquake as is illustrated in Table 196.  At later time periods, however, 
recovery slows and fewer essential facilities throughout the region are operational with 
the addition of liquefaction, though this reduction in minor. 
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Hospitals 308 42 3
Schools 4,695 885 117
EOCs 92 23 1
Police Stations 1,207 276 62




Table 196: Essential Facilities Functionalities - Level II SW 
No. 
Functional












% of Total 
Functional
Day 1 200 64.94% 1,076 73.45% 868 71.91% 3,648 77.70%
Day 3 200 64.94% 1,076 73.45% 870 72.08% 3,650 77.74%
Day 7 266 86.36% 1,160 79.18% 931 77.13% 3,810 81.15%
Day 14 266 86.36% 1,160 79.18% 931 77.13% 3,810 81.15%
Day 30 283 91.88% 1,312 89.56% 1,075 89.06% 4,399 93.70%
Day 90 303 98.38% 1,381 94.27% 1,125 93.21% 4,522 96.32%
Hospitals Fire Stations Police Stations Schools
308 Total Strucutres 1,465 Total Strucutres 1,207 Total Strucutres 4,695 Total Strucutres
 
 
6.3.3.3 Transportation Systems 
 Changes to transportation system damage occur with highway bridges primarily.  
Over 800 additional bridges experience at least moderate damage and another 200 
collapses.  Further damage occurs to railway facilities which increase to 85 facilities with 
moderate damage instead of just 36 as shown in Table 197.  Port facilities show 56 more 
instances of moderate damage for a total of 109 facilities, while airport facilities with at 
least moderate damage increases to 14.   
Table 197: Transportation System Damage - Level II SW 
Region 
Total








Highway Bridges 30,314 1,987 530 28,356 29,142
Highway Segments 10,325 0 0 10,314 10,314
Railway Bridges 425 9 0 416 421
Railway Facilities 393 85 0 358 376
Railway Segments 8,885 0 0 8,885 8,885
Bus Facilities 84 5 1 82 83
Ferry Facilities 5 5 5 0 0
Port Facilities 691 109 14 638 660
Airport Facilities 637 64 8 596 624
Airport Runways 720 0 0 720 720
No. Factilities
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 The regional functionality of highway bridges decreases much the same as the 
previous epicenter when liquefaction is added.  The day after the earthquake roughly 800 
fewer bridges are operational.  Table 198 shows the functionality of regional bridges up 
to three months after the earthquake.  Three months after the earthquake only 100 fewer 
bridges are functional, though these bridges are located closest to the epicenter further 
diminishing the capacity of that region’s transportation network.   
Table 198: Highway Bridge Functionality – Level II SW 
No. Functional % Total Functional
Day 1 28,372 93.59%
Day 3 29,019 95.73%
Day 7 29,142 96.13%
Day 14 29,182 96.27%
Day 30 29,210 96.36%




 The highway network shows the greatest probability of damage in northeastern 
Missouri, nearest the epicenter.  Figure 139 illustrates the probability distribution for 
 the case of at least moderate damage.  The greatest probability of damage is only 0.25 
(depicted in red) though this extends of over a large area.  Damage probabilities greater 
than 5% do not extend much outside Arkansas, indicating that the greatest damage, and 
losses, will occur in this area.  Damage to railway lines occur in the same manner, though 
the maximum probability of damage is roughly 0.20.  Airport runways also experience 
damage in this fashion, as they too are paved surfaces.   
 
Figure 139: At Least Moderate Damage - Highway Segments – Level II SW 
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Losses related to various transportation components are delineated in Table 199.  
Loss categories are added for highway segments, railway segments and airport runways.  
These new categories alone total $1.68 billion, which equates to over 30% of all 
transportation losses.  Highway bridge loss increases from $601 million to $2.98 billion 
and railway bridge loss more than doubles with the addition of liquefaction.  Airport 
facilities incur an additional $36 million, thus bus and ferry facilities remain unchanged.  
The highway system, however, still maintains the greatest percentage of transportation 
losses at 75%.   
Table 199: Transportation Losses by Component – Level II SW 
Component Loss % Loss
Highway Bridges $2,980,840,000 54.84%
Highway Segments $1,087,900,000 20.02%
Railway Bridges $1,070,000 0.02%
Railway Segments $201,450,000 3.71%
Railway Facilities $128,360,000 2.36%
Airport Facilities $400,670,000 7.37%
Airport Runways $390,610,000 7.19%
Bus Facilities $10,530,000 0.19%
Port Facilities $228,240,000 4.20%
Ferry Facilities $5,570,000 0.10%
Total $5,435,240,000  
 
6.3.3.4 Utility Systems 
 Utility facilities do not experience significant increases in moderate damage and 
do not incur any collapses even with the addition of liquefaction (See Table 200).  In 
addition, changes to utility facility functionalities are still roughly the same as those 
displayed in the improved Level I case, as is shown in Table 201.   
 Damage to pipeline is very different from estimates shown in the previous 
analysis case.  The number of leaks for each type of pipelines is reduced by half, though 
the amount of breaks increases by roughly that same amount.  Table 202 illustrates the 
occurrence of leaks and breaks for this scenario event.  As in the previous analysis case 
potable water lines show the greatest number of leaks and breaks at 39,540 and 58,974, 
respectively.  Natural gas lines still hold the greatest leak rate of 0.167 leaks/km, which is 
approximately half of the leak rate determined with the improved site factor case.  Break 
rate is also greatest with natural gas lines with an estimated 0.249 breaks/km.  This is 
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roughly three times more than the previous analysis case where the break rate for natural 
gas pipelines was 0.084 breaks/km. 








Potable Water 249 19 3
Waste Water 1,646 180 16
Natural Gas 114 6 0
Oil Systems 49 12 0
Electric Power 158 17 2




Table 201: Utility Facilities Functionality - Level II SW 
Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 14 Day 30 Day 90 Total
Potable Water 230 240 244 244 245 249 249
Waste Water 1,280 1,484 1,587 1,590 1,605 1,636 1,646
Natural Gas 108 111 114 114 114 114 114
Oil Systems 35 44 47 49 49 49 49
Electric Power 123 148 155 157 158 158 158











Potable Water 500,560 39,540 58,974
Waste Water 300,336 31,273 46,643
Natural Gas 200,224 33,430 49,860
Oil 0 0 0  
 
Table 203: Potable Water and Electricity Service Disruptions – Level II SW 
Total No. Households Day 1 Day 3 Day 7 Day 30 Day 90
Potable Water 691,487 667,700 628,100 359,277 119,978
Electric Power 409,466 256,907 117,481 33,448 523
4,238,197
No. of Households without Service
 
 
 Service disruptions increase for potable water distribution though leaves electric 
service much the same as in the improved Level I analysis.  Table 203 displays the 
number of service outages at various periods after the scenario earthquake.  The number 
of potable water disruptions more than doubles the day after the earthquake and this ratio 
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only increases until the last interval; 90 days.  The improved site analysis estimated all 
potable water service be operational within three months after the earthquake, though the 
addition of liquefaction susceptibility brings that number to nearly 120,000 outages.  
Regional electric service incurs approximately, 5,400 additional disruptions the day after 
the earthquake, only to show a greater increase of 14,000 outages after three days.  This 
margin over the improved case keeps increasing until one month after the scenario 
earthquake.  By the three month interval, however; service disruptions are equal to those 
seen in the improved Level I analysis. 
 Losses to the utility system increase due to the inclusion of pipeline losses which 
are made possible by the incorporation of liquefaction susceptibility.  Pipeline losses 
alone account for $1.76 billion of utility losses, which equates to 16% of all utility system 
losses.  Table 204 highlights these loss values as well as the loss incurred by all other 
utility subsystems.  An additional $1.24 billion in loss is attributed to waste water 
facilities, which still maintain the highest percentage of total utility losses.  Natural gas 
and electric components show approximately $250 million in additional loss each, 
contributing to the overall loss increase.   
Table 204: Utility System Losses by Component – Level II SW 
Utility System Loss % Total
Potable Water Facility $516,050,000 4.68%
Potable Water Lines $668,820,000 6.06%
Waste Water Facility $7,605,070,000 68.92%
Waste Water Lines $528,980,000 4.79%
Oil Facilities $360,000 0.00%
Nautral Gas Facilities $6,010,000 0.05%
Natural Gas Lines $565,460,000 5.12%
Electric Systems $1,137,440,000 10.31%
Communication $6,560,000 0.06%
Total $11,034,750,000  
 
6.3.3.5 Induced Damage and Social Losses 
Shelter requirements roughly quadruple, with over 144,000 displaced households 
and 33,000 temporary housing needs.  The majority of this housing need occur in 
Arkansas and Tennessee as is shown in Table 205.  Memphis, Tennessee is within tens of 
kilometers of the southwest source and is likely to sustain significant damage to its 
residential building infrastructure leaving many citizens without a place to live.  Missouri 
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also shows nearly 15,000 additional displaced households and 4,300 temporary housing 
requirements.  Overall, however; over 87,000 more households are displaced and 25,000 
additional temporary housing spaces.   













Total 114,701 33,373  
 
 As with the central epicenter, the addition of liquefaction susceptibilities does not 
change the number of fire ignitions following the earthquake significantly.  Debris 
generation does increase, however; from 12 million tons to 18 million tons.  Additional 
truckloads are required to remove the extra debris.  Additional debris requires 240,000 
truckloads, for a total of 720,000 truckloads.   
Table 206: Casualties - 2 AM – Level II SW 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Commercial 191 53 8 15
Commuting 3 4 7 1
Educational 0 0 0 0
Hotels 392 111 16 30
Industrial 283 82 12 24
Other-Residential 8,057 2,076 227 426
Single Family 17,996 4,819 529 987
TOTAL 26,922 7,145 799 1,483  
  
The northeast and central extensions established a new time of day for the worst-
case casualty scenario as does the southwest source, 2 AM.  Table 206 delineates the 
numbers and severities of casualties at this time of day.  A total of 36,352 casualties are 
expected at 2 PM, while 2 PM and 5 PM are estimated to create 35,334 and 35,295 
casualties, respectively.  This indicates that adding liquefaction susceptibility information 
adds roughly 15,000 casualties to the study region, with nearly 400 of those being 
additional deaths.  While each severity level increases by roughly the same margin it is 
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still vital to keep in mind that this worst case scenario generates nearly 800 severe 
injuries and 1,500 deaths which might be reduced if regional infrastructures are 
strengthened.   
 
6.3.3.6 Economic Losses 
 Building losses for the entire study region are delineated by type and state in 
Table 207.  Structural, non-structural and contents damage nearly double only with the 
addition of liquefaction susceptibility.  All income losses increase, though by much 
smaller margins.  Losses in Arkansas increase by nearly $5 billion while another $5.7 
billion of additional building loss occurs in Tennessee. All other states experience 
increased building losses, with the exception Alabama which remains unchanged.  Total 
building losses increase by $14.7 billion to reach $34.4 billion regionally.   
 Transportation losses for components of the system were discussed earlier, though 
state losses have not and appear in Table 208.  Losses in Arkansas alone increase by $1.4 
billion, which equates to nearly 370% more than the improved Level I analysis.  Missouri 
sees an additional $880 million of loss while Tennessee losses jump to $1.14 billion in 
losses state-wide.  As with building losses, Alabama does not incur additional losses 
above the estimate in the improved site analysis.  Regionally, transportation related losses 
increase by $3.75 billion to reach $5.04 billion in total transportation loss.   




















Alabama $3,946 $22,809 $11,863 $520 0.12 $56 $676 $1,073 $989 $41,932
Arkansas $1,667,172 $5,841,246 $1,888,170 $76,277 12.2 $37,610 $212,435 $290,888 $477,685 $10,491,483
Illinois $105,430 $399,150 $137,236 $2,929 1.78 $2,102 $9,399 $12,009 $26,186 $694,441
Indiana $16,754 $66,090 $27,416 $1,534 0.43 $276 $1,202 $1,611 $3,795 $118,678
Kentucky $364,983 $1,162,988 $378,779 $11,309 4.33 $7,955 $69,307 $99,156 $101,406 $2,195,883
Mississippi $322,230 $1,044,604 $383,115 $20,051 3.87 $7,215 $90,918 $130,734 $104,492 $2,103,359
Missouri $620,465 $2,125,796 $721,173 $27,839 5.28 $13,278 $70,960 $102,694 $166,567 $3,848,772
Tennessee $2,298,756 $7,784,561 $2,746,724 $96,806 7.81 $51,147 $510,327 $690,919 $709,962 $14,889,202
TOTAL $5,399,736 $18,447,244 $6,294,476 $237,265 $119,639 $965,224 $1,329,084 $1,591,082 $34,383,750
Capital Losses Income Losses
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Table 208: Direct Transportation Losses ($ thousands) – Level II SW 
Highway Railway Light Rail Bus Facility Ports Ferries Airports Total
Alabama $2,355 $736 $0 $64 $2,820 $0 $3,365 $9,340
Arkansas $1,590,988 $112,397 $0 $1,148 $36,971 $0 $134,891 $1,876,395
Illinois $171,264 $13,855 $0 $1,019 $17,842 $2,420 $32,119 $238,519
Indiana $2,636 $3,126 $0 $37 $5,754 $0 $8,662 $20,215
Kentucky $355,964 $27,155 $0 $609 $43,333 $1,068 $22,362 $450,491
Mississippi $119,202 $6,506 $0 $566 $5,241 $0 $35,802 $167,317
Missouri $923,199 $79,863 $0 $4,201 $53,672 $1,123 $83,236 $1,145,294
Tennessee $903,136 $87,241 $3 $2,889 $62,607 $959 $80,237 $1,137,072




Utility losses by state are displayed in Table 209.  With buildings and 
transportation losses increasing drastically it only follows that utility losses increase in 
the same fashion.  An additional $1 billion in losses occurs in Arkansas, though Missouri 
and Tennessee also add several hundred million each.  Overall, utility losses increase by 
$1.1 billion for a total regional loss of $2.5 billion.   
All state and major system losses are compiled in Table 210.  Alabama shows a 
decrease in regional losses, though this amount is so small that the change is negligible 
on the regional level.  Most of the additional losses incurred across the study region are 
attributed to Arkansas and Tennessee, which comprise 68% of all additional losses.  An 
additional $21 billion are added to the direct loss estimate for an earthquake at the 
southwest fault extension.  Total regional losses are now estimated at approximately 
$50.5 billion.   
Table 209: Direct Utility Losses ($ thousands) – Level II SW 
Potable Water Waste Water Oil Systems Natural Gas Electric Power Communication Total
Alabama $1,750 $16,831 $1 $478 $9,417 $38 $28,515
Arkansas $420,561 $2,931,109 $84 $288,277 $414,578 $1,888 $4,056,497
Illinois $61,736 $515,297 $8 $11,081 $72,231 $332 $660,685
Indiana $5,000 $20,477 $9 $394 $8,083 $34 $33,997
Kentucky $74,331 $443,710 $1 $19,164 $67,567 $507 $605,280
Mississippi $28,106 $392,672 $0 $21,483 $59,774 $386 $502,421
Missouri $392,771 $1,929,849 $6 $150,208 $355,917 $1,193 $2,829,944
Tennessee $200,617 $1,884,104 $250 $80,381 $149,870 $2,179 $2,317,401
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Table 210: Total Direct Losses – Level II SW 
Liquefaction Diff. from Improved % Difference
Alabama 0.08 0.00 -0.01%
Arkansas 16.42 7.41 20.96%
Illinois 15.94 15.09 42.70%
Indiana 0.17 0.07 0.21%
Kentucky 3.25 1.56 4.41%
Mississippi 2.77 0.73 2.05%
Missouri 7.82 3.65 10.32%




Liquefaction Diff. from Improved % Difference
Buildings $34.38 $14.73 70.09%
Transporation $5.04 $3.76 17.88%





Indirect economic losses change as well, with employment needs decreasing by 
approximately 50%.  This proportion holds for the first two years of regional recovery, 
with the first year requiring only 3 million jobs.  First year indirect economic impact 
shows gains of nearly $5 billion, which is in direct contrast to the improved Level I 
analysis.  Table 211 shows the remaining indirect losses and employment requirements 
for the first fifteen years after the scenario earthquake.   
Table 211: Indirect Economic Losses ($ millions) – Level II SW 
Loss Total %
First Year Employment Impact 2,985,980 -100.27
Income Impact -5,648 -3.98
Second Year Employment Impact 1,384,602 46.49
Income Impact 10,641 7.51
Third Year Employment Impact 171,238 5.75
Income Impact 8,799 6.21
Fourth Year Employment Impact 9,644 0.32
Income Impact -563 -0.40
Fifth Year Employment Impact 544 0.02
Income Impact -1,090 -0.77
Years 6 to 15 Employment Impact 27 0.00
Income Impact -1,120 -0.79  
 
6.3.4 Pipeline Networks  
 The Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP) GOLD data set provides 
information on various types of buildings, transportation and utility networks and systems.  
Natural gas and oil pipeline data is extracted from those numerous data sets and added to  
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the HAZUS-MH utility distribution network inventory.  Natural gas lines carry natural 
gas and propane, normal butane, iso-butane and natural gasoline (LPG/NGL), while oil 
pipelines carry crude oil, refined oil or petrochemicals.  These distribution networks only 
include the types of pipelines shown in Table 212.  In some cases a diameter is not 
specified for pipeline segments, in which case the diameters appearing in the pipeline 
table are assigned to those particular segments.  The diameters are averages taken from 
large sets of pipeline data and are only used to determine the type of repair rate equation 
that is applied to a particular pipeline.  These pipeline types apply to both natural gas and 
oil classifications.   
Table 212: Pipeline Types in HSIP 
Pipeline Type Diameter (in.)
Transmission/Trunk Line 17
Gathering System Main Line 8
Gathering System Field Line 6
Local Distribution Line 7  
 
 When pipeline network data is added to HAZUS-MH all inventory assumptions 
used to determine pipeline damage for gas and oil lines are negated.  This means the 
baseline estimation of local distribution lines (to individual homes) is no longer 
applicable and all pipeline damage and loss predictions are carried out for the regional 
pipeline network only, as this is the extent of pipeline information provided in the HSIP 
GOLD dataset.  Regional pipeline networks for natural gas and oil are depicted in Figure 
140 for the study region under investigation here.  It is evident from the illustration that 
local distribution networks which provide service to individual homes are not included in 
the dataset and thus provide a critical point of comparison with basic HAZUS-MH 
pipeline assumptions which account for these pipeline segments.   
 The northeast extension event shows damage which reaches a maximum regional 
value in only one segment of oil pipeline and just a few segments of natural gas lines.  As 
shown in Figure 141 & Figure 142 maximum break rates only reach 0.035 and 0.090 
breaks/m for natural gas and oil lines, respectively.  These high damage rates are 
confined to southern Illinois and southeastern Missouri, primarily.  Leak and repair rates 
show similar distributions, though their maximum rate values are substantially larger.  
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Leak rates for natural gas and oil pipelines reach maximums of 0.139 and 0.037 leaks/m, 
while repair rate maximums are 0.174 and 0.046 repairs/m, respectively.   
 
Figure 140: Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines from HSIP 
 
Figure 141: NE Epicenter - Natural Gas Line Break Rate 
  
The central source experiences the majority of its pipeline damage in southeastern 
Missouri as well as parts of northwestern Tennessee and northeastern Arkansas.  Figure 
143 & Figure 144 display regional break rates for this scenario earthquake which are 
meant to be illustrative of all damage and repair rate distributions.  Break rates for natural 
gas and oil peak at 0.035 and 0.0092 breaks/m, respectively.  Maximum leak rates for 
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natural gas lines reach 0.139 leaks/km, while oil lines only reach 0.037 leaks/m.  Natural 
gas line maximum repair rates are ten times greater than oil lines at 0.174 repairs/m, 
versus only 0.046 repairs/m. 
 
Figure 142: NE Epicenter - Oil Pipeline Break Rate 
 
Figure 143: Central Epicenter - Natural Gas Line Break Rate 
  
Pipeline damage for natural gas and oil lines for a scenario earthquake at the 
southwest extension are illustrated in Figure 145 & Figure 146.  Again, while only break 
rates are shown for these two pipeline distribution networks leak and repair rates show 
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similar distributions and maximum locations though the rates themselves are different.  
The maximum leak rates for natural gas and oil lines are 0.175 and 0.016 leaks/m while 
repair rates for these same networks are 0.218 and 0.02 repairs/m, respectively.  It is also 
relevant to note that the southwest source exhibits higher break rates than the previous 
epicenters for natural gas lines, though the central extension shows the greatest oil break 
rate by far, at 0.0092 breaks/m.     
 
Figure 144: Central Epicenter - Oil Pipeline Break Rate 
 
Figure 145: SW Epicenter - Natural Gas Line Break Rate 
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 In order to calculate the number of leaks, breaks and required repairs the pipeline 
networks must be reprojected onto a flat coordinate system.  This displays pipeline 
lengths in units of meters which are multiplied by the break rates (damage/m) to calculate  
 
Figure 146: SW Epicenter - Oil Pipeline Break Rate 
 
the number of damage occurrences over the specific length of pipe.  Each segment’s 
damage is then totaled to find the number of breaks, leaks and repairs expected across the 
entire study region. These values appear in Table 213 for each of the three source fault 
extensions.  The ‘HAZUS-MH Default’ category refers to the default assumptions of 
natural gas line damage only, and not the default or Level I analysis case.  The estimates 
of break and leaks used for comparison here are taken from the Level II analysis with 
liquefaction susceptibility data.  Every extension shows the greatest estimates of damage 
belonging to the HAZUS-MH estimates.  All extensions show drastic reductions in 
damage for all fault extensions.  The central and northeast extensions show identical oil 
line damage, while southwest extension damage values are very similar.  Since HAZUS-
MH provides no internal damage estimate the break and leak values determined here are 
the only estimates available in this study.  Natural gas lines show similar trends to those 
displayed with oil lines.  Natural gas lines damage values, however; are much greater.  
These values are less than 1% of the HAZUS-MH estimated values for each fault 
extension. 
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Table 213: Pipeline Damage with the HSIP Gold Dataset 
No. Leaks No. Breaks No. Repairs No. Leaks No. Breaks No. Repairs No. Leaks No. Breaks No. Repairs
Natural Gas Lines
HAZUS-MH Default 21,339 36,625 57,964 21,582 37,574 59,156 33,430 49,860 83,290
HSIP 102 25 129 102 25 129 158 38 195
Difference 21,237 36,600 57835 21,480 37,549 59027 33,272 49,822 83095
Total (HAZUS+HSIP) 21,339 36,625 57,964 21,582 37,574 59,156 33,430 49,860 83,290
Oil Pipelines
HSIP 7 2 9 7 2 9 10 2 12
Northeast Extension Central Extension Southwest Extension
 
 
The drastic differences in damage estimations greatly affect system service 
disruptions to regional customers, which are not calculated by HAZUS-MH for natural 
gas and oil pipelines.  While pipeline functionalities are calculated in the program no 
break or leak rates are large enough to permit the calculation of non-negligible system 
downtime.  HSIP pipelines exhibit no repair needs with regard to the time needed to fix 
broken lines, despite number of repairs called for in the previous table (Table 213).  
Furthermore, pipeline losses are not determined by HAZUS-MH when external pipeline 
data is provided.  Without this information there is no way to compare loss values from 
the Level II liquefaction analysis with pipeline losses here.  It is possible to assign loss 
values to each break and leak externally, though this information is not known and thus 
not incorporated.  With this in mind, only pipeline damage comparisons are permitted.  
These damage comparisons show that HAZUS-MH provides much greater estimates of 
all forms of pipeline damage for natural gas and oil pipelines.   
 
6.3.5 Building Fragilities 
 HAZUS-MH fragility curves for the general building stock are updated with new 
fragility curves developed by the MAE Center.  These fragility curves apply to each of 
the 36 specific buildings types (See HAZUS-MH Technical Manual for classifications) 
and all code levels; Pre-Code, Low-Code, Moderate-Code and High-Code.  Only the 
former three code types are employed herein as high-code buildings do not exist in the 
CEUS.  In addition, four damage states are considered with the MAE Center set of 
building fragilities; at least slight damage, at least moderate damage, at least extensive 
damage and complete damage.  This broad range of curves permits the modification of 
regional damage to building types, code levels and damage states present in HAZUS-MH.   
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 Building fragility curves are parameterized so that a generic set of curves is 
derived.  These curves are dependent of three parameters; stiffness, strength and ductility, 
which closely relate to serviceability, damage control and collapse prevention limit states, 
respectively.  A Response Database was employed with pre-determined inelastic 
structural responses which eliminated cumbersome simulation time since new fragilities 
could be derived directly.  Maximum responses were estimated using the nonlinear static 
procedure (NSP) with SDOF simplification of multi-degree of freedom structures (Jeong 
& Elnashai, 2006).   
 The fragility curves developed by Jeong and Elnashai (2006) are based on spectral 
acceleration while HAZUS-MH fragilities are based on spectral displacement (FEMA-
NIBS, Technical Manual, 2006).  This prohibits the incorporation of these curves in the 
program so an external damage analysis is required.  The conversion process first 
requires the determination of Memphis, Tennessee, damage probabilities since the 
fragilities were originally developed for this geographic area.  Each building type 
requires its own set of probabilities as is shown in Table 214.  The spectral displacement 
value is identified for the Memphis region, which is also the value used to determine the 














where P(LS/e) = Probability of exceeding a given limit state at a given earthquake  
  intensity; 
Φ  = Standard normal cumulative distribution function; 
e  = Spectral acceleration; 
βλ,  = Modification parameters developed by MAE Center analyses 
This procedure is repeated for all structure types and seismic design levels which are then 
complied into an updated version of Table 214.  Results of the original damage states and 
updated damage states are compared and a ratio calculated (Parameterized Fragility 
damage value/HAZUS-MH damage value) which converts HAZUS-MH damage values 
to damage values representative of MAE Center fragilities.  Finally, Table 214 is 
completed with the damage ratios which added to building damage figures from HAZUS-
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MH which permits the calculation of MAE Center-based general building stock damage.  
It is relevant to note that due to the external calculation of damage no economic loss 
values are determined for MAE Center general building stock damage.   
 HAZUS-MH employs a Capacity Spectrum Method (CSM) which identifies an 
intersection point of structural capacity and demand curves.  The resulting fragilities 
incorporate empirical data, though the curves are largely influenced by expert opinion.  
Some curves are almost entirely dependent on engineering expertise as fragilities for 
some buildings types are widely studied.  The updated fragilities developed in the MAE 
Center provide a scientific basis for all building type fragilities and thus provide a more 
accurate representation of building performance.   
Table 214: Fragility Curve Development - Memphis 
 LS #1 LS #2 LS #3 LS #4 
W1-H     
W1-M     
W1-L     
W1-P     
? ? ? ?     
? ? ? ?     
? ? ? ?     
  
 Updating general building stock damage reveals less damage to most specific 
buildings types at all damage and seismic code levels.  All comparisons made here 
employ general building stock damage from the Level II analysis of the southwest 
extension event.  This means that building damage incorporates ground motion amplified 
by ground motion and adjusted by permanent ground deformations induced by 
liquefaction.   
 Light wood frames are one of the most prominent building types in this CEUS 
study region and also experience the most significant change in damage.  Both low- and 
moderate-code levels show dramatic increases in the number of buildings appearing in 
each damage state.  Most noticeably, building collapse increase to 94,000 when MAE 
Center fragilities are used.  HAZUS-MH estimates approximately 37,000 moderate-code 
collapses, which is roughly 35% of MAE Center estimated damage.  At least extensive 
damage shows over 82,000 more occurrences with updated fragilities, while at least 
moderate experiences roughly 58,000 more instances of each damage category. Table 
215 displays these values for moderate- and low-code.   
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Table 215: Updated Light Wood Frame (W1) Damage 
W1 - Pre Code W1 - Low Code W1 - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 0 2,117,904 488,853
At Least Slight 101,038 218,076
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate No 17,470 86,748
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive Inventory 8,007 51,529
Complete 7,719 48,551
At Least Slight 106,629 265,593
Improved Damage At Least Moderate No 19,936 142,300
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive Inventory 9,981 131,587
Complete 11,560 138,796  
 
The only other building type to experience any form of increased damage is 
mobile homes, though only low- and moderate-code buildings realize more damage when 
fragilities are updated.  This is illustrated in Table 216.  More extensive damage states 
show the greatest increases in building damage.  At least extensive and complete damage 
states experience increases of more than 30%.  Lesser damage states incur only 2%-15% 
damage increase.  While low- and moderate-code buildings see more damage, pre-code 
buildings experience less damage when fragilities are updated.  Complete damage, for 
instance, is reduced by half when fragilities are updated.  The remainder of the specific 
building types incurs less damage than HAZUS-MH estimates.  Building type W2, 
commercial and industrial wood construction, sees the greatest change to pre-code 
buildings, while moderate-code structures only incur 10-20 fewer occurrences of damage 
at various damage states.  Low-code buildings represent a small portion of regional W2 
inventory and thus experience little change.  Table 217 illustrates these results for all 
code levels and damage states.   
Table 216: Updated Mobile Home (MH) Damage 
MH - Pre Code MH - Low Code MH - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 268,227 169,644 45,373
At Least Slight 101,154 32,757 36,464
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 56,468 16,995 31,015
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 30,257 3,327 19,689
Complete 11,882 1,429 10,921
At Least Slight 96,737 33,581 37,380
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 50,070 16,995 33,122
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 20,528 3,327 23,001
Complete 5,476 1,429 15,063  
 
- 243 - 
Table 217: Adjusted Commercial & Industrial Wood (W2) Damage 
W2 - Pre Code W2 - Low Code W2 - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 6,801 1,386 1,270
At Least Slight 1,023 82 783
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 603 26 306
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 194 6 143
Complete 97 6 118
At Least Slight 925 76 766
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 459 26 293
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 100 6 135
Complete 39 6 102  
 
All steel building types (S1L, S2L, S3, S4L & S5L) all show relatively the same 
damage modifications.  Updated damage values are illustrates in Table 218- Table 222.  
At least slight damage decreases between 5% and 20% depending on code level and 
specific building type.  At least moderate damage is reduced by 10%-30%, while at least 
extensive damage drops by 20%-50%.  Complete damage experiences the greatest 
reductions which are between 45% and 75% of original HAZUS-MH damage estimates.  
Table 218: S1L Adjusted Damage 
S1L - Pre Code S1L - Low Code S1L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 1,536 111 91
At Least Slight 232 1 64
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 98 0 41
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 51 0 14
Complete 18 0 14
At Least Slight 199 1 62
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 73 0 38
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 25 0 12
Complete 7 0 7  
 
Table 219: S2L Adjusted Damage 
S2L - Pre Code S2L - Low Code S2L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 345 233 187
At Least Slight 89 6 130
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 77 2 80
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 55 1 25
Complete 22 0 16
At Least Slight 74 5 122
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 56 2 71
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 25 1 20
Complete 7 0 11  
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Table 220: S3 Adjusted Damage 
S3 - Pre Code S3 - Low Code S3 - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 3,147 978 549
At Least Slight 807 96 490
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 544 58 401
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 334 23 161
Complete 166 5 68
At Least Slight 754 91 482
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 477 58 387
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 236 23 148
Complete 67 5 56  
 
Table 221: S4L Adjusted Damage 
S4L - Pre Code S4L - Low Code S4L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 1,441 978 232
At Least Slight 234 173 169
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 173 131 110
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 119 60 36
Complete 51 26 21
At Least Slight 196 148 158
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 128 131 99
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 59 60 30
Complete 14 26 15  
 
Table 222: S5L Adjusted Damage 
S5L - Pre Code S5L - Low Code S5L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 2,113 669 309
At Least Slight 318 31 275
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 204 12 234
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 125 3 130
Complete 52 1 61
At Least Slight 284 29
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 161 12 Not
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 75 3 Available
Complete 19 1  
 
Concrete and precast structures experience roughly the same reduction in the occurrence 
of damage for various damage states.  At least slight damage reductions occur over a 
lesser range, only 6%-12% reductions from HAZUS-MH damage estimates.  At least 
moderate damage also shows a tighter range of damage reduction, 15-25%.  At least 
extensive and complete damage realize a much broader range of damage modifications, 
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however.  Damage cases are reduced by 20%-50% and 30%-65%, respectively (See 
Table 223 -Table 227).  These reductions depend on code level primarily.   
Table 223: C1L Adjusted Damage 
C1L - Pre Code C1L - Low Code C1L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 409 34 23
At Least Slight 32 1 20
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 11 0 16
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 4 0 8
Complete 2 0 3
At Least Slight 28 1 19
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 8 0 15
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 2 0 7
Complete 1 0 2  
 
Table 224: C2L Adjusted Damage 
C2L - Pre Code C2L - Low Code C2L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 5,644 843 387
At Least Slight 534 66 311
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 294 36 258
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 178 10 154
Complete 87 2 73
At Least Slight 470 60 289
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 228 36 222
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 104 10 119
Complete 29 2 46  
 
Table 225: C3L Adjusted Damage 
C3L - Pre Code C3L - Low Code C3L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 132 0 0
At Least Slight 9
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 2 No No
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 0 Inventory Inventory
Complete 0
At Least Slight 9
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 2 No No
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 0 Inventory Inventory
Complete 0  
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Table 226: PC1 Adjusted Damage 
PC1 - Pre Code PC1 - Low Code PC1 - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 2,658 956 388
At Least Slight 533 74 265
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 375 42 165
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 221 12 67
Complete 94 2 44
At Least Slight 490 70 256
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 325 42 154
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 163 12 59
Complete 46 2 37  
 
 Code level plays a significant role in the amount of damage determined by MAE 
Center fragilities.  Pre-code buildings show much greater reductions in damage than low-
code, and especially moderate-code buildings.  Numerous specific buildings types see 
less than 15% reductions for all damage states at the moderate-code level, while pre-code 
building only experience these small reductions at mild damage states.  Extensive and 
complete damage states decrease by more than 40% frequently.  This is particularly 
evident with PC1 buildings (See Table 226) and reinforced masonry buildings (See Table 
228 & Table 229).  In fact, damage modification to both types of reinforced masonry 
structures, RM1L and RM2L, exhibit the same trends as though previously discussed for 
precast structures.  Unreinforced masonry damage, illustrated in Table 230, realizes 
damage reductions of 10%-20% at lesser damage states (at leas slight and moderate) 
while reductions of 20%-40% occur for at least extensive and complete damage levels.   
Table 227: PC2L Adjusted Damage 
PC2L - Pre Code PC2L - Low Code PC2L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 203 10 13
At Least Slight 14 0 9
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 8 0 6
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 3 0 2
Complete 1 0 2
At Least Slight 12 0 8
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 6 0 5
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 2 0 2
Complete 0 0 1  
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Table 228: RM1L Adjusted Damage 
RM1L - Pre Code RM1L - Low Code RM1L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 2,425 139 516
At Least Slight 211 1 267
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 145 0 164
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 70 0 92
Complete 17 0 66
At Least Slight 189 1 265
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 122 0 162
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 50 0 90
Complete 8 0 64  
 
Table 229: RM2L Adjusted Damage 
RM2L - Pre Code RM2L - Low Code RM2L - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 170 56 0
At Least Slight 4 0
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 1 0 No
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 0 0 Inventory
Complete 0 0
At Least Slight 3 0
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 1 0 No 
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 0 0 Inventory
Complete 0 0  
 
Table 230: URML Adjusted Damage 
URML - Pre Code URML - Low Code URML - Moderate Code
Total Building Count 287,023 168,716 59,642
At Least Slight 55,784 15,383 49,494
Damage from HAZUS At Least Moderate 32,147 8,334 38,103
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 17,934 2,072 20,535
Complete 8,712 888 12,698
At Least Slight 53,285 14,941
Improved Damage At Least Moderate 29,013 8,334 Not
(number of buildings) At Least Extensive 14,560 2,072 Available
Complete 6,184 888  
 
 The updated damage estimates do not include all 36 specific buildings types since 
only the 16 discussed in this subsection are present in the CEUS study region, though 
fragilities exist for the unused buildings types.  Overall, most building types show fewer 
cases of damage at all damage levels with the exceptions of light wood frames and 
mobile homes at low- and moderate-code levels. While these are only two of the 16 
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buildings types investigated here it is relevant to note that these two specific building 
types represent nearly 85% of regional buildings.  
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7 Analysis Level and Regional Comparisons 
 
7.1 Hazard/Site Affects 
 The impact of site affects and liquefaction susceptibilities are well documented in 
previous sections, though a short review of these affects is still warranted here.  The 
application of regional site data affects all ground shaking parameters supplied to 
HAZUS-MH as user-input hazard maps.  Each epicenter/fault extension exhibited 
increased maximum PGA and short-period spectral acceleration values.  These changes 
are anywhere from 5%-50% of the default, site class ‘D’ values.  Long-period spectral 
acceleration and PGV parameters show increases of 40%-60% for maximum regional 
values.  Also, census tracts within the Mississippi Embayment region of the study area 
show increased seismic response values, though these are considered mid-range shaking 
in comparison to maximum values at the epicenters.  When the three source scenarios are 
compared the greatest shaking values, as determined by maximum shaking at the source, 
occurs at various fault extensions where shaking modified by site data reaches the 
following; PGA – 1.38g (northeast), PGV – 52.1 in./sec. (southwest), Sa 0.3 sec. – 2.1g 
(northeast) and Sa 1.0 sec.- 1.43g (central).   
 Liquefaction susceptibility does not directly affect ground shaking in HAZUS-
MH, though the probabilities of liquefaction calculated based on these susceptibility 
values do take PGA into account.  The addition of this information does permit the 
determination of permanent ground deformations of vertical settlement and lateral 
spreading.  While each extension appears to exhibit roughly the same settlement patterns 
and values, lateral spreading appears to affect the central and southwest extensions more 
than the northeast.  This is due to the positioning of the two former source faults in the 
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7.2 Determination of Worst-Case Scenario 
 
7.2.1 Level 1 Comparison of Three Epicenters 
 The results of each individual Level I analysis are well catalogued in previous 
sections though it is necessary to use this information to determine a worst-case scenario 
earthquake for the study region under investigation.  Based on the breadth and depth of 
the result parameters provided by HAZUS-MH there are numerous methods by which to 
determine what scenario earthquake produces the most damage in a given region.  Prior 
to the examination of regional economic losses it is relevant to consider the damage, loss 
of shelter and life that define regional earthquakes.   
 Damage to the general building stock for each epicenter is detailed in Table 231.  
It is evident from this data that the southwest epicenter shows the greatest number of 
collapsed buildings, be they light wood frames, unreinforced masonry or mobile homes.   
Extensive damage cases for URMs is greatest with a southwest event while mobile 
homes is greatest with the southwest source.   
Table 231: General Building Stock Damage - Level I 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Northeast 2,624,381 106,604 21,386 1,944 142
Central 2,624,630 114,728 14,203 904 57
Southwest 2,466,122 227,216 58,421 2,573 132
Northeast 414,627 68,748 27,790 9,684 4,579
Central 439,989 54,788 22,094 6,399 2,146
Southwest 445,227 31,324 26,780 16,340 5,734
Northeast 297,276 77,582 83,744 22,428 3,564
Central 296,882 88,580 81,186 16,234 1,699






 Damage to essential facilities is another category by which worst-case scenario 
may be determined.  The number of essential facilities reaching the at least moderate 
damage state for each epicenter is shown in Table 232.  While the northeast exhibits the 
most damage to hospitals and fire stations the southwest experiences the greatest damage 
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to school and police stations.  The central epicenter shows only moderate damage in 
comparison to the other two epicenters.   
Table 232: Essential Facilities Damage - Level I 
E.F. Type Northeast Central Southwest
Hospitals 39 28 33
Schools 287 220 461
Police Stations 92 103 108




Table 233: Transportation Damage - Level I 
Transportation Type Northeast Central Southwest
Highway Bridges 350 371 379
Railway Facilities 12 20 42
Port Facilities 22 17 38




Table 234: Utility Facility Damage - Level I 
Facility Type Northeast Central Southwest
Potable Water 8 7 1
Waste Water 47 22 31
Natural Gas 2 0 0
Oil 0 0 8
Electric Power 4 2 5




The most prominent transportation facilities are displayed in Table 233 with their 
corresponding number of components realizing at least moderate damage.  The southwest 
epicenter shows the greatest level of damage in every category.  Railway and port 
facilities damage for the southwest epicenter is twice as much as the central epicenter.    
 Utility systems damage does not present a clear worst-case, which is consistent 
with essential facilities and general building stock damage.  Table 234 presents the 
quantity of each utility facility type reaching at least moderate damage.  While the 
northeast epicenter generates the greatest damage to potable water, waste water and 
communication facilities, oil facilities are much more likely to incur damage when the 
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southwest scenario is applied.  Again, the central epicenter event causes no facility type 
to reach its highest damage count.   
 Several other comparison parameters include debris generation, shelter 
requirements and casualties.  The greatest amount of debris, seven million tons, is created 
with the southwest scenario event. The central and northeast events only produce three 
and five million tons, respectively.   Shelter requirements for each fault epicenter event 
are illustrated in Table 235.  The southwest creates the greatest housing losses and 
temporary shelter requirements by far as this event requires nearly twice as many shelter 
needs as the other two cases.   
Table 235: Housing Requirements - Level I 
Northeast Central Southwest
Displaced Households 9,924 5,191 18,837




Table 236: Casualties - Level I 
Time of Day Northeast Central Southwest
2:00 AM 2,288 3,963 8,659
2:00 PM 2,614 4,184 13,616




Yet another critical factor to consider is the extent of regional casualties, or 
injuries and fatalities.  Table 236 details the total number of casualties at all severity 
levels for the three epicenter events.  The southwest epicenter generates the most 
casualties by over 4,000 at any of the three times of day considered, though the 2 PM 
interval is undoubtedly the most costly.  The northeast and central epicenters are largely 
unaffected by time of day, while is the northeast epicenter produces the least casualties.   
While damage to various inventory components show conflicting results by which 
to determine the worst-case scenario, direct economic losses show a clear worst-case.  
Table 237 illustrates the direct economic losses for the major inventory categories as well 
as total regional loss.  While utility losses are greatest with the northeast event building 
and transportation losses incur far greater losses in the southwest than their counterparts.  
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As a result, the southwest epicenter is determined to be the worst-case scenario based on 
total direct economic loss at $15.6 billion.  This is 25% more than the northeast epicenter 
event and 78% greater than the central epicenter event.   
Table 237: Direct Economic Losses - Level I 
Direct Loss Cetegory Northeast Central Southwest
Buildings $8.51 $5.79 $12.94
Transportation $0.49 $0.46 $0.58
Utility $3.48 $2.49 $2.03




7.2.2 Improved Level I Comparison of Three Extensions 
 As was documented in previous sections, ground motion modified with site 
affects increase overall damage to the general building stock.  Table 238 is used to 
compare these updated damage counts.  Adjustment of the ground motion generates the 
greatest number of collapses with the southwest epicenter event for URMs and mobile 
homes.  The northeast extension still reports the most light wood frame collapses, 
however.  Extensive damage to mobile homes and URMs is also greatest with the 
southwest fault.  The remaining damage categories show conflicting circumstances 
generating the largest amount of damage.   
Table 238: General Building Stock Damage - Improved Level I 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Northeast 2,536,590 168,305 43,263 6,021 442
Central 2,493,495 204,074 51,449 5,242 372
Southwest 2,417,549 273,037 59,725 4,060 264
Northeast 422,589 55,655 27,112 10,700 9,446
Central 421,742 46,399 32,180 14,930 10,329
Southwest 405,427 46,332 40,100 19,998 13,754
Northeast 326,463 79,162 49,863 19,455 9,637
Central 326,135 73,127 50,729 24,420 10,129
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Table 239: Essential Facilities Damage - Improved Level I 
E.F. Type Northeast Central Southwest
Hospitals 22 30 42
Schools 460 633 884
Police Stations 177 221 276




 The improved analysis does not present a clear worst-case with regard to essential 
facilities damage.  At least moderate damage to each facility type is greatest for the 
southwest event.  Table 239 shows that the southwest extension generates the 
significantly more damage than the other two sources.  Nearly twice as many hospitals 
and schools are damaged from a southwest extension event than a northeast event.   
 Highway bridges are most affected by an earthquake at the southwest extension 
which damages nearly 1,200 bridges.  This is nearly 25% more than the next largest 
damage estimate.  Railway and port facilities, however; experience their greatest amounts 
of damage from an event at the northeast extension.  Airports also experience their worst-
case damage from a southwest source event.  Table 240 displays these values as well we 
those quantities of at least moderate damage for all three extensions.     
Table 240: Transportation Facilities Damage - Improved Level I 
Transportation Type Northeast Central Southwest
Highway Bridges 831 934 1179
Railway Facilities 46 29 36
Port Facilities 114 46 53




Table 241: Utility Facilities Damage - Improved Level I 
Facility Type Northeast Central Southwest
Potable Water 36 23 19
Waste Water 162 163 180
Natural Gas 12 7 6
Oil 1 1 12
Electric Power 16 15 17




- 255 - 
 Utility facilities also show varying damage levels across the three extensions.  
Waste water and oil facilities incur the most damage from the southwest thrust event, 
while natural gas facilities show their greatest damage when an earthquake strikes in the 
northeast.  Table 241 shows these trends as well as the various extensions that report 
extreme damage quantities for communication, electric and potable water facilities.  With 
extreme damage cases varying so much between epicenters it is difficult to define a 
worst-case from these damage results either.   
 The debris model indicates the largest generation case is the southwest fault with 
12 million tons of debris.  The northeast and central events produce significantly less as 
seven and nine million tons, respectively.  Further, damage estimates for shelter 
requirements resulting from this improved analysis are delineated in Table 242.  Both the 
northeast and central fault thrust events displace significantly fewer households than the 
southwest event does.  The same follows for temporary housing requirements, as the 
southwest fault extension experiences the greatest loss estimates as with previous 
estimates.  Finally, casualty estimates are highest with the southwest scenario results.  
Table 243 shows that over 21,000 casualties occur at the worst-case time of day in the 
southwest.  The northeast and central extensions generate roughly 4,000-8,000 fewer 
casualties.   
Table 242: Shelter Requirements - Improved Level I 
Northeast Central Southwest
Displaced Households 18,507 21,382 27,513




Table 243: Casualties - Improved Level I 
Time of Day Northeast Central Southwest
2:00 AM 11,083 12,524 15,763
2:00 PM 12,962 15,467 21,026
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Table 244: Total Direct Economic Losses - Improved Level I 
Direct Loss Cetegory Northeast Central Southwest
Buildings $13.98 $15.30 $19.66
Transportation $1.16 $1.05 $1.29
Utility $9.42 $7.57 $8.51




As with the Level I analysis the worst-case is determined based on total, direct 
economic loss.  Table 244 illustrates losses incurred by each major inventory system due 
to a scenario earthquake at each epicenter.  Utility losses are highest in the northeast 
scenario at $9.4 billion. Both building and transportation losses report their most extreme 
loss values with the southwest event.  Roughly $19.7 and $1.29 billion are estimated for 
these two major inventory categories, which contribute to the total loss of $29.5 billion at 
the southwest epicenter.  Again, the southwest event is worst-case as it shows 20% more 
loss than the northeast event and 23% more loss than the central event.    
 
7.2.3 Level II Comparison of Three Extensions 
 The addition of liquefaction susceptibilities greatly increases the number of 
damaged buildings resulting from an earthquake at each extension.  It is clear from the 
quantities shown in Table 245 that light wood frames suffer the most damage with an 
earthquake in the northeast.  The same is true of extensive damage, though moderate and 
slight are worst with a northeast event.  Complete damage to unreinforced masonry 
structures in most severe with a southwest event, which is the case for extensive and 
moderate damage as well.  Mobile homes also show extreme cases of damage at the 
southwest extension for the most severe damage states.  Unfortunately, no clear worst-
case can be determined from this data, unless the critical damage category is collapse.   
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Table 245: General Building Stock Damage - Level II 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Northeast 2,491,106 157,017 37,923 5,355 63,242
Central 2,459,409 188,644 46,548 5,071 54,957
Southwest 2,385,421 251,064 52,004 3,520 62,624
Northeast 416,209 53,784 25,231 9,450 20,823
Central 419,877 44,747 29,650 13,320 17,999
Southwest 404,381 44,657 36,918 17,943 21,673
Northeast 323,556 77,100 47,078 17,350 19,490
Central 324,749 71,532 47,513 21,776 19,014






 Essential facilities show extreme quantities of at least moderate damage occurring 
at the southwest extension.  As was discussed in the Level II Analysis section, at least 
moderate damage counts do not change between the improved Level I analysis and Level 
II analysis.  Table 246 quantifies at least moderate damage to all essential facility types at 
each of the three extensions.   
Table 246: Essential Facilities Damage - Level II 
E.F. Type Northeast Central Southwest
Hospitals 22 30 42
Schools 460 633 885
Police Stations 177 221 276
Fire Stations 218 253 305
Epicenters
 
Table 247: Transportation Damage - Level II 
Transportation Type Northeast Central Southwest
Highway Bridges 1511 1754 1987
Railway Facilities 55 46 85
Port Facilities 138 83 109
Airport Facilities 43 47 64
Epicenters
 
Table 248: Utility Facilities Damage - Level II 
Facility Type Northeast Central Southwest
Potable Water 36 23 19
Waste Water 162 163 180
Natural Gas 12 7 6
Oil 1 1 12
Electric Power 16 15 17
Communication 98 100 111
Epicenter
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 Port facilities are the only types of transportation structure that does not see its 
greatest damage count with an event at the southwest epicenter.  With 85 railway 
facilities, 1,987 highway bridges and 64 airport facilities seeing at least moderate damage, 
the southwest event does indeed realize the most damage in these categories.  As shown 
in Table 247 roughly 15% more bridges are damaged due to an event at the southwest 
extension than the remaining two sources locations.   
The addition of liquefaction susceptibilities does not clarify a worst-case situation 
with regard to utility systems damage.  Table 248 illustrates the distribution utility 
facilities damage by epicenter.  Natural gas and potable water are most susceptible to 
damage from seismic activity at the northeast extension as 12 and 36, respectively, 
realize at least moderate damage.  Electric power, waste water and communications 
facilities are damaged most severely by a southwest fault rupture earthquake while oil 
facilities damage remains dependent on southwest ground motions.   
 As with previous analysis levels debris generation is greatest with the southwest 
event.  Approximately 18 million tons of debris is created, while the northeast and central 
epicenters follow with 16 million and 15 million tons, respectively.  Shelter requirements 
are also greatest with the northeast extension event.  Over 118,000 households are 
displaced which is nearly 4,000 more than the southwest event and 19,000 more than the 
central.  Temporary housing needs follow suit as they are at least slightly more than the 
remaining extensions (See Table 249).  Midday casualty estimates from the southwest 
fault show the largest number of casualties, when all severity levels are considered.  
Table 250 illustrates the anticipated number of casualties at various times of day, the 
most critical case at the southwest event is approximately 1,000 casualties more than the 
next most critical scenario.   
Table 249: Shelter Requirements - Level II 
Northeast Central Southwest
Displaced Households 118,743 99,544 114,700
Temporary Housing 34,181 28,765 33,374
Epicenter
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Table 250: Casualties - Level II 
Time of Day Northeast Central Southwest
2:00 AM 35,487 31,076 36,350
2:00 PM 31,915 28,688 35,334




 Finally, Level II regional losses for each source fault are considered.  Table 251 
displays the losses incurred by each major inventory group at each epicenter.  Building 
losses in the southwest are $1.5 billion greater than any other, while utility losses of 
$11.55 billion occur at the northeast extension and transportation losses of $5.04 billion 
at the southwest fault segment.  The difference in building losses is enough make a 
southwest epicenter earthquake the worst-case scenario considered in this research.  At 
$50.5 billion in total regional loss the southwest event is nearly $6 billion greater than the 
next most critical case.   
Table 251: Total Direct Economic Losses - Level II 
Direct Loss Cetegory Northeast Central Southwest
Buildings $32.90 $28.68 $34.38
Transportation $4.44 $4.39 $5.04
Utility $11.55 $9.80 $11.03




7.3 Comparison of Levels I and II 
 The first analysis case investigated in this research is a baseline, Level I analysis 
with HAZUS-MH default hazard and inventory assumptions only.  The most improved 
level of analysis carried out in the research is a Level II analysis which makes use of 
improved site information and liquefaction susceptibility across nearly the entire region.  
Utility distribution systems are also updated with regional natural gas and oil distribution 
lines contained in the HSIP GOLD dataset.  With all these improvements to the seismic 
loss model complete it is critical to determine the affects of these improvements.   
 Of the three fault segments considered both the Level I and Level II analyses 
show that the southwest event produces the greatest direct economic loss.  Changes to 
regional shaking values have been documented in previous sections, though it is relevant 
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to note again that maximum shaking values at the southwest extension increase for PGV 
and long-period spectral values while PGA and short-period spectral values do not 
change as much when the model is improved.  Table 252 displays regional damage and 
loss values for the baseline and improved cases.  Building damage is quantified by the 
number of collapses experienced by the three primary building types.  Improving the 
regional earthquake loss model generates 440 times more cases of complete damage to 
light wood frames.  The revised number of collapses shown by this building type in the 
Level II analysis renders the baseline estimate virtually negligible as it grossly 
underestimates the damage incurred by light wood frames.  Unreinforced masonry 
buildings and mobile homes show much less of a difference.  While these buildings still 
show 16,000 and 19,100 more collapses, this pales in comparison to the 63,100 more 
seen by light wood frames.  This dramatic increase in damage can be attributed almost 
entirely to the addition of regional liquefaction susceptibility information.   
Table 252: Level I and Level II Comparison 
Level I Level II
Light Wood Fram Collapses 142 63,242
URML collapses 5,734 21,673
Mobile Home Collapses 3,564 22,667
At Least Moderate Damage:
Essential Facilities 66 1,508
Highway Bridges 379 1,987
Utility Facilities 86 345
Debris (millions of tons) 7 18
Displaced househlds 18,837 118,743
Temporary housing 5,848 34,181
Casualties 13,616 36,350
Building Loss $12.94 $34.38
Transportation Loss $0.58 $5.04
Utility Loss $2.03 $11.03
Total Direct Economic Loss $15.6 $50.5  
  
Damage to key regional facilities, including essential, transportation and utility 
facilities, increase though by a much lesser margin than the general building stock.  Over 
1,450 more essential facilities incur at least moderate damage over the course of all 
model improvements.  This increase equates to roughly 22 times more essential facilities 
experiencing damage.  Highway bridge damage is multiplied by nearly five times with 
the addition of site affects and liquefaction susceptibility.  Though not shown here, 
damage to highway segments, rail segments and airport runways is determined in the 
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most improved analysis.  These results can be referenced in the Level II Analysis section.  
Furthermore, at least moderate damage cases for all utility facilities nearly double as the 
model is improved, as well.  
 Modified ground shaking in conjunction with liquefaction-induced settlement and 
spreading greatly increase damage and the amount of debris generated by regional 
damage.  The default analysis creates seven million tons of debris while the Level II 
generates more than twice that, or 18 million tons of debris.  More damage translates to 
fewer inhabitable homes, which is reflected in the substantial increase in housing 
requirements in the Level II analysis.  Both displaced household and temporary housing 
estimates increase by roughly six times from the baseline, default case.   
 Finally, regional losses show dramatic increases with seismic model 
improvements.  Both transportation and utility losses increase dramatically as each 
estimate shows additional losses of $4.5 billion and $9 billion, respectively.  These major 
changes are attributed to the inclusion of road and railway losses in the transportation 
estimate and the addition of improved pipeline losses to the utility systems loss estimate.  
All of these adjustments are the result of liquefaction susceptibility values which permit 
the determination of permanent ground deformations that are required to ascertain the 
damage of paved surface and underground pipelines.  Building damage more than 
doubles between Level I and Level II analyses.  This is attributed to intensified ground 
shaking and permanent ground deformations added to various improved models.  Total 
direct economic loss shows an increase of nearly $34.5 billion.  The Level I worst-case 
scenario shows total losses of $15.6 billion, which increases to nearly $50.5 billion once 
all seismic risks are considered.  This translates to a 225% loss increase from the Level I, 
baseline model.   
 The Level II model is considered to be the most regionally accurate model, with 
updated soil information and regional inventory.  All analyses undertaken herein show 
that each regionally-specific data addition increases the overall loss estimate. This may 
be contradicted by the addition of HSIP regional utility distribution lines, which actually 
generate less damage than the baseline HAZUS-MH assumptions for utility networks.  
For every earthquake scenario, not just the worst-case southwest epicenter, fewer breaks 
and leaks are anticipated with the HSIP data.  Without damage estimations for local 
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distribution networks only major utility lines are assessed damage.  This is the case with 
HSIP utilities, as no pipeline data is available for local lines.  If a more conservative 
estimate of pipeline damage and resulting utility loss is desired then it may be a better 
choice to use the HAZUS-MH pipeline assumptions even if the damage and loss 
estimates are higher than actual distribution networks might predict.   
Fragilities for the general building stock is updated with MAE Center developed 
fragilities for all 36 specific building types, four seismic code levels and various damage 
states, though only four damage states are considered in this research.  For most building 
types, steel, precast concrete, reinforced concrete reinforced masonry and unreinforced 
masonry, the frequency of build damage decreases for all damage states.  Low damage 
levels such as at least slight and at least moderate show the smallest decreases, while 
extensive and complete damage reductions are much greater.  All code levels show and 
damage states for these building types show overestimations of damage in HAZUS-MH.   
Light wood frame construction and some categories of mobile homes report 
increased damage.  Light wood frames, or W1 structures, show loss increases for all 
damage states and code levels between 50% and 75% than HAZUS-MH estimates for the 
same hazard scenario.  Mobile homes only experience damage increases with low- and 
moderate-code buildings, while pre-code structures show reduced damage with updated 
fragilities.  Mobile home damage increases are most prominent at the more severe 
damage levels as extensive and complete damage occurrences increase by over 30%.   
 
7.4 Comparison with FEMA Baseline Study 
 As was mentioned earlier a series of baseline studies was completed by FEMA for 
a series of earthquakes, one on each epicenter of the New Madrid Fault.  Each scenario 
employed shake maps for PGA, PGV, short-period and long-period spectral accelerations.  
The maps were developed according to the line-source fault rupture methodology 
discussed in the Project Overview section.  Shake maps for PGA and Sa 0.3 Sec. were 
employed in the improved Level I and Level II analyses conducted in this study.  While 
the northeast extension is not the worst-case scenario determined by FEMA or by this 
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research this event still serves as an appropriate comparison scenario when referenced 
against Level II northeast analysis completed in this research.   
 Various result parameters are extracted from FEMA northeast as well as this 
study region’s northeast epicenter for comparison.  Table 253 quantifies several key 
damage and loss variables from the FEMA study and this study.  The collapse rates of the 
three general building types detailed in this comparison show that FEMA-predicted 
collapse values are roughly twice as much as though shown in results of this study.  The 
transportation system presents a lesser difference margin as the FEMA study shows only 
155 more highway bridges are damaged than the Level II results.  These estimates 
indicated that the Level II results are roughly 47% less that the building damage 
predictions shown in the FEMA study and 9% less than the highway bridge damage 
estimates. 
Table 253: FEMA - Current Study Damage and Loss Comparison 
FEMA Northeast Level II Northeast
Light Wood Frame Collapses 120,002 63,242
URM Collapses 32,056 20,823
Mobile Home Collapses 31,123 19,490
Highway Bridges - At Least Moderate 1,656 1,511
Potable Water Breaks 65,795 43,320
Waste Water Breaks 52,038 34,262
Debris (thousands of tons) 26 16
Displaced Households 205,637 118,743
Temporary Housing 57,437 34,181
Casualties - Worst Case 61,657 35,487
Building Losses $49.21 $32.90
Transportation Losses $6.30 $4.44
Utility Losses $12.50 $11.55




Pipeline damage to potable water and waste water distribution systems is nearly 
twice as much in the FEMA study.  Potable water and waste water lines are expected to 
incur 65,800 and 52,000 breaks, receptively, based on FEMA results, though this study 
estimates only 43,300 and 34,200 for these same values.   
 Various other loss values include debris generation, shelter requirements and 
injuries.  Approximately 10 million tons more debris is generated by the FEMA study, 
which is a 63% increase over the debris value shown in this research.  Regional shelter 
requirements shown in the FEMA study are roughly 75% greater than the values 
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determined in the Level II analysis.  Lastly, casualties incurred by the FEMA region are 
show increases similar those experienced by regional shelter requirements.  Overall, the 
FEMA baseline study anticipates nearly twice as much damage as the Level II results for 
the northeast extension.   
 Regional losses show roughly the same trends as infrastructure damage.  Building 
losses are nearly $33 billion, while FEMA baseline losses for buildings exceed $49 
billion.  Transportation and utility losses presented in the Level II analysis are 15%-33% 
less than those reported in the FEMA study of the northeast extension.  It is critical to 
note here that both studies incorporate HAZUS-MH default pipeline assumptions for the 
northeast epicenter.  Early discussions cite greater damage estimates with HAZUS-MH 
assumptions as oppose to regional network data.  Based on this damage comparison the 
larger damage case is also assumed to incur greater losses and thus is used for 
comparisons with the FEMA study.  When all loss components are totaled the FEMA 
study reports over $68 billion in regional loss, while the results of this study are only 
$48.9 billion.  The FEMA baseline study of the northeast extension provides regional 
losses approximately 40% greater than the regionally results presented in this study of the 
northeast extension.  
  Further comparisons of regional loss values for each of the three fault extensions 
are detailed in Table 254.  In every case the losses determined by FEMA are 40% - 65% 
greater than the results of this study.  Both the studies indicate that the worst-case 
scenario is an earthquake on the southwest extension of the New Madrid Fault, as FEMA 
and this research show extreme loss values at this location of $77.1 and $50.5 billion, 
respectively.  The only significant difference between these two scenarios is the version 
of liquefaction susceptibility map employed. 
Table 254: Comparison of Regional Economic Losses for Three Fault Extensions 
Building Transportation Utility Total
FEMA Northeast $49.20 $6.30 $12.50 $68.0
Level II Northeast $32.90 $4.44 $11.55 $48.9
FEMA Central $52.60 $6.70 $11.00 $70.3
Level II Central $28.68 $4.39 $9.80 $42.9
FEMA Southwest $57.80 $7.30 $12.00 $77.1
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Based on the results of the study conducted here it is necessary to investigate the 
impact of the liquefaction susceptibility map specifically.  Since results for the updated 
liquefaction map already exist the only analyses required are those of the FEMA baseline 
region with the old liquefaction map in HAZUS-MH.  By isolating the liquefaction map 
the regional sensitivity to that single factor is investigated in additional simulations using 
the aforementioned FEMA-developed hazard maps for the southwest fault extension. 
 Results from the subsequent analysis indicate that the liquefaction susceptibility 
map is indeed a major contributor to the difference in regional losses.  Table 255 
highlights the new results from the analyses with the original liquefaction map.  The 
original FEMA study of the southwest epicenter appears on the first line and is followed 
by the results of the rerun of the FEMA SW scenario with the original liquefaction map.  
Since these results employ the same hazard (ground motion and liquefaction 
susceptibility) it verifies the original FEMA results.  The ‘Level II’ values indicate the 
losses for the study region considered in this research.  The difference in the additional 
Level II with the old (or original) liquefaction proxy indicates that this is indeed the 
reason that regional damage and loss values in this research are less than the values 
determined in the FEMA baseline study.  Though the original FEMA analysis reports 
$2.5 billion more loss this is less than 5% total regional loss and can be considered 
negligible.    
Table 255: Effect of Liquefaction Map and Proxy 
Building Transportation Utility Total
FEMA Southwest $57.80 $7.30 $12.00 $77.1
Level II Southwest w/ Old Liquefaction $55.62 $7.23 $11.69 $74.5
Level II Southwest w/ New Liquefaction $34.38 $5.04 $11.03 $50.5
Losses ($ billions)
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8 Summary and Conclusions 
 
8.1 Summary of Results 
The different impact assessment cases considered in this report in conjunction 
with comparisons with the FEMA baseline and the CUSEC state-based assessments 
provide a wealth of information on the probable impact of a NMSZ earthquake.  Whereas 
conclusions are drawn as results are presented in earlier sections, important conclusions 
are reiterated hereafter. 
Based on the analyses conducted herein it is concluded that the incorporation of 
site affects and soil amplification intensifies ground motion.  Peak ground acceleration 
increases for all three fault extension though this is most pronounced with the central 
fault extension as the maximum PGA value nearly doubles, from 0.67g to 1.25g.  Peak 
ground velocities show trends similar to those exhibited by PGA values.  The maximum 
PGV value resulting from a central extension event increases by roughly 60% when site 
affects are considered.  All fault extensions show PGV increases of at least 25%, however.  
Short-period spectral acceleration values experience negligible changes when regional 
site affects are applied to the ground motion for both the northeast and central fault 
extensions.  The southwest extension, however; shows a reduction in short-period 
spectral acceleration, from 2.6g in the default case to 1.5g in the improved case.  Long-
period spectral accelerations increase by sizeable margins as well, though the central 
extension scenario experiences the greatest increase in maximum value, from 0.8g to 1.5g. 
 The addition of liquefaction susceptibility further increases regional loss 
estimations over those experienced by the addition of site classes.  Total direct economic 
losses double in some cases when liquefaction is considered.  The inclusion of these 
factors permits the determination of the worst-case scenario for an earthquake on the 
New Madrid Fault.  This worst-cased scenario occurs along the southwest extension of 
the fault and is estimated to generate $50.5 billion in regional losses.   
 Comparisons with the FEMA baseline study for the northeast extension illustrate 
the impact of ground shaking on loss and the related methods by which hazard is defined.  
The finite fault rupture model employed by FEMA and the USGS to determine ground 
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motion shows substantially more intense shaking than the attenuations provided for the 
Central and Eastern U.S. is HAZUS-MH.  
 An investigation of the liquefaction susceptibility proxy indicates that using the 
original liquefaction map generates significantly higher regional losses.  As was 
discussed earlier, the original liquefaction susceptibility proxy and map was reported to 
produce $77 billion in economic loss for the southwest extension.  A check of this 
scenario reported $74.5 billion, which is roughly 3% less than the loss value determined 
by FEMA.  This small difference may be considered negligible.  Updating the 
liquefaction proxy and map produces much lower economic losses or only $50.5 billion 
for the southwest fault event.  Incorporating a revised version of the liquefaction proxy 
and map reduces loss values by one-third.   
 The variation in regional losses exhibited by HAZUS-MH analyses completed 
with original and updated liquefaction maps highlights the uncertainty present in the 
determination of regional liquefaction susceptibility.  Updating local liquefaction 
susceptibility values in specific areas reduced liquefaction potentials, permanent ground 
deformations for lateral spreading and settlement.  Applying the revised version of the 
liquefaction susceptibility proxy and map results in less economic loss than that estimated 
in the FEMA study.  Both maps do not account for permanent ground deformation due to 
lateral spreading, however, which is a significant deficiency in both maps.  When these 
two impact assessments are evaluated and compared to one another though, they provide 
a range of loss values that can be used to bracket regional impacts and quantify 
uncertainty, whereas one individual assessment cannot.   
 The only inventory improvement used in this study is the ingestion of the pipeline 
data from the HSIP Gold dataset. Damage predicted using the HSIP data is lower than 
estimates based on the HAZUS default pipeline data. This is attributed to the observation 
that the HSIP data set does not include the delivery (local) distribution system, but rather 
the major pipelines only. HAZUS, on the other hand, assumes that the pipeline network 
coincides with the road network. HAZUS appears to be more conservative, though its 
relationship with the real pipeline network is unknown. Improving the HSIP data set is 
therefore the clear option to follow. 
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 Replacing HAZUS fragilities by MAE Center-calibrated parameterized fragilities 
(Jeong and Elnashai, 2006) resulted in reduced damage for most structures but for light 
wood frames and some mobile homes, which show increased damage. Since light wood 
frames are numerous in the study region, the overall impact of using MAE Center 
fragilities is some increase in the estimated losses. 
 At this preliminary stage of the project, the most reliable economic impact 
estimates are summarized in Table 256.  The economic losses and social impacts are 
likely to increase when the hazard, fragility and inventory are developed further, and 
additional aspects, such as traffic flow modeling, are accounted for. 
Table 256: Regional Impact Assessment Summary Values 
Northeast Central Southwest
Fatalities 1,799 1,570 1,939
Buildings Losses $32.9 $28.7 $34.4
Transportation Losses $4.4 $4.4 $5.1
Utility Losses $11.6 $9.8 $11.0
Total Direct Economic Losses $48.9 $42.9 $50.5  
 
Seismic risk assessment in the New Madrid Seismic Zone is still in its early days.  
Both the study completed herein and the FEMA baseline assessments should be 
considered preliminary work and points of reference for future studies.  There is still 
much information to be gathered and incorporated into loss assessments. 
 
8.2 Future Work 
 The analysis undertaken here included various updates to soil information as well 
as utility distribution network additions and building fragilities.  Even though liquefaction 
susceptibilities were used and investigated these values remain suspect and the use of 
more reliable liquefaction information is warranted.  Further updates to the bridge data 
with the assets present in the National Bridge Inventory are also needed.  Various other 
inventory items would benefit from updated databases, including; essential facilities and 
their building types, hazardous materials, high-potential loss facilities, communications 
networks, power plants as well as many other transportation and utility networks 
component inventories.  Additional inventory categories for regionally significant 
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structures would provide more accuracy in loss modeling for the CEUS, such as major 
bridges and high-rise structures.  
 Future impact assessments will also benefit from the identification of specific 
inventory categories that are especially vulnerable to shaking.  As was highlighted earlier, 
URMs are particularly susceptible to damage and collapse even when subjected to low 
levels of shaking.  Significant damage sustained by these structures is the likely cause of 
a large portion of regional injuries and fatalities.  As a result, future assessments will 
need to quantify the casualties resulting from URM damage and follow with mitigation 
strategies to reduce the social impacts of this type of damage.   
 The classification of regional seismic code levels also plays a crucial role in the 
determination of damage.  As is shown in Figure 43, the moderate-code level is assigned 
to a portion of the study region.  It is unlikely that construction in that area complies with 
moderate-code specifications and thus should be classified as low-code.  Future impact 
assessments will classify the entire eight-state region as low-code to better reflect the 
actual construction practices of the central U.S.  Updating this code-level classification 
will produce greater damage levels nearest the presumed New Madrid Fault which 
generates the most intense regional shaking values.  In addition, direct economic losses in 
the area changed from moderate- to low-code will increase. 
Yet another area of concern is the relationship between critical infrastructure 
components and areas of severe casualties.  The performance and functionality of the 
transportation network and trauma centers will greatly affect the ability to aid severely 
injured residents of heavily damaged areas.  Identifying potential locations of significant 
damage to transportation and utility networks and severe casualties will support planning 
efforts to mitigate these regional vulnerabilities and streamline response efforts.   
Currently, HAZUS operates with a fire following earthquake model that is 
relatively simple and only considers peak ground acceleration and census tract building 
density.  Since much of the eight-state region considered in the catastrophic planning 
effort for the NMSZ is rural a new model considering pipeline damage as well as regional 
shaking, construction type, number of fire breaks and extent of fire breaks may be useful.   
Only hazard scenarios located along the presumed New Madrid Fault system are 
considered in this report.  Future work, however, will include analyses of hazard 
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scenarios along the Wabash Valley Fault with a magnitude of 7.1.  This event generates 
its most intense shaking along the Illinois/Kentucky border.  A second additional scenario 
is near St. Louis, Missouri, with a magnitude of 6.0.  This event will likely generate the 
greatest damage and loss to the urban area of St. Louis, Missouri, and provide a worst-
case for that city.   
 It has also been shown that the method by which earthquake hazard is 
characterized greatly affects impact assessment.  Loss models would benefit from a 
sensitivity study that focuses on hazard characterization methods (point-source versus 
line-source for example).  While the Mew Madrid Seismic Zone has no clearly defined 
faults but rather a broad area within which earthquakes are expected to occur 
investigations of fracture initiation and propagation will lead to the determination of 
better defined limits between which losses may credibly vary. 
 Further impact assessments shall be undertaken at the county level within the 
entire eight-state region.  Individual worst-case scenarios will be identified for each state 
and earthquake impact assessments completed.  Reporting of result data is required at the 
county-level to incorporate emergency planners at various levels within each state.   
 While the study detailed herein addresses several components of loss assessment 
numerous hazard, inventory and fragility parameters were not addressed at this early 
stage of the project.  The following list delineates hazard, inventory and fragility 
components (some of which were investigated in this research) as well as regional 
demographics and loss modeling parameters that should be addressed in future 
earthquake impact assessments:      
 
• Hazard 
o Refined site class maps  
o Refined liquefaction susceptibility maps 
o Refined landsliding maps detailing slope angles 
o Refined ground water depth maps 
o Various ground motion definition methods for determination of worst-case 
(most intense) ground motion 
 Point-source 
 Line-source 
 Area source 
• Inventory 
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o Updated general buildings stock per census tract by specific building and 
occupancy type by adding information regarding building counts, square 
footage, number of stories, seismic design level and year built  
o Develop point-wise general building data if time permits 
o Essential Facilities (Point-wise location data)  
 Each facilities is defined by seismic design level, year built, 
backup power capabilities as well as the number of available beds 
for medical care facilities and the number of fire trucks at each fire 
station 
o Transportation Systems  
 All highway and railway bridges require the definition of bridge 
length, scour index, skew angle and maximum single span length 
 Highway Segment, Railway Segment and Airport Runway 
Segment length and width 
 Facilities comprising the transportation systems require point-wise 
location data as well as the year each facility was built, seismic 
design level, building type (structure type), backup power 
capabilities and details regarding the anchoring of fuel tanks and 
equipment 
o Utility Systems  
 Pipeline networks necessitate pipeline lengths, qualification as 
ductile of brittle pipe and pipe diameter for proper damage 
determinations in HAZUS  
 All facilities, pumping stations, control vaults and stations, plants, 
etc. require information about building (structure) type, seismic 
design level, year built, backup power capabilities and the 
anchoring of tanks and equipment 
o Hazardous Materials Facilities and high-Potential Loss Facilities 
 Chemicals and amounts per site 
 Anchoring of tanks and equipment 
o Military Installations 
 Number and types of buildings on site, etc. 
• Fragilities 
o For all specific building types 
o For transportation components (Bridges, Facilities and Networks) 
o For utility components (Facilities and Networks) 
• Demographics and Social Loss Models 
o Updated regional demographics for age, gender, income, ethnicity, etc. 
o Regional models for displaced persons and temporary housing 
• Other Loss and Restoration Models 
o Regional restoration functions for functionality estimates of regional 
facilities and networks 
o Regionally adapted direct and indirect economic loss models 
 
The above list provides a guide to the data and models that should be collected and 
ingested into HAZUS for more accurate and reliable loss assessment results.  Additional 
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assessments for individual states should be considered as well.  While the regional losses 
detailed herein addressed the northern and southern fault extremes, individual state 
analyses would benefit from a scenario occurring closest to the state of interest.  This 
type of earthquake impact assessment will provide state emergency management agencies 
and aid organizations with the worst-case damage, loss and functionality estimates for 
their individual state.   
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Appendix A: Uncertainties in Loss Assessment Results 
Over the course of this investigation numerous deficiencies in HAZUS-MH are 
identified which call into question the reliability of results and calculations completed by 
the program.  One major concern is the cut-off distance applied to point-source 
earthquakes in HAZUS-MH.  All attenuations are cut-off at a distance of 200km from the 
epicenter, after which a value of zero is assigned to all ground motion values in these 
census tracts.  This assignment of zero PGA produces random damage to essential 
facilities.  By assigning random damage probabilities some essential facilities that 
experience minor ground shaking (< 0.05g) may be assessed probabilities greater than 
80% for the at least moderate damage state, for example.  If this method of ground 
motion definition is applied over a large area, more than 100 or 150 counties for instance, 
the high damage likelihoods will impact regional building losses significantly.   
The hazard definition methodology plays a critical role in the determination of 
regional damage, loss and systems functionalities.  It has been shown that the difference 
between a point-source hazard generation method and a line-source, or fault-rupture, 
hazard generation method yield very different regional direct and induced damage as well 
as social and economic losses.  The point-source method used in this research is based on 
the combined weighting of four attenuation functions determined appropriate for the 
central and eastern U.S.  These attenuations estimate the propagation of ground shaking 
from a single point rupture, generating concentric circles of equal shaking, when site 
affects are not included.  The fault-rupture methodology employed in the referenced 
FEMA baseline study, as well as in the improved Level I and Level II analyses models 
the breaking of a fault segment.  Rather than a single rupture, the line-source estimates 
the shaking produces by a continuous rupture along a specific length of the fault.  Since 
so little is know about the behavior and rupture mechanism of the New Madrid Fault 
various methods maybe used to define the source excitation in this area.  The uncertainty 
present in the regional hazard definition propagates to all facets of earthquake impact 
assessments all damage, loss and functionality values are related to regional ground 
motion in some manner.   
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Additional program deficiencies exist in the fire following earthquake model 
which is based on fire damage and spread for urban Japan.  This model employs urban 
building density, street widths and fire propagation (Scawthorn, Eidinger & Schiff, 2005).  
Variables for the quantity and width of fire breaks, or streets in the Hamada model, are 
grossly different for an urban setting than a rural setting.  Since most of the CEUS region 
investigated here is rural, fire breaks and building density factors are not necessarily 
applicable.  The fire model in HAZUS-MH is closed source, indicating that these 
parameters relating to the ignition and spread of fire.  There is no opportunity to improve 
the model to represent the characteristics of the central and eastern U.S.  In addition, the 
fire model can not be refined for larger urban areas and very rural locations within the 
region of interest.   
Building damage values experience inconsistencies when rounded off at the 
census tract level.  Examining the general building stock damage by building count and 
square footage for any level if analysis undertaken herein it reveals that the total number 
of buildings or total square footage is slightly different between damage assessments for 
each fault extension.  The Level I analysis, for example, shows 2,754,457 light wood 
frame structures with the northeast event, 2,754,522 for the central event and 2,754,464 
for the southwest event.  These differences are less than 0.005% of the light wood frame 
inventory, though are still noticeable.  This trend applies to the major building types 
discusses in this study at all levels of analysis.   
Additional problems are encountered when externally provided inventory is added.  
Numerous program crashes and bugs prohibit the proper importing of data as well as the 
inaccurate reading of data projections from ArcGIS.  It is common for HAZUS-MH to 
require several attempts at importing the same data prior to its proper recognition and 
assignment within the program.  Furthermore, when attempting to remove inventory 
items is unsuccessful in numerous cases.  Even when calculations show that the removed 
inventory is no longer present HAZUS-MH still displays this deleted inventory in its 
inventory windows.   
Region sizes are also inhibited by the limited computing capability of HAZUS-
MH.  Only regions less than two gigabytes in size are permitted by the default HAZUS-
MH server.  It is stipulated that SQL Server may be added to permit the use of larger 
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regions, though computation time is still extremely long and inhibits the number of 
analyses that can be completed in a given time frame.   
HAZUS-MH does not have a feature to determine assessment uncertainty, but 
rather suggests conducting several analyses with varied input parameters.  This larger 
sensitivity study not only requires considerable time, it also prevents the determination of 
uncertainty to be quantified in one file.  Sensitivity to a single variable or a group of 
variables must be analyzed outside of HAZUS-MH, which also requires substantial 
amounts of time.  Also, some form of uncertainty characterization would provide a range 
of loss values that are expected instead of one single regional loss number that provides 
the illusion of a single, definitive loss value for a seismic event.   
Essential facilities damage and losses are based on several key variables that 
define structural type.  The former is defined in HAZUS-MH via two categories; 
structure type and seismic design class.  The structure type classifications for essential 
facilities are based on regional assumptions rather than actual field surveys.  These 
assumptions stipulates that nearly all CEUS hospitals are precast concrete tilt-up 
structures with shear walls, PC1, with a small percentage specified as low-rise steel 
frames, S1L.  All police and fire stations, as well as schools are assumed to be low-rise 
unreinforced masonry structures.  In addition all essential facilities are classified as pre-
code or moderate-code in a corresponding manner to the general building stock (See 
Figure 43).  This is not the case for actual regional essential facilities and could be 
improved.   
Yet another area of concern in the analyses completed in this study is the level of 
damage seen in ferry facilities of the transportation system.  Every earthquake scenario, 
regardless of epicenter location, generated complete damage of all ferry facilities.  One 
ferry facility lies north of St. Louis, Missouri, which would not be expected to incur 
complete damage from an event on the southwest extension.  HAZUS-MH, however; 
predicts complete damage of this northern facility for a seismic event in northeastern 
Arkansas.  Every scenario was assessed the loss value associated with complete damage 
of all four facilities which is not likely to be the case in an actual event, and raises 
questions about the HAZUS-MH damage and loss model for these facilities, and others, 
with regards to their accuracy and performance.     
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With the great amount of uncertainty present in HAZUS-MH the program would 
benefit from options to reduce uncertainty and investigate mitigation options.  Adding 
retrofitting options to regional infrastructure components such as buildings and bridges 
permits desktop studies to investigate the impact of numerous seismic retrofits without 
the added expense of trial and error retrofitting in the field.  This means that numerous 
retrofit options for a single bridge or building type may be considered in an analytical 
loss assessment study and the best option determined based on these results as oppose to 
applying an assumed best-retrofit option and waiting for an actual event to check these 
suggestions.   
Previous comparisons of externally calculated ground motion and HAZUS-MH 
calculated ground motion within the 200km source-to-site distance show and 
overestimation of ground motion, particularly near the epicenter.  Previous the ground 
motion determined within HAZUS and externally were compared (See Accuracy of 
Hazard Maps section).  The northeast epicenter external calculations assign a maximum 
regional PGA of 0.9g in the default case, which occurs at the census tract nearest the 
specified epicenter.  HAZUS-MH internally calculated ground motion assigns a much 
higher regional maximum PGA of 1.48g.  The difference between these two calculations 
is roughly 0.6g.  A reduction in maximum shaking value of this magnitude will impact 
the damage to tracts nearest the epicenter significantly.  Greater damage generates higher 
losses to buildings, transportation and utility systems, as well as altering social impacts 
and induced damage.  While the margin or error decreases as the source-to-site distance 
increases, internally calculated ground motions are still higher.  This concern, as well as 
the aforementioned concerns, call into questions the practicality and reliability of 
HAZUS-MH.  In light of this reliability discussion and the results presented as study, 
conclusions, values and estimates should be taken as a median values, from which actual 
losses will differ.   
The number of census tracts is a critical factor in the region determination as well.  
FEMA encountered problems with map attachments and analyses in HAZUS-MH that 
are attributed to the region size exceeding the suggested limit.  Attempts were made to 
introduce SQL Server 2005 in place of the suggested SQL Server 2000 which permits the 
use of regions larger than 2GBs.  After much collaboration with PBS&J, the developers 
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of HAZUS-MH, it was determined that SQL Server 2005 is not compatible with 
HAZUS-MH MR2 due to updates made in the 2005 edition of SQL Server.  Without the 
use of an external database management system it is necessary to work within the 
limitations of HAZUS-MH’s default server.  The region used in this research comprises 
approximately 1,900 census tracts, which is less than the recommended region size limit 
and permits analysis with the HAZUS-MH default server.   
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Appendix B: HAZUS-MH Databases for New Madrid 
Seismic Zone Loss Assessment 
Files contained on CD: 
 
RecheckFEMAsouthwest.hpr: This is a rerun of the original FEMA baseline study for 
the southwest extension of the New Madrid Fault.  Hazard maps include the shaking 
maps developed by FEMA/USGS for the southwest extension, which are found on this 
CD in the ‘Hazard Maps’ folder then the ‘Improved Level I Ground Motions’ folder with 
file name “Swshakemaps.mdb.”  In addition the “LiquefactionOriginal.mdb” liquefaction 
susceptibility map was employed.  This map is also found in the ‘Hazard Maps’ folder on 
the CD.  
 
CONTENTS OF ‘Hazard Maps’ FOLDER: 
 
LiquefactionOriginal.mdb: This is the original liquefaction susceptibility map 
developed based on a liquefaction proxy that is discussed in the body of report.  It was 
used for the FEMA Baseline study and a recheck scenario that is also included on this CD. 
 
LiquefactionUpdated.mdb: An updated version of the original liquefaction 
susceptibility map and proxy.  This map is used for all Level II analyses in this report. 
 
CONTENTS OF ‘Level I Ground Motions’ FOLDER: 
 
NortheastDefault.mdb: All hazard maps used to determine losses for an earthquake 
along the northeast extension of the New Madrid Fault.  Soil amplification of ground 
motion is not included. Developed using CEUS attenuations prescribed in HAZUS-MH. 
 
CentralDefault.mdb: All hazard maps used to determine losses for an earthquake along 
the central extension of the New Madrid Fault.  Soil amplification of ground motion is 
not included.  Developed using CEUS attenuations prescribed in HAZUS-MH. 
 
SouthwestDefault.mdb: All hazard maps used to determine losses for an earthquake 
along the southwest extension of the New Madrid Fault.  Soil amplification of ground 
motion is not included.  Developed using CEUS attenuations prescribed in HAZUS-MH. 
 
CONTENTS OF ‘Improved Level I Ground Motions’ FOLDER: 
 
NEshakemaps.mdb: All hazard maps used to determine losses for an earthquake along 
the northeast extension of the New Madrid Fault.  Soil amplification of ground motion is 
included with the addition of site affects.  Maps developed by FEMA/USGS with finite-
fault model for northeast extension of New Madrid Fault system.  
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NM-RT-HAZUS.mdb: All hazard maps used to determine losses for an earthquake 
along the central extension of the New Madrid Fault.  Soil amplification of ground 
motion is included with the addition of site affects.  Maps developed by FEMA/USGS 
with finite-fault model for central extension of New Madrid Fault system. 
 
SWshakemap.mdb: All hazard maps used to determine losses for an earthquake along 
the southwest extension of the New Madrid Fault.  Soil amplification of ground motion is 
included with the addition of site affects.  Maps developed by FEMA/USGS with finite-
fault model for southwest extension of New Madrid Fault system. 
 
CONTENTS OF ‘HSIP Pipelines’ FOLDER: 
 
FEMApipelines.mdb: Regional natural gas and oil pipelines extracted from the HSIP 
GOLD dataset from 2005. 
 
PipelinesNortheast.hpr:  HAZUS analysis of HSIP pipeline damage with Improved 
Level I ground motion for the northeast extension and updated liquefaction map. 
 
PipelinesCentral.hpr:  HAZUS analysis of HSIP pipeline damage with Improved Level 
I ground motion for the central extension and updated liquefaction map. 
 
PipelinesSouthwest.hpr:  HAZUS analysis of HSIP pipeline damage with Improved 
Level I ground motion for the southwest extension and updated liquefaction map. 
 
CONTENTS OF ‘Building Fragilities’ FOLDER: 
 
Southwest GBS Inventory.xls: Collection regional building counts and square footages 
delineated by specific building type taken from the Level II analysis of the southwest 
fault extension.   
 
Fragility Conversion Factors.xls: Spreadsheet detailing the development of general 
building stock damage conversion factors for all specific building types, codes levels and 
damage states.  Fragility functions developed by the MAE Center.  
 
GBS Fragility Conversion Southwest.xls: Modification of damage to regional general 
building stock by building count using MAE Center-developed building fragilities.  
Damage estimates are performed for the southwest extension Level II hazard scenario.   
 
CONTENTS OF ‘Level I’ FOLDER: 
 
NortheastLevel1.hpr: Level I analysis of northeast epicenter event.  This region 
employs northeast default ground motions also found on this CD. 
 
CentralLevel1.hpr: Level I analysis of central epicenter event.  This region employs 
central default ground motions also found on this CD. 
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SouthwestLevel1.hpr: Level I analysis of southwest epicenter event.  This region 
employs southwest default ground motions also found on this CD. 
 
CONTENTS OF ‘Improved Level I’ FOLDER: 
 
NortheastImprovedLevel1: Improved Level I analysis of northeast fault extension with 
FEMA/USGS ground motions for the northeast extension.  These ground motions are 
included on this CD. 
 
CentralImprovedLevel1: Improved Level I analysis of central fault extension with 
FEMA/USGS ground motions for the central extension.  These ground motions are 
included on this CD. 
 
SouthwestImprovedLevel1: Improved Level I analysis of Southwest fault extension 
with FEMA/USGS ground motions for the Southwest extension.  These ground motions 
are included on this CD. 
 
CONTENTS OF ‘Level II’ FOLDER: 
 
NortheastLevel2.hpr: Level II analysis of northeast fault extension with FEMA/USGS 
ground motions for northeast extension.  Also, updated liquefaction susceptibility map is 
used.  All these hazard maps are included on this CD. 
 
CentralLevel2.hpr: Level II analysis of central fault extension with FEMA/USGS 
ground motions for central extension.  Also, updated liquefaction susceptibility map is 
used.  All these hazard maps are included on this CD. 
 
NortheastLevel2.hpr: Level II analysis of southwest fault extension with FEMA/USGS 
ground motions for southwest extension.  Also, updated liquefaction susceptibility map is 
used.  All these hazard maps are included on this CD. 
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Appendix C: Counties Experiencing Damage  
 All counties in the study region experience some form of damage resulting in loss.  
Whether from building, transportation and/or utility damage, no county in the 230-county 
study region is exempt from damage resulting from shaking in the new Madrid Seismic 
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Tennessee 
Benton 
Carroll 
Cheatham 
Chester 
Crockett 
Davidson 
Decatur 
Dickson 
Dyer 
Fayette 
Gibson 
Giles 
Hardeman 
Hardin 
Haywood 
Henderson 
Henry 
Hickman 
Houston 
Humphreys 
Lake 
Lauderdale 
Lawrence 
Lewis 
Madison 
Maury 
McNairy 
Montgomery 
Obion 
Perry 
Robertson 
Shelby 
Stewart 
Tipton 
Wayne 
Weakley 
Williamson 
 
 
